Integrating through Crises

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-163
Author(s):  
George Pagoulatos

EMU was a brainchild of contrasting parental personalities. Integrationist European ambition joined disparate national pursuits to create an imperfect EMU architecture, though one amenable to correction through crises. When the debt crisis hit the periphery, recessionary national adjustment was supported by insufficient Eurozone-level reforms. The EU opted for incremental crisis management and paid a price in terms of fragmentation. The Eurozone debt crisis bequeathed a contradictory legacy of both raising the visibility of the reform agenda and raising the bar of political difficulty in bringing it about, having divided Europe between (heartless) ‘creditor’ and (reckless) ‘borrower’ countries. By raising the stakes of EU failure, the Covid-19 crisis operated as a reform accelerator. The joint reaction demonstrated that the EU maintained its survival instinct, drawing on the political capital invested in its preservation. The Eurozone’s reform conundrum remains the glaring gap between what is widely admitted as necessary and what is realized as politically feasible. Consecutive reform attempts have been frustrated by country coalitions that resist movement towards further risk sharing (through the fiscal, financial or monetary channel) or deny any further transfer of national autonomy. There are ways out of the EMU straitjacket. One is formally deferring the rules. Another is saying things without doing them. A third strategy is doing things without saying them. The momentous leap of ‘Next Generation EU’ notwithstanding, EMU remains incomplete, even though confidence in its ability to survive has been greatly boosted by its resilience in the face of the two severe, consecutive crises.

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (Suppl. 1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Denis Horgan ◽  
Walter Ricciardi

In the world of modern health, despite the fact that we've been blessed with amazing advances of late - the advent of personalised medicine is just one example - “change” for most citizens seems slow. There are clear discrepancies in availability of the best care for all, the divisions in access from country to country, wealthy to poor, are large. There are even discrepancies between regions of the larger countries, where access often varies alarmingly. Too many Member States (with their competence for healthcare) appear to be clinging stubbornly to the concept of “one-size-fits-all” in healthcare and often stifle advances possible through personalised medicine. Meanwhile, the legislative arena encompassing health has grown big and unwieldy in many respects. And bigger is not always better. The health advances spoken of above, an increased knowledge on the part of patients, the emergence of Big Data and more, are quickly changing the face of healthcare in Europe. But healthcare thinking across the EU isn't changing fast enough. The new technologies will certainly speak for themselves, but only if allowed to do so. Acknowledging that, this article highlights a positive reform agenda, while explaining that new avenues need to be explored.


2020 ◽  
pp. 16-26
Author(s):  
Cornel Ban

Fiscal policy is the sum of decisions on taxation and spending that one takes in an economy, particularly in times of crisis. As such, it is of existential importance in the life of a society. Known for its recent waves of spending cuts and tax increases (austerity) during recessions (Blyth, 2013), 2020 Europe has had a more expansionary fiscal policy than ever before. How do we make sense of this shift? To answer this question, let us draw on select insights from three political economy literatures on fiscal crisis management. The first is the literature on learning. For its proponents, changes in fiscal policy are powered by evidence-based, yet politically mediated cognitive updating in the corridors of power. Plainly put, policymakers are keen students of what changes in their environment. This literature has showed that a great deal of learning took place in the EU since 2010 in particular (Schmidt, 2020; Kahkhaji and Radaelli, 2017; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2019). Its main implication for fiscal policy under corona is that between 2010 and 2015 the EU leaders learned about the limits of austerity and the virtues of more spending and tax cuts in a recession. Consequently, one would expect that when a deep recession arrives again (and it did in the spring of 2020), they would not be tempted to do a rerun of the self-defeating policies of the 2010-2012 period. As Keynes put it, “when the facts change, I change my mind.”


Significance Garcia’s death removes from the political scene one of Peru’s most influential politicians. The twice former-president had been closely identified as a recipient of bribes from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht, although he consistently denied allegations against him. He was one of several senior political figures, both in Peru and in Latin America more broadly, to be embroiled in the so-called ‘Car Wash’ investigation. Impacts APRA’s ability to rebuild political support in the country is doubtful. The Peruvian and Brazilian examples of judicial activism will not necessarily be paralleled elsewhere. President Martin Vizcarra will push ahead with his reform agenda in the face of congressional opposition.


2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
REGINA SMYTH

In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia's President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the political battle to eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.


Significance The surprisingly ample victory of opposition candidate Alberto Fernandez over President Mauricio Macri in the August 11 presidential primaries triggered a currency run and a sharp fall in international reserves and led the government to announce a “voluntary reprofiling” of short-term debt. The announcement was interpreted as a default, worsening investor expectations. The debt crisis puts the political transition at stake, with nearly two months before the general election and over three months until a new administration takes office in December. Impacts Following a new debt crisis, capital markets will be closed, forcing a sharper fiscal adjustment. The financial crisis will delay any economic rebound and worsen social indicators. The fragile fiscal situation will inhibit implementation of any ‘populist’ measures by the new government. The structural reform agenda will make some progress, though more slowly than expected.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 200-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keohane

In 1999, few people would have predicted that the EU would send ships to Somalia, police to Afghanistan, judges to Kosovo and soldiers to Chad. Yet, that is exactly what the EU has been doing. The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) –since renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – was launched shortly after NATO’s war in Kosovo in June 1999, to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without depending on the US (via NATO). Since 2003 the EU has initiated some 24 peace-support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, using both civil and military resources, and some of these missions have had impressive results. However, at times there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors. Lessons already identified in the crisis management debate point to two fundamental factors of success. First, a comprehensive approach that brings together the different actors deployed in the field. Second, the resilience of the political and material commitment of crisis management actors, possibly over many years. Both these factors pose important questions for the future of EU peace operations.


The article examines the features of the institutional and legal mechanism of the Union in the field of security and defence from its founding under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the current stage under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The legal characteristics of the EU institutions, that deals with the defence and security of Member States is provided. In particular, the activities of the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were analyzed. It is established that the institutional component of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy is characterized by the preservation of the sovereign powers of the Member States, as the development and decision-making at the highest level takes place through intergovernmental bodies of the Union. The powers of subsidiary bodies established by decisions of the EU Council are studied. The activities of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management are analyzed. In particular, the Political and Security Committee is the central executive body of the Union and a kind of "engine" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Especially important is his work on crisis management and finding the most optimal solutions in this direction. The EU Military Committee is the highest military body of the European Union, which manages all military activities within the EU. The EU Staff is the Union's main military expert body, tasked with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in line with the European Security Strategy. The European Defence Agency is a center of cooperation in the field of defence policy between Member States, EU institutions and third countries. It is noted that the EU institutional mechanism in the field of security and defence is represented not only by purely military but also by civilian structures, among which the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is the key. It has been found that the above institutions have sole executive powers and are not empowered to make legally binding decisions for Member States. It is concluded that one of the trends in the development of the EU institutional mechanism in the XXI century is so-called military-civil synergy, which occurs through cooperation between military and civilian structures of the Union, whose activities are aimed at achieving systematic goals in security and defence issues.


2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Jürgen Bieling

Over the past years the centre of the economic crisis has repeatedly shifted. Starting as a subprime crisis in the US, it soon unfolded as a global economic and financial crisis in order then to become a sovereign debt crisis, euro crisis and, eventually, also a social and democratic crisis. Against the background of the general political and economic conditions within the EU, this article traces the shifts of the political terrain. It focuses above all on the transition from a rather costly crisis management (bank rescues, economic stimulus programmes and automatic stabilizers) towards a new agenda of austerity policies. Structurally, this agenda can be seen as the reaction to significant increases in public debt. In addition, it has been promoted politically and institutionalized through successive European economic governance reforms. These reforms have also had a serious impact on domestic social and employment policies. In some countries dependent on external credits this is already evident, while in other countries the deregulatory aspects of the radicalized reform agenda have only just started to unfold.


Author(s):  
Claire Kilpatrick

This chapter examines the institutional actions and acts produced in the context of the EU sovereign debt crisis. By identifying a number of these acts and actions as abnormal rather than merely non-standard or atypical, attention is drawn to the features of these acts and actions that trouble the law/non-law boundary. Significantly, they trouble it not because they are soft law, but rather because they act as law without fulfilling the requirements or desiderata of binding acts adopted by public authorities. This includes obviously problematic features such as secret sources and institutional actions. It also opens for consideration the cumulative and not easily visible institutional power conferred by interaction of a series of different levers possessed by the European Central Bank in sovereign debt crisis management. Hence the contribution stresses the rule of law issues raised by this large new area of EU action.


Author(s):  
Pavlína Janebová

The article examines the positions of the Czech, Hungarian and Slovak social democratic political parties on the introduction of the permanent European Stability Mechanism as a means of addressing the economic and debt crisis in the EU. Using the categories of frames used by political parties in relation to the EU (utilitarian and cultural) introduced by Helbling et al., the political parties’ representatives’ speeches and written statements are analyzed. The analysis showed that all three of the parties use similar arguments and they tend to frame their opinions in both utilitarian and cultural terms with the category of “political efficiency” being the most frequent. While the most extensive debate about the issue was in Slovakia as the only Eurozone member of all three given countries, the Hungarian MSzP was able to conceive the topic in a broader context. The similarity of the positions of all three examined parties may indicate an ability of national political parties to constitute one of the key pillars in developing a supranational political system in the EU.


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