Reason, Egoism, and the Prisoners' Dilemma

1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-177
Author(s):  
Larry Eshelman

In this essay I shall try to show that the egoist's inability to avoid the Prisoners’ Dilemma is not a reason for rejecting egoism. In the first section I shall outline the Prisoners’ Dilemma and indicate why the egoist cannot avoid the dilemma. In the next section I shall consider an argument against egoism based upon an appeal to our intuitions as to what is rational. And in the final section I shall consider the argument that egoism is not self-supporting and so is not an adequate conception of rationality.But first a few words should be said about what is meant by egoism here. The egoist is commonly thought of as someone who acts from selfinterest. This is in keeping with the present use of the term as long as ‘self-interest’ is not understood in a too narrow a fashion. Perhaps a Jess misleading way of characterizing the egoist, though, is as someone who tries to maximize his happiness - i.e., he is an individual utility maximizer.

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (106) ◽  
pp. 70-95
Author(s):  
Maria Jørgsen

Disquieting Ethics in »Michael Kohlhaas« by Heinrich von Kleist:This article argues that the concept of evil takes a central place in the exploration of the Kantian ethics in Heinrich von Kleist’s novella »Michael Kohlhaas«.Maria Jørgensen argues that not only is the famous duty to which Kohlhaas finds himself obliged conceived in accordance with Kant’s ethics of duty, but also the description of Kohlhaas’ subjectivity in general is constructed by means of Kantian terms. Kleist’s text makes use of concepts such as duty, freedom, pathology, universality and the sublime in order to construct Kohlhaas as an inherently decentered subject. Furthermore Jørgensen argues that the emptying of the concept of the Good in Kantian ethics surfaces in Kleist’s novella as a hitherto unnoticed tendency to a certain tautologisation in Kohlhaas’ qualitative judgments.In the final section of the article the evil act in »Michael Kohlhaas« as an act of freedom, »Aktus der Freiheit«, is investigated with a departure in the Kantian concept of diabolical evil in Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. If Kohlhaas’ first attempt to act ethically is contaminated by the self-interest which sticks to his initial duty to secure redress for the wrongs done to him and his fellow citizens by the Junker von Tronka, his last act of refusing to negotiate with the Elector of Saxony functions as a purely ethical act in Kantian terms. Kohlhaas’ act can be seen as an ethical act as it neglects the subject’s pathology, which according to Kant can only be done by an act of reason. Furthermore the act is in keeping with the criteria which Kant, according to Alenka Zupančič, delivers in the famous footnote on the execution of Louis XVI in Metaphysik der Sitten: The act is characterized by being purely formal, it arises from a maxim, and it is first of all an act of freedom. This article thus argues that »Michael Kohlhaas« evidently contains a fulfilled ethical act in Kantian terms, but that this act must be found in quite another place than previously assumed.


1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Carl Overvold

Owing to a genral dissatisfaction with hedonistic theories of value, a number of recent discussions have sought to identify an agent's selfinterest, individual utility, or personal welfare with what the agent most wants to do, all things considered. Two features of these accounts merit special attention for the argument in this paper. First, on such accounts any desire or aversion which persists in the face of complete information is logically relevant to the determination of an agent's self interest. This includes apparently altruistic desires like a desire for another's happiness as well as more narrow and self-regarding desires like a desire to eat a good meal. Second, when the agent finds himself in a situation where he must choose between incompatible desires, his informed preference determines the act which is most in his self-interest.


Author(s):  
Michael P. Young

This paper discusses the intersection of humor and politics from a media perspective, particularly through the lens of television aesthetics. As a growing branch of television studies, television aesthetics tends to refer to stylistic analysis but also, more rarely, to an interest in philosophical aesthetics as applied to television (Butler, 2010; Cardwell, 2013). I will focus on the genre of political satire and identify the critically acclaimed television series Veep (HBO, 2012 – present) as a program which exemplifies the expression and underlying values of a contemporary strain of aesthetic sensibility – schadenfreude – that runs through its axes of coarse disempowering humor and the portrayal of politics. Specifically, the paper explores how Veep’s affective reception results from humorously overlapping two of the more problematic aspects that persist in the political landscape, namely, self-interest and ineptitude.This paper begins by reflecting on the universal prevalence of schadenfreude. The first section briefly traces key historical instantiations of political satire, understood as a genre that humorously derides the shortcomings and dissonances of a prevailing political milieu. The second section conceptualizes schadenfreude in satirical terms and underlies its philosophical foundations. The third section elaborates on the novelty of Veep by highlighting its gendered position as the first comedic fictional television program of a female president and outlines how its satirical modality depends on its coarse writing style and depiction of antiheroinism to make the problematic political milieu pleasurable to viewers whose normative experience of politics is frequently negative. The final section considers the ‘real world’ implications of Veep as a social commentary on unsavory political personas and perspectives. Article received: May 10, 2019; Article accepted: July 6, 2019; Published online: October 15, 2019; Original scholarly articleHow to cite this articel: Young, Michael P. "Such Schadenfreude – Unpacking The Medley of Caustic Humor and Politics in Veep." AM Journal of Art and Media Studies 20 (2019): 61-69. doi: 10.25038/am.v0i20.327


2000 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 567-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sally

A theory of sympathy is advanced, based on the insights of theorists such as Hume, Smith, Cooley, Mead, and Heider, and drawing on modern findings in sociology and social psychology. The process of identifying with another person is determined by the perception of distance from the other, may involve non-conscious imitation, and leads to an enlarged self-interest. The core of the theory is a model balancing physical distance, psychological similarity and familiarity, affection, and evaluation. Great emphasis is placed on the incarnation of social actors, the importance of their bodies and sentiments, and the effects of the interaction order. This theoretical structure is applied to the Prisoners' Dilemma in order to derive a large set of predictions that are tested successfully against the wealth of experimental results.


1992 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliott Sober

When does self-interest counsel cooperation? This question pertains both to the labile behaviors produced by rational deliberation and to the more instinctive and fixed behaviors produced by natural selection. In both cases, a standard starting point for the investigation is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma. In this game, each player has the option of producing one or the other of two behaviors (labeled “cooperate” and “defect”). The pay-offs to the row player are as follows:


1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 498-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Jones

In its purest form a collective good is said to possess the characteristics of non-rivalness in consumption and non-price exclusion. Non-rivalness implies that consumption to the full by one person in no way impedes the consumption of that same quantity by others. This does not mean that the same subjective benefit is derived by each individual, but simply that consumption by one individual does not interfere with the benefits derived by another. The characteristic of non-exclusion requires that if the good is provided to one then it is provided to all. It is this attribute in particular which casts doubt on the likelihood that, in a large group, individuals will voluntarily reveal their preferences for the good. Goods which are not perfectly rival but which are price exclusive may be provided in the market by clubs. However, when an individual's consumption of a good is not dependent on his making a contribution to its provision the individual utility maximizer may be inclined to ‘free ride’, in the hope of enjoying the good at no personal expense. It is clear that if all individuals act in the same manner this good is not likely to be provided in the private market.


Author(s):  
Alexander Blaszczynski

Abstract. Background: Tensions exist with various stakeholders facing competing interests in providing legal land-based and online regulated gambling products. Threats to revenue/taxation occur in response to harm minimisation and responsible gambling policies. Setting aside the concept of total prohibition, the objectives of responsible gambling are to encourage and/or restrict an individual’s gambling expenditure in terms of money and time to personally affordable limits. Stakeholder responsibilities: Governments craft the gambling environment through legislation, monitor compliance with regulatory requirements, and receive taxation revenue as a proportion of expenditure. Industry operators on the other hand, compete across market sectors through marketing and advertising, and through the development of commercially innovative products, reaping substantial financial rewards. Concurrently, governments are driven to respond to community pressures to minimize the range of negative gambling-related social, personal and economic harms and costs. Industry operators are exposed to the same pressures but additionally overlaid with the self-interest of avoiding the imposition of more stringent restrictive policies. Cooperation of stakeholders: The resulting tension between taxation revenue and profit making, harm minimization, and social impacts creates a climate of conflict between all involved parties. Data-driven policies become compromised by unsubstantiated claims of, and counter claims against, the nature and extent of gambling-related harms, effectiveness of policy strategies, with allegations of bias and influence associated with researchers supported by industry and government research funding sources. Conclusion: To effectively advance policies, it is argued that it is imperative that all parties collaborate in a cooperative manner to achieve the objectives of responsible gambling and harm minimization. This extends to and includes more transparent funding for researchers from both government and industry. Continued reliance on data collected from analogue populations or volunteers participating in simulated gambling tasks will not provide data capable of valid and reliable extrapolation to real gamblers in real venues risking their own funds. Failure to adhere to principles of corporate responsibility and consumer protection by both governments and industry will challenge the social licence to offer gambling products. Appropriate and transparent safeguards learnt from the tobacco and alcohol field, it is argued, can guide the conduct of gambling research.


1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (7) ◽  
pp. 481-482
Author(s):  
Graham L. Staines
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document