Drug violence set to rise in Ecuador

Significance The kidnappings follow a series of violent incidents in the area, including a bomb attack on March 20 that killed three soldiers and the bombing of a police station on January 27 that injured more than 20. The violence comes as armed groups in neighbouring Colombia fight for control of lucrative drug networks in the wake of that country’s peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Impacts Right-wing politicians and parties will use the escalation in violence to call for a strengthening of the police, military and penal code. Supporters of the former President Rafael Correa will benefit if Moreno is unable to contain violence to the border region. Escalating violence will unnerve investors but it is unlikely to reduce inward investment unless the conflict spreads south.

Significance Although a ceasefire has been in place since October 2020, very little has been done during that time to integrate or demobilise the many armed forces and groups that exist across the country. The obstacles are formidable. Impacts Significant demobilisation and reintegration will not happen in the near term. Local security will continue to rest on fragile political and financial arrangements between armed groups and governing authorities. The current high levels of oil and gas revenue will tend to discourage unrest.


Significance The closure of border crossings since March 2020 has fuelled violent competition for control of lucrative informal crossings (trochas) and frontier towns. However, the Venezuelan military is ill-prepared to deal with the expanding presence of Colombia’s irregular armed groups. Recent incursions highlight weaknesses in the Venezuelan armed forces, which have suffered casualties. Impacts The penetration of organised crime groups into Venezuela’s disintegrating state and economy will continue to intensify. Organised criminal violence coupled with the violence of military operations will fuel displacement, COVID and civilian casualties. A speedy, negotiated solution to Venezuela’s political impasse is needed to preclude fusion with Colombia’s own protracted insurgency.


Significance The meeting, which will be the third in the process so far, has been delayed due to disagreements among ethnic minority groups, including ethnic minority armed groups (EMAGs). Myanmar’s next general election is due in 2020, when State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) will be seeking to retain control of the civilian portion of government. Impacts While ongoing violence may dissuade Western investors, China and India will see opportunity rather than risk in Myanmar. China will encourage EMAGs to negotiate peace. Myanmar military personnel will face US sanctions over attacks on Rohingya Muslims.


Significance Meanwhile, concern is growing that Israel is mounting regular airstrikes on Iran-backed militia bases inside Iraq. The conflict against Islamic State (IS) led to the emergence of numerous armed groups, known as the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs), formalised by a 2014 government decision and theoretically integrated into the armed forces in 2018. Most are drawn from southern Shia areas, and many of the largest are backed by Iran. Impacts Militias will be forced to lower their profile and present fewer threats. Larger Iran-backed militias will use reforms to consolidate their power. Israel will continue striking Iran-backed militias and Iraq may turn to Russia for air defence.


Significance The move follows Duque's cancellation of peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN) on January 18, after a bomb attack on a Bogota police academy that killed 22. On February 6, Duque announced a new Defence and Security Policy (PDS) ruling out any prospect of bilateral ceasefires with non-state armed groups and launching a renewed focus on hardline security strategies. Impacts A return to open war will undermine hopes of an economic ‘peace dividend’ following the peace process with the FARC. An increase in militarised security policies and forcible coca eradication will lead to more human rights abuse and extrajudicial killings. Increased violence will breed contempt for the government among rural communities, making the removal of armed groups more difficult. With Venezuela’s crisis looking set to worsen, Colombia’s security situation shows little prospect of improvement in the coming years.


Subject Situation regarding Myanmar's ethnic armed organisations. Significance The government and military in Myanmar and leaders of ten ethnically based guerrilla groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) last week pledged to step up their commitment to the peace process, to transform the NCA into a lasting settlement. Several other armed groups are still in conflict with the state, notwithstanding occasional ceasefires. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) will very likely retain control over the civilian part of government following this year’s general election, but ethnic parties will probably make parliamentary gains at its expense. Impacts Suu Kyi is very unlikely to face pressure to step down even if the NLD’s parliamentary majority is heavily reduced. Even with increased seat share in parliament, ethnic parties will struggle to influence policy. China and India will double down on their support for the Myanmar military.


Significance The talks are part of the effort to end decades of fighting between Myanmar's military (Tatmadaw) and various ethnic minority armed groups (EMAGs). Impacts Myanmar's government will need further Chinese support to bring north-eastern EMAGs back into the peace process. Vested economic interests will likely complicate reaching any peace deal. The government will have difficulty securing new NCA signatories while managing ties with the FPNCC. Pressure will grow for greater civil society involvement in the Panglong process, including media, hitherto barred.


Significance The agreement has formally held, but implementation is well behind schedule and shows no sign of accelerating. Moreover, there still appears to be little prospect that the agreement will resolve the deeper political ills that have kept South Sudan embroiled in conflict for most of its history. Impacts Rhetorical commitments to institutional reform will translate into changes that are symbolic at best. Escalating armed conflict between the army and other armed groups is still a risk. The economy will remain stagnant.


Subject Myanmar's political landscape ahead of next year's elections. Significance As the next general election appears on the horizon, parliament last month began debating possible amendments to the constitution. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), which controls the civilian portion of government, wants to reduce the military’s reserved parliamentary quota. Meanwhile, the NLD faces increased criticism from parties representing the country’s ethnic minorities. Impacts There is unlikely to be any progress in the country's peace process, aimed at ending conflicts between the military and ethnic armed groups. The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party will aim to enhance its internal organisation. As attention turns to the polls, the government will devote even fewer resources than currently to resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mansour Rahmdel

Purpose The aim of this paper is considering that obtaining illegitimate property and obtaining property illegally is morally outrageous. The law also condemns it as a crime. The act of those who launder the proceeds of crime is also condemned. This condemnation is almost universal. So, money laundering as a way of diversion of the origin of the illegal gains into legitimate currency or other assets has been criminalized in most of the countries, including in Iran. Before criminalization of money laundering, there were different laws which referred to the case without referring to the term of money laundry. According to Article 49 of the Iranian Constitution “all proceeds of illegal sources like embezzlement, bribery, gambling and other ways should be confiscated.” Design/methodology/approach Article 662 of the Islamic Penal Code (IPC) ratified in 1996 criminalized dealing with the proceeds of theft and Note 2 of Article 119 of the Penal Code of the Armed Forces criminalized obtaining the proceeds of embezzlement. But, in 2008, to follow the international conventions, especially Article 3 of the psychotropic substances 1988 in Vienna and also Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, the legislator ratified the anti-money laundering code (AMLC). The methodology is an analytical one. The author using an analytical method, has analyzed the subject with consideration of Iran’s situation, as well as international documents and FATF’s recommendations. Findings The author has studied the issue, believing that domestic regulations of Iran comply with international regulations and FATF recommendations. The current paper considers the different aspects of the AMLCs in Iran in relation to FATF recommendations. Originality/value The author confirms the originality of the paper and declares that he has referred all the other materials.


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