Lesbian Love and the Troublesome Sperm Donor

Author(s):  
Petra Nordqvist
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

If a person requires a tissue donation in order to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in the biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. Such views tend to ignore the role played by a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need and the perceived burden of the donation type in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we argue that such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two main studies and three supplementary studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness, unique ability to help, and donation burden play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that the primary factor driving individuals’ judgments about the moral responsibility of a potential donor to donate tissue to someone in need was the degree to which a donor was in a unique ability to help. We observed no significant role for biological relatedness as such. Biologically related individuals were deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have a relatively unique capacity to help. We also found that people are less inclined to think individuals have a moral responsibility to donate tissue when the donation is more costly to make. We bring these results into dialogue with contemporary disputes concerning the ethics of tissue donation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

If a person requires an organ or tissue donation to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. We contend that such views ignore the role that a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need plays in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we think this will not be due to the fact that the donor stands in a close biological relationship to the recipient. Rather, we think such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues and organs with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness and unique ability play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that biologically related individuals are deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have the capacity to help.


Author(s):  
Rosanna Hertz ◽  
Margaret K. Nelson

This chapter introduces the members of the 7008er network at the occasion of a significant gathering, when seven families with children born from the same sperm donor come together at a hotel in the Midwest. From the beginning, the children in this network seek to construct themselves as a family. Love, trust, and harmony serve as guideposts in the unscripted land of donor-linked families. They also use structures they know from traditional families, such as a sibling pecking order. As the group expands to incorporate new members, the original narrative of family membership fails to describe the reality of competing allegiances among teenagers. Instead of remaining a coherent group, the members of this network break into a number of separate factions. Born between 1995 and 2001, the kids interviewed are between fifteen and nineteen years old.


Author(s):  
Rosanna Hertz ◽  
Margaret K. Nelson

The same-sex couples highlighted in this narrative are members of the “families of choice” cohorts that arose during the 1980s. Although they were establishing a new family form, the mothers in a two-mother family told their child that he had a sperm donor “father” whom he could meet when he turned eighteen. When the meeting occurred, the two formed a limited father-child bond. The donor provides emotional support, but he does not offer any material support. When other offspring from the same donor contact him, the donor introduced the donor siblings to each other. The members of this network reconsider ideas about the relative influence of nature and nurture. Yet ideas about chosen families remain central to the manner in which the members relate to one another. Born between 1986 and 1990, the kids in this network were between twenty-four and twenty-eight years old at the time of the interviews.


Author(s):  
Rosanna Hertz ◽  
Margaret K. Nelson

This chapter introduces the concept of networks of strangers linked by reliance on the same sperm donor. It draws on participants’ use of the language of genes and the language of choice to explain how these networks develop. Because the relationships within these networks are unprecedented, the members have to decide for themselves naming conventions and social norms. The introduction suggests the importance of these relationships at a time when family size is shrinking. It includes a discussion of research methods, describing how the authors located respondents and the characteristics of respondents (212 parents and 154 donor-conceived children). It also explains how the authors chose to feature particular networks that reflected different eras, different age groups of children, and different internal dynamics.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. S10-S11
Author(s):  
Silvia Modamio-Høybjør ◽  
Silvia Fernández ◽  
Raquel Garcia ◽  
Moisés De La Casa ◽  
Ferran Garcia ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Chuan Huang ◽  
Qian Liu ◽  
Zhong-Wei Wang ◽  
Wen-Jun Zhou ◽  
Zeng-Hui Huang ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
I. Glenn Cohen

Gamete donor anonymity has become an increasingly active area of legislative, bioethical, and empirical interest over the last decade or so. This chapter begins by detailing the very different status of gamete donor anonymity, contrasting the United States (where the law does not prohibit it) with the rest of the world (where it has been largely prohibited by law) and examining the effects of these policies. The chapter then examines the major arguments that have been offered in favor of and against mandating nonanonymous gamete donation. In particular, it focuses on the effects of removing anonymity on supply and arguments in favor of ending sperm donor anonymity based on the welfare of donor-conceived children or rights claims by them. The chapter also more briefly considers ethical and legal issues related to donor compensation, accidental incest, information reciprocity between donors and recipients, and reproductive tourism.


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