scholarly journals Integration of Iran-backed armed groups into the Iraqi and Syrian armed forces: implications for stability in Iraq and Syria

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Hamidreza Azizi
Keyword(s):  
Asian Survey ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald M. Seekins

The appearance of an unwanted visitor in Aung San Suu Kyi's lakeside compound in Yangon gave the SPDC military regime a pretext to extend her house arrest, while the refusal of major armed groups in the border areas to accept subordination under the Tatmadaw (armed forces) central command posed serious problems for Myanmar's future stability.


Significance Although a ceasefire has been in place since October 2020, very little has been done during that time to integrate or demobilise the many armed forces and groups that exist across the country. The obstacles are formidable. Impacts Significant demobilisation and reintegration will not happen in the near term. Local security will continue to rest on fragile political and financial arrangements between armed groups and governing authorities. The current high levels of oil and gas revenue will tend to discourage unrest.


Significance The closure of border crossings since March 2020 has fuelled violent competition for control of lucrative informal crossings (trochas) and frontier towns. However, the Venezuelan military is ill-prepared to deal with the expanding presence of Colombia’s irregular armed groups. Recent incursions highlight weaknesses in the Venezuelan armed forces, which have suffered casualties. Impacts The penetration of organised crime groups into Venezuela’s disintegrating state and economy will continue to intensify. Organised criminal violence coupled with the violence of military operations will fuel displacement, COVID and civilian casualties. A speedy, negotiated solution to Venezuela’s political impasse is needed to preclude fusion with Colombia’s own protracted insurgency.


2020 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2094715
Author(s):  
Anthony King

In 2018, Ilmari Käihkö published a special collection in Armed Forces & Society on the debate about small unit cohesion. Later, in reaction to a response by Guy Siebold, he published a further intervention with Peter Haldén. Focusing on my 2006 article in the journal and my subsequent debate, Käihkö has claimed that the cohesion debate is too narrow. It ignores organizational factors in the armed forces and wider political factors, including nationalism and state policy. Consequently, it is incapable of analyzing non-Western state or irregular forces and is only relevant for the 20th and 21st centuries. This response shows that while Käihkö’s extension of the empirical archive to non-Western armed groups is to be welcomed, none of his theoretical claims are sustainable.


2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (907-909) ◽  
pp. 267-285
Author(s):  
Sabrina Henry

AbstractThis paper focuses on the “continuous combat function” concept and proposes to extend its application. First, the article will demonstrate that the continuous combat function concept should be extended to certain members of organized armed groups in cases where those groups do not belong to any of the parties to an international armed conflict and whose actions do not reach the level of intensity required for a separate non-international armed conflict (NIAC) to exist. Secondly, the paper will look at the extension of this concept in order to determine individual membership in State armed forces in the context of a NIAC, while arguing that the notion of “armed forces” should be interpreted differently depending of the nature of the conflict, be it international or non-international.


Significance Meanwhile, concern is growing that Israel is mounting regular airstrikes on Iran-backed militia bases inside Iraq. The conflict against Islamic State (IS) led to the emergence of numerous armed groups, known as the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs), formalised by a 2014 government decision and theoretically integrated into the armed forces in 2018. Most are drawn from southern Shia areas, and many of the largest are backed by Iran. Impacts Militias will be forced to lower their profile and present fewer threats. Larger Iran-backed militias will use reforms to consolidate their power. Israel will continue striking Iran-backed militias and Iraq may turn to Russia for air defence.


Author(s):  
Duthie Roger ◽  
Mayer-Rieckh Alexander

Principle 37 focuses on the disbandment of parastatal armed forces and the demobilization and social reintegration of children involved in armed conflicts. It articulates measures designed to prevent the transformation of conflict violence to criminal violence through the dismantling and reintegration of all armed groups engaged in abuses, and outlines comprehensive responses to the injustices experienced by children during armed conflict. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 37 before discussing its theoretical framework and practice. It then examines the importance of reintegration processes and how they can be affected by transitional justice measures, along with their implications for former child combatants. It also highlights the relevance of measures for dealing with unofficial armed groups from an impunity standpoint, as well as the efforts of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs to address them.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter examines the access to combatant status by members of non-state armed groups from a historical perspective. It demonstrates that practically since the time the distinction between combatants and non-combatants had solidified into law, the applicable rules have permitted members of at least some non-state armed groups to benefit from combatant status. At various times in the history of regulation of armed conflicts, these groups have included militias and volunteer corps, armed forces professing allegiance to a non-recognized governmental authority, and national liberation movements. Overall, the historical analysis presented in this chapter suggests that it would be erroneous to interpret the rules on eligibility for combatancy in the context of internationalized armed conflicts in an unduly restrictive manner.


Significance The kidnappings follow a series of violent incidents in the area, including a bomb attack on March 20 that killed three soldiers and the bombing of a police station on January 27 that injured more than 20. The violence comes as armed groups in neighbouring Colombia fight for control of lucrative drug networks in the wake of that country’s peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Impacts Right-wing politicians and parties will use the escalation in violence to call for a strengthening of the police, military and penal code. Supporters of the former President Rafael Correa will benefit if Moreno is unable to contain violence to the border region. Escalating violence will unnerve investors but it is unlikely to reduce inward investment unless the conflict spreads south.


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