Building the euro area's debt crisis management capacity with the IMF

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Schwarzer
2020 ◽  
pp. 223-238
Author(s):  
Manuela Moschella

In the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, some of the most advanced economies in the world turned to the IMF for financial assistance. Not only did the Eurozone countries ask for the Fund’s help; they also incorporated the IMF into the institutional architecture for handling crises in the European Monetary Union. This chapter uses competence–control theory to shed light on the puzzles raised by the decision to enlist the IMF in Eurozone crisis management. Firstly, the chapter argues that the Eurozone’s motivation for enlisting the IMF can be found in the competence deficit its governors confronted in managing the crisis. In particular, Eurozone countries lacked sufficient competence (including expertise, money, and credibility) to formulate and enforce adjustment in crisis-hit countries. By enlisting the IMF, Eurozone countries acquired the necessary competence but had to share control. Secondly, the chapter shows that the tradeoff between competence and control shifted over time: even after creating their own crisis management competencies, member states continued to enlist the IMF as a way to reduce the control problems that creditor states confronted in enforcing adjustment in debtor countries.


1985 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-727 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin J. Cohen

The global debt problem influences the foreign-policy capabilities of the United States through its impact on the government's “linkage strategies” in foreign affairs. In some circumstances policy makers are forced to make connections between different policy instruments or issues that might not otherwise have been felt necessary; in others, opportunities for connections are created that might not otherwise have been felt possible. The Polish debt crisis of 1981–82, the Latin American debt crisis of 1982–83, and the IMF quota increase in 1983 are suggestive in this regard. Linkage strategies bred by the debt issue are more apt to be successful when the interest shared by the United States with other countries in avoiding default is reinforced by other shared economic or political interests. They will also be more successful to the extent that the government can supplement its own power resources by relating bank decisions to foreign-policy considerations. Power in such situations, however, is a wasting asset, even when employed indirectly through the intermediation of the IMF.


Author(s):  
Ferran ARMENGOL FERRER

LABURPENA: Egonkortasuneko Mekanismo Europarrean (EME) baldintzapena nola aplikatzen den aztertuko dugu artikulu honetan, Europar Batasunaren esparruan aitortuta dauden oinarrizko eskubideen ikuspegitik. Horretarako, giza eskubideen alorrean nazioarteko hitzarmenak aplikatzearen alde egin duten jarrera doktrinalak hartu dira erreferentziatzat, Nazioarteko Diru Funtsak (NDF) eta nazioarteko beste finantza-erakunde batzuek garapen bidean diren herrialdeekiko operazioetan txertatu duten baldintzapenari muga jartzeko. Europar Batasunaren eremuan 2009-2010 urteetako zor publikoaren krisiari erantzuna emateko sortu diren organismoek eta, batez ere, EMEk (euro eremuan egonkortasuna ziurtatzeko organismoak,) ordea, egiturazko elementu gisa sartu dute baldintzapena haien operazioetan, NDFaren antzeko filosofia hartuta, hau da, zuhurtziaren bitartez lortu nahi dute hazkunde ekonomikoa, eta, horren ondorioz, oinarrizko eskubide batzuk ezin izan dira behar bezala gauzatu. Horrek mahai gainean jartzen du kontu bat, ea politika horiek bateragarri ote diren Europar Batasunaren helburu eta printzipioekin; hasiera batean «zuzenbidezko komunitatea» esamoldeaz definitu baitzuten EB, eta giza eskubideetan oinarrituta eraiki. Justizia Auzitegiak horri buruz idatzi zuen lehenengo epai —goiztiarrak— (Pringle epaiak), ordea, ez zuen zehaztu EMEren baldintzapenak Europar Batasunaren xede eta printzipioekin eta giza eskubideekiko errespetuarekin bat egiten ote duen. Hala ere, badirudi irizpide hori aldatzen ari dela, Ledra Advertising-en duela gutxi eman den epaiaren harira; izan ere, jabetzarako eskubideari dei egiteko atea ireki du, baldintzapena ezartzearen ondorioz eragindako kalteengatiko ordaina eskatzeari dagokionez. Hortaz, EME Europako Diru Funtsean eraldatuta bakarrik heldu ahalko zaie oinarrizko eskubideei, EME erkideko erakunde gisa eratzen bada, baldintzapenaren ondorio kaltegarriak geldiarazteari edo arintzeari begira. Are gehiago, Europako Diru Funtsean baldintzapena judizialki kontrolatzea erreferentea izan liteke nazioarteko beste finantza-erakunde batzuentzat. RESUMEN: El presente artículo analiza la aplicación de la condicionalidad en el Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad (MEDE) desde la perspectiva de los derechos fundamentales reconocidos en el ámbito de la Unión Europea. A tal efecto, se toman como referencia las posiciones doctrinales que han venido defendiendo la aplicación de los convenios internacionales en materia de derechos humanos como límite a la condicionalidad introducida por el FMI y otras instituciones financieras internacionales en sus operaciones con los países en desarrollo. Los organismos creados en el ámbito de la Unión Europea para dar respuesta a la crisis de la Deuda pública de 2009-10, y de modo singular el MEDE, organismo creado para garantizar la estabilidad de la zona euro, han introducido, sin embargo, la condicionalidad como un elemento estructural en sus operaciones, con una filosofía parecida a la del FMI, es decir, conseguir el crecimiento económico a partir de la austeridad, con lo que se ha visto perjudicado el ejercicio de diversos derechos fundamentales. Ello plantea la cuestión de la compatibilidad de tales políticas con los objetivos y principios de la Unión Europea, definida en su día como «Comunidad de Derecho» y fundada sobre los valores de los derechos humanos. La primera —y temprana— sentencia dictada al respecto por el Tribunal de Justicia (sentencia Pringle) dejó, sin embargo, en el aire la cuestión de la compatibilidad de la condicionalidad del MEDE con los objetivos y principios de la Unión Europea y el respeto de los derechos humanos. Parece, no obstante, que este criterio tiende a modificarse a partir del reciente fallo en Ledra Advertising, que ha abierto la puerta a invocar el derecho de propiedad para ser indemnizado por los daños causados por la aplicación de la condicionalidad. Con todo, será a partir de la transformación del MEDE en el Fondo Monetario Europeo, si éste se constituye como institución comunitaria, como puede hacerse efectiva la invocación de los derechos fundamentales para frenar o mitigar los efectos perjudiciales de la condicionalidad. Más aún, el control judicial de la condicionalidad en el FME podría servir como referente para otras instituciones financieras internacionales. ABSTRACT: This article analyses the application of conditionality within the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from the perspective of the fundamental rights recognized within the EU. To this end, we take as a reference the doctrinal positions that have been defending the application of international conventions on human rights as a limit to the conditionality introduced by the IMF and another financial international institutions in their operations with developing countries. The public agencies created within the EU in order to meet the demands of the public debt crisis of 2009-10, and specifically the ESM, a body created to guarantee the Euro zone’s stability, have nonetheless introduced the conditionality as a structural element in their operations, with a philosophy comparable to that of the IMF, i.e. to achieve economic growth from austerity, thus impairing the exercise of several fundamental rights. That raises the question of compatibility of those policies with the objectives and principles of the EU, defined one day as a «community of law» and founded upon the values of fundamental rights. The first —and early— judgement delivered on this ground by the European Court of Justice (Pringle case) left nevertheless in the air the compatibility of the conditionality of ESM with the objectives and principles of the EU and with the respect to human rights. It seems however that this criteria tends to be modified by the recent judgment Ledra Advertising that opened the door to invoke the right to property in order to be compensated by damages caused as a consequence of conditionality. Even so, it will be after the transformation of the ESM into an European Monetary Fund, if this is constituted as a Community institution, that invoking fundamental rights shall be effective in order to stop or mitigate the adverse effects of conditionality. What is more, the judicial control over conditionality within the EMF might serve as a reference for other international financial institutions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147-163
Author(s):  
George Pagoulatos

EMU was a brainchild of contrasting parental personalities. Integrationist European ambition joined disparate national pursuits to create an imperfect EMU architecture, though one amenable to correction through crises. When the debt crisis hit the periphery, recessionary national adjustment was supported by insufficient Eurozone-level reforms. The EU opted for incremental crisis management and paid a price in terms of fragmentation. The Eurozone debt crisis bequeathed a contradictory legacy of both raising the visibility of the reform agenda and raising the bar of political difficulty in bringing it about, having divided Europe between (heartless) ‘creditor’ and (reckless) ‘borrower’ countries. By raising the stakes of EU failure, the Covid-19 crisis operated as a reform accelerator. The joint reaction demonstrated that the EU maintained its survival instinct, drawing on the political capital invested in its preservation. The Eurozone’s reform conundrum remains the glaring gap between what is widely admitted as necessary and what is realized as politically feasible. Consecutive reform attempts have been frustrated by country coalitions that resist movement towards further risk sharing (through the fiscal, financial or monetary channel) or deny any further transfer of national autonomy. There are ways out of the EMU straitjacket. One is formally deferring the rules. Another is saying things without doing them. A third strategy is doing things without saying them. The momentous leap of ‘Next Generation EU’ notwithstanding, EMU remains incomplete, even though confidence in its ability to survive has been greatly boosted by its resilience in the face of the two severe, consecutive crises.


2018 ◽  
pp. 88-115
Author(s):  
Sten Widmalm ◽  
Thomas Persson ◽  
Charles Parker

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