scholarly journals Before L1

Gesture ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulf Liszkowski
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Referential Communication ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Symbolic Communication ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Acts ◽  
Communicative Act ◽  
Socially Situated ◽  
Representational Gestures

This paper investigates the social-cognitive and motivational complexities underlying prelinguistic infants’ gestural communication. With regard to deictic referential gestures, new and recent experimental evidence shows that infant pointing is a complex communicative act based on social-cognitive skills and cooperative motives. With regard to infant representational gestures, findings suggest the need to re-interpret these gestures as initially non-symbolic gestural social acts. Based on the available empirical evidence, the paper argues that deictic referential communication emerges as a foundation of human communication first in gestures, already before language. Representational symbolic communication, instead, emerges as a transformation of deictic communication first in the vocal modality and, perhaps, in gestures through non-symbolic, socially situated routines.

scholarly journals Social Cognition through the Lens of Cognitive and Clinical Neuroscience

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Arioli ◽  
Chiara Crespi ◽  
Nicola Canessa
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Deficits ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Acquired Brain Injury ◽  
Clinical Neuroscience ◽  
Pathological Conditions ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Cognitive Deficits

Social cognition refers to a set of processes, ranging from perception to decision-making, underlying the ability to decode others’ intentions and behaviors to plan actions fitting with social and moral, besides individual and economic considerations. Its centrality in everyday life reflects the neural complexity of social processing and the ubiquity of social cognitive deficits in different pathological conditions. Social cognitive processes can be clustered in three domains associated with (a) perceptual processing of social information such as faces and emotional expressions (social perception), (b) grasping others’ cognitive or affective states (social understanding), and (c) planning behaviors taking into consideration others’, in addition to one’s own, goals (social decision-making). We review these domains from the lens of cognitive neuroscience, i.e., in terms of the brain areas mediating the role of such processes in the ability to make sense of others’ behavior and plan socially appropriate actions. The increasing evidence on the “social brain” obtained from healthy young individuals nowadays constitutes the baseline for detecting changes in social cognitive skills associated with physiological aging or pathological conditions. In the latter case, impairments in one or more of the abovementioned domains represent a prominent concern, or even a core facet, of neurological (e.g., acquired brain injury or neurodegenerative diseases), psychiatric (e.g., schizophrenia), and developmental (e.g., autism) disorders. To pave the way for the other papers of this issue, addressing the social cognitive deficits associated with severe acquired brain injury, we will briefly discuss the available evidence on the status of social cognition in normal aging and its breakdown in neurodegenerative disorders. Although the assessment and treatment of such impairments is a relatively novel sector in neurorehabilitation, the evidence summarized here strongly suggests that the development of remediation procedures for social cognitive skills will represent a future field of translational research in clinical neuroscience.

scholarly journals Common Ground Information Affects Reference Resolution: Evidence From Behavioral Data, ERPs, and Eye-Tracking

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Richter ◽  
Mariella Paul ◽  
Barbara Höhle ◽  
Isabell Wartenburger
Keyword(s):  
Eye Tracking ◽  
Language Processing ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Event Related Potentials ◽  
Referential Communication ◽  
Reference Resolution ◽  
Early Integration ◽  
Related Potentials ◽  
Socially Situated

One of the most important social cognitive skills in humans is the ability to “put oneself in someone else’s shoes,” that is, to take another person’s perspective. In socially situated communication, perspective taking enables the listener to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of what is said (sentence meaning) and what is meant (speaker’s meaning) by the speaker. To successfully decode the speaker’s meaning, the listener has to take into account which information he/she and the speaker share in their common ground (CG). We here further investigated competing accounts about when and how CG information affects language comprehension by means of reaction time (RT) measures, accuracy data, event-related potentials (ERPs), and eye-tracking. Early integration accounts would predict that CG information is considered immediately and would hence not expect to find costs of CG integration. Late integration accounts would predict a rather late and effortful integration of CG information during the parsing process that might be reflected in integration or updating costs. Other accounts predict the simultaneous integration of privileged ground (PG) and CG perspectives. We used a computerized version of the referential communication game with object triplets of different sizes presented visually in CG or PG. In critical trials (i.e., conflict trials), CG information had to be integrated while privileged information had to be suppressed. Listeners mastered the integration of CG (response accuracy 99.8%). Yet, slower RTs, and enhanced late positivities in the ERPs showed that CG integration had its costs. Moreover, eye-tracking data indicated an early anticipation of referents in CG but an inability to suppress looks to the privileged competitor, resulting in later and longer looks to targets in those trials, in which CG information had to be considered. Our data therefore support accounts that foresee an early anticipation of referents to be in CG but a rather late and effortful integration if conflicting information has to be processed. We show that both perspectives, PG and CG, contribute to socially situated language processing and discuss the data with reference to theoretical accounts and recent findings on the use of CG information for reference resolution.

scholarly journals Orbital prefrontal cortex volume predicts social network size: an imaging study of individual differences in humans

2012 ◽  
Vol 279 (1736) ◽  
pp. 2157-2162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Powell ◽  
Penelope A. Lewis ◽  
Neil Roberts ◽  
Marta García-Fiñana ◽  
R. I. M. Dunbar
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Imaging Study ◽  
Network Size ◽  
Magnetic Resonance Images ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Social Network Size ◽  
The Social

The social brain hypothesis, an explanation for the unusually large brains of primates, posits that the size of social group typical of a species is directly related to the volume of its neocortex. To test whether this hypothesis also applies at the within-species level, we applied the Cavalieri method of stereology in conjunction with point counting on magnetic resonance images to determine the volume of prefrontal cortex (PFC) subfields, including dorsal and orbital regions. Path analysis in a sample of 40 healthy adult humans revealed a significant linear relationship between orbital (but not dorsal) PFC volume and the size of subjects' social networks that was mediated by individual intentionality (mentalizing) competences. The results support the social brain hypothesis by indicating a relationship between PFC volume and social network size that applies within species, and, more importantly, indicates that the relationship is mediated by social cognitive skills.

The social-pragmatic theory of word learning

Pragmatics ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Word Learning ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Learning Processes ◽  
Cultural Learning ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
New Words ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
Special Case

Some researchers have tried to explain early word learning via garden-variety learning processes and others by invoking linguistically specific “constraints” that help children to narrow down the referential possibilities. The social-pragmatic approach to word learning argues that children do not need specifically linguistic constraints to learn words, but rather what they need are flexible and powerful social-cognitive skills that allow them to understand the communicative intentions of others in a wide variety of interactive situations. A series of seven word learning studies demonstrate something of the range of communicative situations in which children can learn new words. These situations include many non-ostensive contexts in which no one is intentionally teaching the child a new word and the intended referent is not perceptually present at the time of the new word’s introduction. Language acquisition in general, and word learning in particular, is best seen as a special case of cultural learning in which children attempt to discern adults’ intentions toward their intentions toward things in the world.

Does the bonobo have a (chimpanzee-like) theory of mind?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Krupenye ◽  
Evan L. MacLean ◽  
Brian Hare
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Ecological Validity ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theorie De L'esprit ◽  
Cognition Sociale

Theory of mind—the ability to reason about the thoughts and emotions of others—is central to what makes us human. Chimpanzees too appear to understand some psychological states. While less is known about bonobos, several lines of evidence suggest that the social-cognitive abilities of the two sister taxa may differ in key respects. This chapter outlines a framework to guide future research on bonobo social cognition based on the predictions of two potentially complementary hypotheses. The self-domestication hypothesis suggests that selection against aggression and for prosociality in bonobos may have impacted the ontogeny of their social-cognitive skills relative to chimpanzees. The empathizing–systemizing hypothesis links degree of prenatal brain masculinization, a potential result of self-domestication, to adult cognition. Specifically, relative feminization may yield more flexible theory of mind skills in bonobos than chimpanzees. Finally, directions for future study, including development of new paradigms that maximize ecological validity for bonobos, are discussed. La théorie de l’esprit—le pouvoir de raisonner les pensées et émotions des autres—est centrale à notre nature humaine. Il parait que les chimpanzés peuvent comprendre quelques états psychologiques. Tandis que nous savons moins des bonobos, plusieurs témoignages suggèrent que les capacités socio-cognitives des deux taxons soeur peuvent différer dans des aspects clefs. Nous traçons un cadre pour guider les prochaines recherches sur la cognition sociale des bonobos, basé sur les prédictions de deux hypothèses potentiellement complémentaires. L’hypothèse d’auto-domestication suggère que l’anti-agression et la prosocialité des bonobos a influé leur ontogenèse et leur capacités socio-cognitives relativement aux chimpanzés. L’hypothèse d’empathie systématique (Empathizing–Systemizing) forme un lien entre le degré de masculinisation prénatale du cerveau, le résultat potentiel d’auto-domestication, et la cognition adulte. Spécifiquement, la féminisation relative génère des théories de l’esprit plus flexibles chez les bonobos que chez les chimpanzés. Enfin, nous discutons le directions pour les prochaines études, inclut le développement de nouveaux paradigmes qui maximisent la validité écologique des bonobos.

scholarly journals Two sources of meaning in infant communication: preceding action contexts and act-accompanying characteristics

2014 ◽  
Vol 369 (1651) ◽  
pp. 20130294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulf Liszkowski
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Social Experience ◽  
First Year ◽  
Social Cognitive Development ◽  
Communicative Act ◽  
First Year Of Life ◽  
Multisensory Information

How do infants communicate before they have acquired a language? This paper supports the hypothesis that infants possess social–cognitive skills that run deeper than language alone, enabling them to understand others and make themselves understood. I suggested that infants, like adults, use two sources of extralinguistic information to communicate meaningfully and react to and express communicative intentions appropriately. In support, a review of relevant experiments demonstrates, first, that infants use information from preceding shared activities to tailor their comprehension and production of communication. Second, a series of novel findings from our laboratory shows that in the absence of distinguishing information from preceding routines or activities, infants use accompanying characteristics (such as prosody and posture) that mark communicative intentions to extract and transmit meaning. Findings reveal that before infants begin to speak they communicate in meaningful ways by binding preceding and simultaneous multisensory information to a communicative act. These skills are not only a precursor to language, but also an outcome of social–cognitive development and social experience in the first year of life.

Gestural communication of apes

Gesture ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 41-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Pika ◽  
Katja Liebal ◽  
Josep Call ◽  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Individual Variability ◽  
Gestural Communication ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
Symbolic Communication ◽  
Evolutionary Scenario ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Insight Into

Gestural communication of nonhuman primates may allow insight into the evolutionary scenario of human communication given the flexible use and learning of gestures as opposed to vocalizations. This paper provides an overview of the work on the gestural communication of apes with the focus on their repertoire, learning mechanisms, and the flexibility of gesture use during interactions with conspecifics. Although there is a variation between the species in the types and numbers of gestures performed, the influence of ecology, social structure and cognitive skills on their gestural repertoires is relatively restricted. As opposed to humans, apes do not use their gestures referentially nor do their gestures show the symbolic or conventionalized features of human gestural communication. However, since the gestural repertoires of apes are characterized by a high degree of individual variability and flexibility of use as opposed to their vocalizations it seems plausible that the gestures were the modality within which symbolic communication first evolved.

The use of the Social Cognitive Skills Test with children with autistic spectrum disorders

2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Coleman ◽  
Dougal Julian Hare ◽  
Peter Farrell ◽  
Teun Van Manen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Autistic Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Autistic Spectrum ◽  
The Social ◽  
Spectrum Disorders

scholarly journals Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis

2007 ◽  
Vol 362 (1480) ◽  
pp. 639-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrike Moll ◽  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Intelligence ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Primate Cognition ◽  
Social Competition ◽  
Social Intelligence Hypothesis ◽  
The Social

Nicholas Humphrey's social intelligence hypothesis proposed that the major engine of primate cognitive evolution was social competition. Lev Vygotsky also emphasized the social dimension of intelligence, but he focused on human primates and cultural things such as collaboration, communication and teaching. A reasonable proposal is that primate cognition in general was driven mainly by social competition, but beyond that the unique aspects of human cognition were driven by, or even constituted by, social cooperation. In the present paper, we provide evidence for this Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis by comparing the social-cognitive skills of great apes with those of young human children in several domains of activity involving cooperation and communication with others. We argue, finally, that regular participation in cooperative, cultural interactions during ontogeny leads children to construct uniquely powerful forms of perspectival cognitive representation.

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