Colombian border violence will Venezuela worsen crisis

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Border Crossings ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Criminal Violence ◽  
Organised Crime Groups

Significance The closure of border crossings since March 2020 has fuelled violent competition for control of lucrative informal crossings (trochas) and frontier towns. However, the Venezuelan military is ill-prepared to deal with the expanding presence of Colombia’s irregular armed groups. Recent incursions highlight weaknesses in the Venezuelan armed forces, which have suffered casualties. Impacts The penetration of organised crime groups into Venezuela’s disintegrating state and economy will continue to intensify. Organised criminal violence coupled with the violence of military operations will fuel displacement, COVID and civilian casualties. A speedy, negotiated solution to Venezuela’s political impasse is needed to preclude fusion with Colombia’s own protracted insurgency.

Demobilisation will be a long-term challenge in Libya

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Near Term ◽  
The Many ◽  
Financial Arrangements

Significance Although a ceasefire has been in place since October 2020, very little has been done during that time to integrate or demobilise the many armed forces and groups that exist across the country. The obstacles are formidable. Impacts Significant demobilisation and reintegration will not happen in the near term. Local security will continue to rest on fragile political and financial arrangements between armed groups and governing authorities. The current high levels of oil and gas revenue will tend to discourage unrest.

Terrorism, organised crime and threat mitigation in a globalised world

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 951-961
Author(s):  
Yara El Siwi
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Global Networks ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Subsequent Section ◽  
Threat Mitigation ◽  
Organised Crime Groups ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Substantial Interest

Purpose The gruesome attacks of 11 September 2001 signalled a powerful paradigm shift in international politics: governments previously accustomed to military menaces were now being increasingly threatened by independent, non-state actors. Consequently, a plethora of literature emerged, looking to better understand the nature of these actors. An aspect that has attracted substantial interest is the inter-relation between terrorism and organised crime (OC). This paper aims to answer the question as to whether, for the purpose of controlling and mitigating the threat they pose to society, there is meaning in differentiating between terrorist organisations (TOs) and organised crime groups (OCGs). Design/methodology/approach The first section of the paper will provide an account of the various kinds of threats posed by OCGs and TOs. The subsequent section will question whether it is possible, in today’s globalised era, to distinguish between these two actors, while the last sections will ask if such a differentiation is desirable. Findings OCGs and TOs display a clear divergence: the former’s motivation is financial while the latter’s political. With the end of the Cold War, however, each type of organisation has been building up the capabilities of the other, helped by the force of global networks. As such, these two actors now exist within the same body – a continuum – that renders their separation difficult. As to the question of desirability, the separation of the two phenomena has often led to the adoption of highly disproportionate militarised and securitised measures, resulting in a dangerous blending of law enforcement and security service methodology. Originality/value Many have argued for the separation of the “terrorist” from the “criminal”, on the grounds that the former is particularly heinous and deserving of more severe measures. Others have studied the evolution of these two phenomena to understand whether the lines separating them have been blurring and the extent to which this affects law-enforcement. This paper goes beyond notions of feasibility and poses the following question: has the traditional separation of these phenomena led to a desirable regime?

Colombia peace talks offer scope for organised crime

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Rural Areas ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Peace Treaty ◽  
Western Coast ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Criminal Violence ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
The Government ◽  
Criminal Groups

Subject The rising threat from BACRIM. Significance Organised criminal groups are now the non-state actors most frequently responsible for internal displacement of Colombians, according to a recent UN report. There is also evidence that the so-called BACRIM (criminal bands) are seeking to fill the vacuum after an eventual demobilisation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The BACRIM, and Los Urabenos in particular, have expanded control over rural areas and the mining sector, posing a threat as the government seeks to attract foreign investment to boost development in a post-conflict environment. Impacts Criminal violence in cities along the western coast is already causing damage to Colombia's international image. Increased insecurity perceptions risk marring the political and economic benefits the government expects from the peace process. Criminal groups such as Los Urabenos will benefit from the vacuum left by the FARC if a peace treaty is signed later this year.

Brazil's fiscal crunch will worsen Rio crime crisis

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Rio De Janeiro ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Security Strategy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Criminal Violence ◽  
Police Presence ◽  
The Government ◽  
Oil Revenues ◽  
Janeiro State

Subject Deteriorating crime levels in Rio de Janeiro. Significance The government of Rio de Janeiro state, facing a financial crunch, has been accused of undermining the iconic police pacification programme tasked with fighting organised crime in its slums. This represents a blow to a security strategy credited with significantly reducing homicides before Rio's financial troubles began compromising the police presence in the slums from 2014 onwards. The latest budget cut comes precisely as a war between Rio's most powerful gangs intensifies. Impacts Recent reductions in funding and other resources will leave police unprepared to tackle the gang war in Rocinha. Criminal violence will damage Rio's attractiveness for tourists and business, further complicating the recent decline in oil revenues. The decline in the pacification strategy may undercut its importance as a promising model to be applied in other violent cities.

Iraqi measures to rein in militias will be cosmetic

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Government Decision

Significance Meanwhile, concern is growing that Israel is mounting regular airstrikes on Iran-backed militia bases inside Iraq. The conflict against Islamic State (IS) led to the emergence of numerous armed groups, known as the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs), formalised by a 2014 government decision and theoretically integrated into the armed forces in 2018. Most are drawn from southern Shia areas, and many of the largest are backed by Iran. Impacts Militias will be forced to lower their profile and present fewer threats. Larger Iran-backed militias will use reforms to consolidate their power. Israel will continue striking Iran-backed militias and Iraq may turn to Russia for air defence.

Part IV The Right to Reparation/Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, B Guarantees of Non-Recurrence of Violations, Principle 37 Disbandment of Parastatal Armed Forces/Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Children

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duthie Roger ◽  
Mayer-Rieckh Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Social Reintegration ◽  
Criminal Violence ◽  
The Right

Principle 37 focuses on the disbandment of parastatal armed forces and the demobilization and social reintegration of children involved in armed conflicts. It articulates measures designed to prevent the transformation of conflict violence to criminal violence through the dismantling and reintegration of all armed groups engaged in abuses, and outlines comprehensive responses to the injustices experienced by children during armed conflict. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 37 before discussing its theoretical framework and practice. It then examines the importance of reintegration processes and how they can be affected by transitional justice measures, along with their implications for former child combatants. It also highlights the relevance of measures for dealing with unofficial armed groups from an impunity standpoint, as well as the efforts of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs to address them.

Iran regional policy will bolster IRGC political power

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Content Type ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Defence Budget ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
The Government ◽  
State Group

Significance Iran's armed forces have suffered a number of high-profile casualties in Syria and Iraq in recent weeks. General Mohammad Ali Allah-Dadi was killed in an Israeli airstrike inside Syria in January, while General Hamid Taqavi was killed by the Islamic State group (ISG) in Iraq in late December. Taqavi was the highest-ranking officer to be killed since the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. Both men were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Iran's elite military force that conducts all of Tehran's military operations outside the country's borders. As rising instability threatens Iran's interests, the IRGC has stepped up its deployment across the region, raising the risk of military overstretch. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the IRGC is at loggerheads with the government of President Hassan Rouhani as nuclear negotiations approach their next deadline. Impacts IRGC dominance in Tehran policy-making will prevent any wider rapprochement with Washington. Resolution to the Syrian civil war will require regional political agreement involving Iran. Tensions with Saudi Arabia are at risk of further escalation. Demands on the defence budget will increase, raising fiscal strain on government.

Prospects for Mexico and Central America in 2016

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central America ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
State Violence ◽  
Border Security ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Economic Slowdown ◽  
Organised Crime Groups

Subject Prospects for Mexico and Central America in 2016. Significance Mexico and Central America will weather the economic slowdown that is affecting many emerging economies in 2016, with most countries doing well by broader regional standards. Security and governance are causes for concern regionwide. Both criminal and state violence will be major issues in Mexico and northern Central America, with increasing migration giving organised crime groups opportunities to diversify and potentially spread south, and heavy-handed policing exacerbating insecurity. Border security issues have the potential to strain relations between countries, while allegations of corruption will challenge governments, with numerous politicians potentially facing trial.

Drug violence set to rise in Ecuador

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Peace Process ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Penal Code ◽  
Border Region ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Police Station ◽  
Bomb Attack ◽  
Drug Violence

Significance The kidnappings follow a series of violent incidents in the area, including a bomb attack on March 20 that killed three soldiers and the bombing of a police station on January 27 that injured more than 20. The violence comes as armed groups in neighbouring Colombia fight for control of lucrative drug networks in the wake of that country’s peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Impacts Right-wing politicians and parties will use the escalation in violence to call for a strengthening of the police, military and penal code. Supporters of the former President Rafael Correa will benefit if Moreno is unable to contain violence to the border region. Escalating violence will unnerve investors but it is unlikely to reduce inward investment unless the conflict spreads south.

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