intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 560-561 ◽  
Author(s):  
peter singer
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Common Objection

a common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our common moral intuitions. understanding the role that heuristics play in moral judgments undermines this objection. it also indicates why we should not use john rawls' model of reflective equilibrium as the basis for testing normative moral theories.

Moral epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The Way

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.

Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points

1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract is rigged specifically to yield principles which match our pre-contract moral judgments. Rawls provides ammunition for this claim: “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [about what is just] and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”

scholarly journals Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Killoren
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Important Exception

There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions in that debate is whether, and to what extent, the prevalence and persistence of disagreement between our moral intuitions causes problems for those who seek to rely on intuitions in order to make moral decisions, issue moral judgments, and craft moral theories. Meanwhile, in general epistemology, there is a relatively young, and very lively, debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. A central question in that debate concerns peer disagreement: When I am confronted with an epistemic peer with whom I disagree, how should my confidence in my beliefs change (if at all)? The disagreement debate in moral epistemology has not been brought into much contact with the disagreement debate in general epistemology (though McGrath [2007] is an important exception). A purpose of this paper is to increase the area of contact between these two debates. In Section 1, I try to clarify the question I want to ask in this paper – this is the question whether we have any reasons to believe what I shall call “anti-intuitivism.” In Section 2, I argue that anti-intuitivism cannot be supported solely by investigating the mechanisms that produce our intuitions. In Section 3, I discuss an anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement which relies on the so-called “Equal Weight View.” In Section 4, I pause to clarify the notion of epistemic parity and to explain how it ought to be understood in the epistemology of moral intuition. In Section 5, I return to the anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement and explain how an apparently-vulnerable premise of that argument may be quite resilient. In Section 6, I introduce a novel objection against the Equal Weight View in order to show how I think we can successfully resist the anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement.

The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Depaul
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Theory Construction ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Past ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

The resurgence of interest in systematic moral theory over the past ten to fifteen years has brought to the fore debates concerning issues in moral epistemology, in particular, questions regarding the correct method for moral inquiry. Much of the controversy has focused on John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium. One merit claimed for this coherence method is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. Several of Rawls’ prominent critics have charged that Rawls’ loosely assembled rabble of starting points are not epistemically hefty enough to hoist a moral theory upon their shoulders. Perhaps unwittingly, these critics cling to the two level conception of theory construction, for they both defend general principles as the only appropriate starting points for theory construction and insist upon viewing Rawls as one working within the two tiered conception who opts for more particular judgments as starting points.

scholarly journals A OBJETIVIDADE DOS JUÍZOS MORAIS NA TEORIA ÉTICA DE JOHN RAWLS

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 54-63
Author(s):  
Lucas Viana Silva
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Support Point ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Objectivity

Trata do caráter objetivo dos juízos morais a partir da proposta ética de John Rawls. Inicialmente, apresenta a discussão acerca da objetividade dos juízos morais como uma questão relevante do discurso metaético contemporâneo. Em seguida, apresenta o equilíbrio reflexivo, ponto de sustentação dos juízos morais na teoria ética de John Rawls, como procedimento adequado no estabelecimento das bases para uma sociedade bem ordenada. Por fim, explicita como o equilíbrio reflexivo pode garantir objetividade aos juízos e à normatividade morais, sem recorrer ao realismo moral como fundamentação dos mesmos.Abstract: It comes to the objective character of moral judgments from the ethics proposed by John Rawls. Initially presents a discussion about the objectivity of moral judgments as an issue of contemporary metaethical discourse. It then presents the reflective equilibrium, support point of moral judgments in ethical theory of John Rawls, as proper procedure in establishing the foundations for a well-ordered society. Finally, it states as reflective equilibrium can ensure objectivity to the moral judgments and normativity without resorting to moral realism as justification for the same. Keywords: Metaethics. Moral objectivity. Moral realism. Moral judgments. Reflective equilibrium. Constructivism 

scholarly journals Å balansere mellom barnevernets prinsipper

2020 ◽  
pp. 49-65
Author(s):  
Grethe Netland
Keyword(s):  
Child Protection ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Best Interest ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
The Core ◽  
Child Protection Service ◽  
Biological Principle ◽  
The Cost

The focus of this chapter is the potential conflicts between the values that are basic in the work of Norwegian child protection service. Such values are expressed in principles that serve as guidelines for judgement and decisions in the field. ‘The best interest of the child’ principle is held to be grounding. The ‘mildest intervention’ principle and the ‘biological’ principle are normally held to be at the core of how the best interest of the child is to be understood. Important in child protection work, is to interpret the principles, weigh them, and consider what implications they should have in specific cases. I argue that if, for some reason, one principle is ascribed too much weigh on the cost of others, the solution for the child might not be in its best interest. I highlight the importance of not only weighing the principles against each other, but also creating a coherent balance between the principles, people’s moral intuitions and the actual practices of the service. To this end, I suggest that John Rawls’s model called reflective equilibrium might be workable.

Advances in Research on the Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars (MIME)

2021 ◽  
pp. 230-249
Author(s):  
Allison Eden ◽  
Ron Tamborini ◽  
Melinda Aley ◽  
Henry Goble
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Selective Exposure ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Social Perceptions ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Process Perspective

This chapter describes the model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME), which examines connections between moral judgment and exposure to narrative media. The MIME explicates distinct, a priori–defined domains of moral intuitions that cut across cultural boundaries and identifies underlying processes that shape related social perceptions to describe how media and moral judgment are intertwined. The model’s dual-process perspective suggests some moral judgments are determined by quick gut reflexes and others by reflective deliberation. The MIME’s multistage process contains short-term and long-term components. The short-term component describes how exemplars that prime moral intuitions affect the appraisal of media content, which then prompts selective exposure to media that upholds primed intuitions. The long-term component describes how aggregate patterns of exposure to media that upholds primed intuitions encourages further (mass) production of content featuring those intuitions. This reciprocal process describes how media systems and audiences influence the salience of one another’s moral intuitions.

Reflective Equilibrium

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuri Cath
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Standard Assumption ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
The Relationship

This article examines the method of reflective equilibrium (RE), most closely associated with John Rawls, and its role in philosophical inquiry. It begins with an overview of RE before discussing some of the subtleties involved in its interpretation, including challenges to the standard assumption that RE is committed to a coherentist rather than foundationalist view of justification. It then evaluates some of the main objections to RE, including objections that this method is too conservative, objections that appeal to the possibility of disagreements between people that employ this method, and objections that this method generates unreasonable beliefs. It concludes by considering how RE relates to recent debates about the role of intuitions in philosophy, suggesting the relationship is more complex and interesting than it is usually assumed to be.

Justice and the Difference Principle

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The People ◽  
Moral Learning ◽  
The Difference

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a theory of social justice is satisfactory only if it has both of two characteristics (pp. 182, 6). First, it must be capable of serving as the “public moral basis of society” (p. 182). That is, it must be reasonable to suppose that it would be strictly complied with while serving as the public conception of justice in a society which is in favourable circumstances—a society in which the people would strictly comply with any public conception of justice if the strains of commitment to it were not too great, given the general facts of psychology and moral learning (p. 145, cf. pp. 8, 175-83, 245-6). Second, a theory of justice must characterize “ … our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium” (p. 182).

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