Knowledge despite falsehood

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 463-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Montminy
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
False Proposition ◽  
Inferential Knowledge

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S’s false belief that p is not essential to S’s cognition. S’s knowledge is instead due to S’s belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.

Pragmatic Language Performance of Children Adopted Internationally

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 501-514
Author(s):  
Deborah A. Hwa-Froelich ◽  
Hisako Matsuo
Keyword(s):  
Social Communication ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Pragmatic Language ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Language Performance ◽  
Emotion Identification ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Pragmatic Communication ◽  
Eastern European Countries

Purpose Pragmatic language is important for social communication across all settings. Children adopted internationally (CAI) may be at risk of poorer pragmatic language because of adverse early care, delayed adopted language development, and less ability to inhibit. The purpose of this study was to compare pragmatic language performance of CAI from Asian and Eastern European countries with a nonadopted group of children who were of the same age and from similar socioeconomic backgrounds as well as explore the relationship among emotion identification, false belief understanding, and inhibition variables with pragmatic language performance. Method Using a quasi-experimental design, 35 four-year-old CAI (20 Asian, 15 Eastern European) and 33 children who were not adopted were included in this study. The children's pragmatic language, general language, and social communication (emotion identification of facial expressions, false belief understanding, inhibition) were measured. Comparisons by region of origin and adoption experience were completed. We conducted split-half correlation analyses and entered significant correlation variables into simple and backward regression models. Results Pragmatic language performance differed by adoption experience. The adopted and nonadopted groups demonstrated different correlation patterns. Language performance explained most of the pragmatic language variance. Discussion Because CAI perform less well than their nonadopted peers on pragmatic communication measures and different variables are related to their pragmatic performance, speech-language pathologists may need to adapt assessment and intervention practices for this population.

Predictions of Actions and Their Justifications in False-Belief Tasks: The Role of Executive Function

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Executive Function ◽  
Language Development ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Working Memory Capacity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Current Location ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Development Of Language

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.

Misrepresentation, Redundancy, Equivocity, Emptiness (and Swampman)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Biological Systems ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Cognitive Failures ◽  
External Conditions ◽  
Frege Cases

Over the long run, failures of function are the rule rather than the exception for biological systems, being mostly due not to malfunction but to external conditions not historically “Normal” for performance of a function. Most cognitive failures occur because outside conditions are not Normal for the particular cognitive functions attempted. When unitrackers with well-focused targets fail, the result is misperception or false belief. Failures can also occur in the operation of prior mechanisms whose jobs are to prime unitrackers, to send them after clear targets and to keep them on target as they develop. Redundant unitrackers may be maintained side by side, collecting information about the same thing by different means—so called Frege cases. Equivocal unitrackers may develop, aimed incompatibly toward two or more targets at once. False priming can result in empty unitrackers that are not aimed at anything real at all.

Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
The Gettier Problem

Contrary to millennial thought, inferential knowledge does seem to arise in certain cases of reasoning to which false premises are evidentially essential. The phenomenon refutes all of the well-known epistemologies that account for inferential knowledge. I offer an explanation of the phenomenon based on a fairly conservative revision to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, and explain why Peter Klein’s proposed solution fails. The explanation put forward here aims at giving us these two highly desirable results: (a) something we have never had and may not have noticed we needed, a defeasibility theory that is compatible with epistemological fallibilism, and, (b) within this revised, fallibilistic version of the defeasibility theory, an explanation of the benign/malignant distinction for false beliefs that completes the defeasibilist resolution of the Gettier Problem.

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