Neither market nor command economy: Swedish negotiative rent setting in practice

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. A. Stefan Svensson
Keyword(s):  
1992 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Higgs

Relying on standard measures of macroeconomic performance, historians and economists believe that “war prosperity” prevailed in the United States during World War II. This belief is ill-founded, because it does not recognize that the United States had a command economy during the war. From 1942 to 1946 some macroeconomic performance measures are statistically inaccurate; others are conceptually inappropriate. A better grounded interpretation is that during the war the economy was a huge arsenal in which the well-being of consumers deteriorated. After the war genuine prosperity returned for the first time since 1929.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 514
Author(s):  
Mutiara Hikmah

AbstrakThis article giving elaboration regarding Bank Indonesia role as centralbank that hold significant's role and position in Indonesian economicprogress, so Bank Indonesia ought to take position in the change of economicsystem from command economy to market economy. Considering thatcircumstance the role of Bank Indonesia under Article 23D of Constitution ofRepublic Indonesia has been endorsed to promulgating Peraturan BankIndonesia (Bank Indonesia Regulation) which is has same level withPresidential regulation. That regulation considers to the Bank Indonesiaroles to accomplishing through implementation of Law Number 23 year 1999regarding Bank Indonesia. Under the Law central bank have responsibilityto assure and conserve toward rupiah stability. monetary policy. continuityof payment system and banking supervision


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (338) ◽  
pp. 61-66
Author(s):  
Sandris Ancans

AbstractThe economy of Latvia lags behind economically developed nations approximately fourfold in terms of labour productivity in the tradable sector, which is the key constituent of a modern economy, thereby affecting future sustainable development in the entire country, including the rural areas. The economic backwardness is characteristic of the entire Central and Eastern Europe. This is the heritage of a communist regime that lasted for about half a century and the economic system termed a (centrally) planned economy or a command economy. However, such a term for the communist-period economy is not correct, as it does not represent the purpose it was created for. Accordingly, the paper aims to assess the effect of the communism period on the economic backwardness of the Central and Eastern European region of the EU. A planned economy that existed in all communist countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia, was not introduced to contribute to prosperity. It was intended for confrontation or even warfare by the communist countries under the guidance of the USSR against other countries where no communism regime existed, mostly Western world nations with their market economies. For this reason, it is not correct to term it a (centrally) planned economy or a command economy; the right term is a mobilised (war) economy. An extrapolation of a geometric progression for GDP revealed that during the half a century, Latvia as part of the USSR was forced to spend on confrontation with the West not less than EUR 17 bln. (2011 prices) or approximately one gross domestic product of 2011. The research aim of the paper is to assess the effect of the communism period on the economic backwardness of the Central and Eastern European region of the EU.


1971 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-119
Author(s):  
Jean Marczewski
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Alasdair Roberts

This chapter examines the second dilemma in the design of governance strategies, which relates to strictness of control. Leaders must choose whether to monitor and regulate behavior loosely or intensively. This is certainly true with regard to control of the everyday conduct of citizens through surveillance and policing. A similar choice must be made in the economic sphere, between a command economy and free markets. And the dilemma arises again within the apparatus of the state itself. For example, central government must decide whether to exercise more or less supervision over lower levels of government. Moreover, within each level of government, political leaders must decide whether to give more or less autonomy to bureaucrats charged with implementing their policies. In all of these contexts, similar calculations about the right measure of control must be made.


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