Introduction: Decision-Making in the European Union before and after the Lisbon Treaty

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 1121-1127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madeleine Hosli ◽  
Amie Kreppel ◽  
Běla Plechanovová ◽  
Amy Verdun
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 152-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narisong Huhe ◽  
Daniel Naurin ◽  
Robert Thomson

We assess the impact of the United Kingdom’s 2016 decision to leave the European Union on the Council of the European Union, where Brexit is likely to have the clearest observable implications. Using concepts and models from the spatial model of politics and network analysis, we formulate and test expectations regarding the effects of Brexit. We examine two of the most prominent datasets on recent decision-making in the European Union, which include data on cooperation networks among member states before and after the 2016 referendum. Our findings identify some of the political challenges that Brexit will bring, but also highlight the factors that are already helping the European Union’s remaining member states to adapt to Brexit.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bernadette Sangmeister

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (54) ◽  
pp. 65-78
Author(s):  
Beata Molo

Regulations for Supply Security and in Emergency Situations Before and After the Lisbon Treaty Entry into Force Exemplified by Supply with Natural GasThe text presents selected aspects of the issue of the provision of energy supplies security in the European Union illustrated by the example gas supply before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The legal frameworks oriented toward provision of gas supplies security as well as proper functioning of internal market gas in case of disruptions in gas supplies in the European Community/European Union has been discussed in the text. Among the legal acts described in the text are: Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004, Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010, Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017. In order to provide energy supplies security in case of disruptions in supplies the secondary legislation enhances capabilities of transport, storage and reacting.


2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 604-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Thomson ◽  
Javier Arregui ◽  
Dirk Leuffen ◽  
Rory Costello ◽  
James Cross ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (87) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sofiia Vovk ◽  

The article analyzes the approaches to the interpretation of the term "democracy deficit", which takes place in the modern European discourse of integration. It is concluded that in the framework of the first approach, the "deficit of democracy" is linked to the problem of the legitimacy of decisions taken by the "pan-European center". As part of the second with a number of distortions that are prone to a democratic form of government in developed democracies. The causes and conditions of the "democracy deficit" are considered. The peculiarities of legal instruments of citizens' influence on the functioning of the European Union and the problem of the "democracy deficit" at the present stage of its development are considered. The reasons and conditions of "deficit of democracy" emerged, ways of solving this problem were analyzed. The particularities of legal instruments of citizens’ influence on the functioning of European Union and the problem of «democratic deficit» at the modern stage of its development. It is emphasized in the article, that the problem of «democratic deficit» remains a key problem of the EU institutional system and EU decision-making. Legal amendments of the EU founding treaties were provided to minimize the problem of «democratic deficit». The most important changes were determined with the Lisbon Treaty, which fixed several effective legal remedies. For instance, the legislative power of the European Parliament as the unique legitimist institution elected directly by citizens was increased. Changes included the change in calculating such a majority to a new double majority based on in the principle of representation of citizens in the Council of Ministers. The Treaty of Lisbon expanded the role of Member States’ parliaments in the legislative processes of the EU by giving them a prior scrutiny of legislative proposals before the Council and the Parliament can take a position and some control powers. One of the major innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and aims at involving citizens more closely in agenda-setting at EU level is the European citizens’ initiative. The specific character of the EU institutional system and lack of some legal mechanisms of citizens’ participation in the process of EU decision-making, similar to those of national level, demonstrates the existence of the problem of «democratic deficit». Nevertheless modern legislation of EU proves that there is no ground to make a conclusion about weakness of political scope of the European citizenship.


Author(s):  
Michael Shackleton

This chapter examines how the power of the democratic idea drives change in the European Parliament’s (EP) powers. The EP, the only directly elected institution of the European Union, derives its authority from national electorates rather than national governments and is therefore a transnational institution. Since the first direct elections in 1979, the EP’s powers and status have grown dramatically, culminating in the changes agreed under the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, the EU is perceived to be suffering from a ‘democratic deficit’. This chapter first traces the historical evolution of the EP before discussing its decision-making. It then considers how the EP aggregates interests, what influence it exercises, and what kind of body it is becoming. It concludes by assessing various perspectives about the EU’s democratic deficit. The chapter stresses the importance of consensus mechanisms within the EP as well as those that link it to other EU institutions.


Author(s):  
M. Strezhneva

Institutional structures and decision-making processes, which have been established in the European Union, fall beyond the scope of national rules for the functioning of parliamentary government. National parliaments of the EU member states have not succeeded in acquiring solid positions in the multilevel constellation within the Union. Yet nowadays they are assigned an important mission in their efforts to overcome, alongside the European Parliament (EP), the growing democratic deficit at both the European and national levels. The article is meant to assess the potential of national parliaments in capitalizing on the Lisbon Treaty provisions and on new forms of their engagement with supranational institutions (the European Council, the European Commission and the EP in particular), aimed at enhancing their legitimizing influence. General paradigm for the analysis is determined by the multilevel governance concept (MLG). It allows for a picture of European decision-making, which is shared by actors placed at different levels of the governance structure. National parliaments are supposed to be provided with multiple access points to the political process in the European Union as well. But the MLG vision doesn't contradict the fact that the key role within the EU belongs to those who occupy the highest executive power positions at the national level. Three directions for the national parliaments to intensify their involvement are put into spotlight: parliamentary control over national executives; control of compliance with the subsidiarity principle in European legislative proposals and supranational decisions; political dialogue with the European Commission and interparliamentary cooperation. The analysis proves that conditions are ripe for more active stance of national parliaments in the EU affairs. The “system of early warning” of the subsidiarity principle violations, provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, seems most promising. But national parliaments themselves will still have to demonstrate more persistence when using new instruments. Acknowledgment. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Foundation for Humanities (RFH). Project № 14-07-00050.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bernadette Sangmeister

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 1053-1071 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corrado Fumagalli

In this article, I argue that the experimentalist model of democracy can contribute to contemporary disputes about deliberation at the supranational level. The fundamental idea is that, in conditions of disagreement, for a decision to be legitimate, deliberative decision-making processes must be structured so as to allow the inclusion of affected interests before and after voting. I argue that there are three ways for a decision to be illegitimate: exclusion of affected interests from all deliberative phases, Captain Hook politics and garbage-time politics. Captain Hook politics and garbage-time politics illuminate an important variable: in a deliberative process, some interests may enter deliberation too early, other interests too late. However, for a decision to be legitimate, it is not only important that all affected interests can have an influence on collectively binding decisions, but it is also important what moment in time such interests play a part in the deliberative process.


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