An Oxford Nolloth Professor

2019 ◽  
pp. 114-129
Author(s):  
Clement Webb

The work Clement Webb did on the moral argument often had for its context wider theological questions that he wished to explore. He primarily looked to Plato for inspiration about the nature of moral goodness, and he looked to Immanuel Kant on the nature of moral duties. Although he initially thought Kant had reduced religion to morality, he eventually softened on that conviction. As empirical experience justifies belief in an external world, he took our moral experience as solid justification for belief in moral realities. Inspired by James Martineau, Webb argued that the phenomenology of moral duties (which Kant explained so well) warranted belief in departing from an overambitious kind of Kantian autonomy that precludes belief in a “Higher than ourselves” (Martineau’s term) that gives us the moral law. Finally, Webb also saw some of the profound political implications of the erosion of moral foundations.

2019 ◽  
pp. 198-209
Author(s):  
David Baggett ◽  
Jerry L. Walls

A. C. Ewing worked on moral goodness; Austin Farrer focused on the value and dignity of persons; George Mavrodes underscored the odd nature of binding moral duties in a naturalistic world. Robert Adams did work in theistic ethics that produced innovative variants of the moral argument; his wife, Marilyn Adams, demonstrated how God’s incommensurable goodness can address versions of the problem of evil. Linda Zagzebski identified three ways we need moral confidence. C. Stephen Evans defended divine command theory and a natural signs approach to apologetics. John Hare did landmark work on moral arguments. William Lane Craig used the moral argument to powerful effect in books and debates. C. Stephen Layman used the overriding reason thesis and conditional thesis in his variant of the argument. Scott Smith, Mark Linville, Angus Menuge, and Angus Ritchie have offered brilliant epistemic moral arguments. Paul Copan has used history to augment the moral argument.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 44-65
Author(s):  
Fredrik Nilsen

In his major works in ethics, Immanuel Kant (1724—1804) does not pay much attention to the question how humans become moral. The main tasks for Kant in these works are to establish the moral law and discuss its application. However, in his minor works in ethics and pedagogy he draws our attention to the question mentioned and claims that humans first become moral when they get 16 years old. Before we reach this age, our will (Willkür) is able to choose, that means prioritize, between rationality (the moral law) and sensitivity (inclinations), but our will (Wille) lacks the capacity to impose the moral law on ourselves. To evolve in this regard so that our will becomes fully moral and autonomous, we need moral restrictions from other people with more moral experience. The relevant Kantian distinction in this regard is the distinction Kant draws between persons and moral actors in the wake of his formula of the categorical imperative called the formula of humanity. According to this distinction, a person needs to be educated heteronomously in order to reach the level of moral actor and become autonomous. Constraint is therefore a necessary condition for self-constraint.


2019 ◽  
pp. 210-218
Author(s):  
David Baggett ◽  
Jerry L. Walls

This book considered commendable traits of historical moral apologists: how they lived with the argument, did important work in the midst of tragic circumstances, irenically engaged interlocutors, honestly contended with the problem of evil, exhibited epistemic humility, diligently cultivated intellectual rigor, and patiently and painstakingly investigated evidence. It also chronicled the expansive epistemology, wide empiricism, and broad theories of rationality so often on display in the history of moral apologetics, which carved out important room for morality to shape one’s view of metaphysics. The role of moral faith was underscored—involving confidence that the moral law can be satisfied and that adherence to it conduces to deep joy. It also accentuated the political implications of the moral argument and how it can be deployed to argue for more than generic theism. Finally, it argued that a study of this history can elevate the level of contemporary discourse on the topic.


Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert

This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considered rights par excellence. Centrally, to have a demand-right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person, who has a correlative obligation to the right-holder. How are demand-rights possible? Linking its response to central themes and positions within rights theory, Rights and Demands argues for two main theses. First, joint commitment, in a sense that is explained, is a ground of demand-rights. Second, it may well be their only ground. The first thesis is developed with special reference to agreements and promises, generally understood to ground demand-rights. It argues that both of these phenomena are constituted by joint commitments, and that this is true of many other central social phenomena also. In relation to the second thesis it considers the possibility of demand-rights whose existence can be demonstrated by moral argument without appeal to any joint commitment, and the possibility of accruing demand-rights through the existence of a given legal system or other institution construed without any such appeal. The relevance of the book’s conclusions to our understanding of human rights is then explained. Classic and contemporary rights theorists whose work is discussed include Wesley Hohfeld, H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Scanlon, Judith Thomson, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Darwall.


Retos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cornelio Águila

 En este ensayo se presenta una propuesta pedagógica en educación física dirigida a favorecer un aprendizaje significativo transferible a la vida cotidiana y una mayor consciencia social, a partir de la integración de mindfulness (consciencia plena) como base onto-epistemológica. Para ello, en la primera parte, se analiza el concepto de mindfulness desde su naturaleza esencial según la perspectiva budista, que integra sus fundamentos morales y sus implicaciones políticas. Asimismo, se critica el uso de mindfulness en el ámbito educativo como una mera técnica, para, a partir de ahí, defender las posibilidades de su inclusión como esencia onto-epistemológica de la acción pedagógica. En la segunda parte, se desarrollan los principios de esta propuesta de educación física enfocada a la expansión de la consciencia no condicionada del ser humano: una educación física orientada al crecimiento personal y moral, que estimule la participación política y contribuya a la transformación social.  Abstract: In this essay, a pedagogical proposal in physical education is presented aimed at promoting meaningful learning transferable to everyday life and greater social awareness, based on the integration of mindfulness as an onto-epistemological basis. For this, in the first part, the concept of mindfulness is analyzed from its essential nature according to the Buddhist perspective, which integrates its moral foundations and its political implications. Likewise, the use of mindfulness in the educational field is criticized as a mere technique, in order to, from there, defend the possibilities of its inclusion as an onto-epistemological essence of pedagogical action. In the second part, the principles of this proposal of physical education focused on the expansion of the unconditional consciousness of the human being are developed: a physical education oriented to personal and moral growth, which stimulates political participation and contributes to social transformation.


2019 ◽  
pp. 19-33
Author(s):  
Immanuel Kant

Better than anyone, Kant recognized the power and authority of the moral law. On that foundation he constructed two variants of the moral argument. His argument from grace pertains to whether or not the moral life is possible. Morality requires us to achieve a stand too demanding to meet on our own. Divine assistance is needed to close the resulting gap. So rationality dictates that we postulate God’s existence. Kant’s argument from providence pertains to the aforementioned rational need for happiness and virtue to cohere. Full rational commitment to morality requires that morality is a rationally stable enterprise, which entails the ultimate correspondence between virtue and (both individual and corporate) fulfillment. Without God’s existence there’s no particularly good reason to think such correspondence obtains. So rationality dictates the postulation of God’s existence.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Doyle

Deontological international ethics describes, analyzes, and assesses the principles governing the interactions of actors at and across various levels of society; focuses on the relations between states and other international actors; and is concerned with identifying and specifying the moral duties that each kind of international actor bears toward all others. The core theoretical elements of deontological international ethics include accounts of individual and collective agency, moral reason, the moral nature of action, and respect for the moral law as a necessary feature of ethical action. There are three historical phases of deontological international ethics: divine command and natural law ethics prior to Kant, late-modern thinker Immanuel Kant’s international ethics, and contemporary neo-Kantian approaches to nuclear ethics and transnational economic relations. The divine command ethical theories posit divine authority as the absolute and incontrovertible source of moral obligation. Meanwhile, natural law focuses on the intrinsically moral nature of military action and the centrality of moral agency and intention in the rightful use of force. On the other hand, Kant’s systemic deontological ethical theory posits individuals and states as autonomous and rational moral agents, identifies the categorical imperative as the supreme rational principle or morality and the concept of public right as its political corollary, describes a formal method for actors to determine their moral duty in ideal and non-ideal contexts, and applies this theory to the problems of interstate conflict and commerce.


2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka

AbstractThis paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.


2007 ◽  
Vol 33 (S1) ◽  
pp. 151-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD DEVETAK

ABSTRACTImmanuel Kant and Samuel Pufendorf were both exercised by the relationship between politics, morality and lawful authority; a relationship that goes to the heart of the sovereign state’s existence and legitimacy. However, while Kant defended the authority of the moral law, believing morality provides higher authoritative norms than the sovereign state, Pufendorf defends the political morality of authority, believing the sovereign state should submit to no higher moral norms. The rivalry between these two positions is reprised in current debate between cosmopolitanism and statism over humanitarian intervention. Arguing against statism, this article defends a Habermasian-style critical international theory which affords a ‘cosmopolitanism without imperialism’.


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Weber

It is unclear in the Groundwork exactly what Kant takes to be necessary for an act to be morally good or worthy. Traditionally it has been thought that for Kant there are two conditions: it is 1) done in accord with duty, or the moral law, and 2) done for the sake of duty alone. The second condition is commonly thought to entail that an act is not morally good if the agent has a ‘supporting inclination’ or desire to do what is right — be it an inclination of self-interest, or one stemming from some emotion of ‘fellow feeling,’ such as sympathy, compassion, or love. Recent Interpreters, however, claim that Kant is not so strict, because for him the mere presence of a supporting inclination does not necessarily impugn the moral goodness of a dutiful act.


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