Integrating through Crises
EMU was a brainchild of contrasting parental personalities. Integrationist European ambition joined disparate national pursuits to create an imperfect EMU architecture, though one amenable to correction through crises. When the debt crisis hit the periphery, recessionary national adjustment was supported by insufficient Eurozone-level reforms. The EU opted for incremental crisis management and paid a price in terms of fragmentation. The Eurozone debt crisis bequeathed a contradictory legacy of both raising the visibility of the reform agenda and raising the bar of political difficulty in bringing it about, having divided Europe between (heartless) ‘creditor’ and (reckless) ‘borrower’ countries. By raising the stakes of EU failure, the Covid-19 crisis operated as a reform accelerator. The joint reaction demonstrated that the EU maintained its survival instinct, drawing on the political capital invested in its preservation. The Eurozone’s reform conundrum remains the glaring gap between what is widely admitted as necessary and what is realized as politically feasible. Consecutive reform attempts have been frustrated by country coalitions that resist movement towards further risk sharing (through the fiscal, financial or monetary channel) or deny any further transfer of national autonomy. There are ways out of the EMU straitjacket. One is formally deferring the rules. Another is saying things without doing them. A third strategy is doing things without saying them. The momentous leap of ‘Next Generation EU’ notwithstanding, EMU remains incomplete, even though confidence in its ability to survive has been greatly boosted by its resilience in the face of the two severe, consecutive crises.