scholarly journals Phenomenal experience and the aesthetics of agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Antonia Peacocke
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Experience

Phenomenal Experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Making Sense

This paper presents a sketch of a theory of phenomenal consciousness, one that builds on the notion of a “way of appearing,” and draws out various consequences and problems for the view. I unabashedly endorse a version of the Cartesian Theater, while assessing the prospects for making such a view work. As I treat phenomenal consciousness as a relation between a subject and what it is she is conscious of, I face a difficulty in making sense of hallucination, since the object of awareness is missing. I distinguish my position from direct realists who endorse disjunctivism, and end on a somewhat speculative note.

scholarly journals Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-32
Author(s):  
Işık Sarıhan
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Double Vision ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Mind

Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states of a certain kind, which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in confusing two senses of the term “seeming”.

The World-Relatedness of Affectivity: Heidegger and Richir

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (2 supplement) ◽  
pp. 55-77
Author(s):  
Dominic Nnaemeka Ekweariri
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Affective States ◽  
Personal Experiences ◽  
The World

" My investigation reveals that Heidegger’s account of affectivity – though his programmatical determination included an ontical dimension or otherwise lived, personal experiences – is overshadowed by a dense ontology that cannot enable real phenomenal experience. This is why he could not account for other affective states such as emotions, feel-ings and the role of the body in affectivity. Besides, in that account we are lost when we seek to answer the question of whether moods are “one” or “many”. My aim is to point out how these deficiencies in Heidegger’s account of mood could be overcome in Richir’s account of affectivity, where indeterminate background feelings (affections) could give rise to a deter-minate and occurent emotion (affects). The advantage of this move is a rich ontic account of affectivity where not only the body but also sense/meaning of affective episodes play a robust role in an encounter of world events. If Richir reproached Heidegger for existential solipsism, one could now reproach the former for existentiell/phenomenal solipsism. In the end I suggest that these two core but opposite aspects of affectivity (the ontological and the ontic) belong to the same reality: Dasein is not just in the world (ontology), but also the world is in Dasein (ontic/phenomenological). Keywords: mood, affection, affect, Heidegger’s ontology, Richir’s Leib and sense. "

Louise Bourgeois’s Melancholy Objects to be Used

2020 ◽  
pp. 147-164
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Object Relations ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Mental Process ◽  
Inner World ◽  
Louise Bourgeois ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Individual

Over a decade before the French-American sculptor Louise Bourgeois underwent psychoanalysis in New York (1952–1985), her work mined territories of psyche, body, home, and exile. Bourgeois’s papers from 1940 onward reveal that she shared Freud’s description of neurotics, hysterics, and artists as suffering from reminiscences. Scottish psychoanalyst W. R. D. Fairbairn identified the last of these in 1943 as “war neuroses,” just six years before Bourgeois debuted her first mature sculptures. These abstract “personages” served as melancholy surrogates for lost objects, the friends and family Bourgeois left in 1938 in Occupied France. In the 1960s, she further reduced the body to ambivalent amalgams of part-objects made from plaster and latex, suggesting swollen nodes, skin, and sex organs. Of particular interest are two papers published by Fairbairn in 1938 that extend the inner world of the individual to the field of object relations via the transposition of the symbolically “restored object.” Fairbairn conceived the radical notion of restitution, the mental process of repairing damage in the artist’s inner object world. These principles resonate with Bourgeois’s métier and a postwar sculptural aesthetic that probed the phenomenal experience of anxiety, exile, and psychoanalysis on the Self and others.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Richard H. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
21St Century ◽  
The Self ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Avant Garde ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
The Past

The introduction to this study explores the notion of audiovisuality as it pertains to John Cage’s interaction with avant-garde filmmakers. Moving from the corporeal notion of Cage’s “everyday awareness,” audiovisuality is akin to the lived phenomenal experience. Artworks expressing such an awareness point to our understanding of the self and the lived experience. Such a framework allows for the exploration of a number of issues concerning “Cage Studies,” the flood of academic literature from the past two decades that has attempted to situate Cage’s complex aesthetic stances within 20th- and 21st-century theories of history.

scholarly journals Nondual Awareness and Minimal Phenomenal Experience

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoran Josipovic ◽  
Vladimir Miskovic
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Experience

Fragmentation and Singular Propositions

2021 ◽  
pp. 183-198
Author(s):  
Robert Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Singular Propositions ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori

Two puzzles are described: a problem about necessary a posteriori truths and a problem about propositional attitudes with singular propositions as their contents. Two strategies for solving them are compared. The first is the diagonalization strategy, which distinguishes possible worlds that are compatible with what is actually expressed by a given sentential clause from possible worlds that are compatible with what would be expressed by the clause if that possible world were actual. The second strategy is the fragmentation strategy, which represents the intentional states described by sentential clauses as separate nonintegrated representational states. It is argued that these are complementary, not competing, strategies. Both play a role in the solutions to the problems. In conclusion, it is suggested that these strategies can also help to clarify a number of further problems—about self-locating attitudes, about the nature of computation, and about knowledge of phenomenal experience.

Incomplete stimulus representations and the loss of cognitive access in cerebral achromatopsia

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 508-509
Author(s):  
Robert William Kentridge
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Sensory Receptors ◽  
Cognitive Access

AbstractWhen processing of stimuli occurs without attention, phenomenal experience, as well as cognitive access, may be lost. Sensory representations are, however, constructed by neural machinery extending far beyond sensory receptors. In conditions such as cerebral achromatopsia incomplete sensory representations may still elicit phenomenal experience but these representations might be too aberrant to be integrated into the wider cognitive workspace.

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