Political culture and political economy: interest, ideology and free trade

1998 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Trentmann
1996 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 1005-1048 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Trentmann

ABSTRACTThe debate over Free Trade was central to modem British history. This essay shifts attention from party politics to the changing discourse and perception of state and economy within the business community. It distinguishes three phases in the erosion of liberal political economy: reciprocity, defensive tariff reform, and modernizing protectionism. An analysis of the changing argument for protection points to the emergency of a new politico-economic settlement in the age of war and coordinated capitalism. The Free Trade culture of individualism and market was displaced by a new economic vision of combination and regulation. In political culture, however, state and economy continued to be viewed as separate spheres. Instead of a corporatist system, the new settlement between state and business was marked by a dissociation of economic from political pluralism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-69
Author(s):  
Benoit Challand ◽  
Joshua Rogers

This paper provides an historical exploration of local governance in Yemen across the past sixty years. It highlights the presence of a strong tradition of local self-rule, self-help, and participation “from below” as well as the presence of a rival, official, political culture upheld by central elites that celebrates centralization and the strong state. Shifts in the predominance of one or the other tendency have coincided with shifts in the political economy of the Yemeni state(s). When it favored the local, central rulers were compelled to give space to local initiatives and Yemen experienced moments of political participation and local development.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-158
Author(s):  
James A. Harris

AbstractMy point of departure in this essay is Smith’s definition of government. “Civil government,” he writes, “so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.” First I unpack Smith’s definition of government as the protection of the rich against the poor. I argue that, on Smith’s view, this is always part of what government is for. I then turn to the question of what, according to Smith, our governors can do to protect the wealth of the rich from the resentment of the poor. I consider, and reject, the idea that Smith might conceive of education as a means of alleviating the resentment of the poor at their poverty. I then describe how, in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith refines and develops Hume’s taxonomy of the opinions upon which all government rests. The sense of allegiance to government, according to Smith, is shaped by instinctive deference to natural forms of authority as well as by rational, Whiggish considerations of utility. I argue that it is the principle of authority that provides the feelings of loyalty upon which government chiefly rests. It follows, I suggest, that to the extent that Smith looked to government to protect the property of the rich against the poor, and thereby to maintain the peace and stability of society at large, he cannot have sought to lessen the hold on ordinary people of natural sentiments of deference. In addition, I consider the implications of Smith’s theory of government for the question of his general attitude toward poverty. I argue against the view that Smith has recognizably “liberal,” progressive views of how the poor should be treated. Instead, I locate Smith in the political culture of the Whiggism of his day.


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Livesey

AbstractWilliam Pitt's 1785 proposal for a free trade area between Britain and Ireland attempted to use free trade as a mechanism of imperial integration. It was a response to the agitation for political reform in Ireland and followed the attainment of legislative independence in 1782. The proposal aimed at coordinating economic and fiscal policy between the kingdoms without imposing explicit political controls. This article establishes that the measure failed because of the lack of consensus around the idea of free trade. Three contrasting ideas of free trade became apparent in the debates around the propositions of 1785: imperial or neomercantilist free trade, Smithean free trade, and national or neo-Machiavellian free trade. Imperial free trade was critical of monopolies but sought to organize trade to the benefit of the imperial metropole; Smithean free trade saw open markets as a discipline that assured efficiency but required imperial institutional frameworks, legally secured, to function. Neo-Machiavellian free trade asserted the right of every political community to organize its trade according to its interests. The article establishes the genealogy of these three positions in pamphlet debates and political correspondence in Britain and Ireland from 1689 to 1785. It argues that majority political opinion in Ireland, with exceptions, understood free trade in a neo-Machiavellian sense, while Pitt was committed to a Smithean ideal. The propositions collapsed because these internal tensions became more evident under the pressure of criticism. Liberal political economy did not of itself offer a route to a British exceptionality that finessed the tensions inherent in empire.


Author(s):  
Laila Kholid Alfirdaus ◽  
Eric Hiariej ◽  
Farsijana Adeney Risakotta

Relasi etnik Minang dan etnik Cina di Padang, Sumatra Barat, menarik untuk dikaji. Melalui desk-study atas kajian Minang dan Cina, yang diperkuat dengan penelitian lapangan pada 2010 dan 2013 secara kualitatif dengan wawancara dan observasi, tulisan ini menemukan bahwa tidak cukup melihat relasi etnik Minang dan Cina dari perspektif ekonomi politik. Kita perlu memberikan perhatian terhadap faktor budaya dan budaya politik masyarakat Minang di Padang yang bercorak matrilineal. Jika literatur yang ada cenderung deterministik, menghasilkan dua pandangan yang secara ekstrem berbeda, yang dalam artikel ini disebut pandangan manis dan sinis, tulisan ini berargumen sebaliknya. Relasi etnik Minang dan etnik Cina tidak bisa secara buru-buru disebut manis hanya karena etnik Cina telah menetap dan berpartisipasi dalam kehidupan sosial ekonomi Padang sejak zaman penjajahan, atau karena Padang relatif minim kerusuhan dibandingkan kota lainnya. Demikian juga, ia tidak bisa serta merta dilihat secara sinis hanya karena segregasi sosial terlihat lebih kentara. Tulisan ini berargumen bahwa dua wajah yang secara bersamaan terjadi tidak lepas dari bentukan budaya Minang yang lekat dengan nilai-nilai matrilineal yang tertuang dalam ide feministik Bundo KanduangInter-etnic relations between Minang and Chinese in Padang, West Sumatra, that looks different compared to other societies in Indonesia is interesting to discuss. Through a desk study about Minang and Chinese, being strengthened with fieldworks in 2010 and 2013 using qualitative methods in which in-depth interview and non-participatory observations, this article found that political economy perspective being used to explain Minang-Chinese relations is not enough. We need to pay attention on culture and political culture of Minangkabau society in Padang, that is matrilineal in the nature. While the existing lieratures tend to strictly classify the relations into sweet and cynical (good and bad relations), this article argue the contrary. The relatively long encounter of Chinese with Minang in Padang as well as the less conflicts (mass violence) against Chinese compared to the other regions could not be simply categorized as manis (sweet relations). Similarly, we should not undermine the good relations between Minang and Chinese, existing in some ocassions merely as formalistic practices just because of segregation in Minang and Chineses residential areas. This article argues that the twocontrary but inseparable faces of Minang-Chineses relations are inseparable from the Minangkabau culture that is matrilineal in the nature, as manifested in Bundo Kanduang containing the idea of femininity.


2021 ◽  
pp. 111-144
Author(s):  
Ryan Walter

This chapter examines the Corn Laws debate from 1813 to 1815, focusing on the contributions of Malthus, Ricardo, and Robert Torrens. This episode has traditionally been studied as a moment of conceptual progress for political economy, above all through the emergence of the concepts of diminishing returns and comparative advantage. The account here produces different results by returning the texts of Malthus, Ricardo, and Torrens to their historical context, which is shown to be one where casuistical argument was deployed to counsel Parliament on how to resolve a policy question. In particular, the issue was whether or not Parliament ought to diverge from the principle of free trade in the pursuit of other principles of statecraft, the stability and security of the food supply preeminently. Once the texts are read as instances of casuistry, Ricardo’s famed theoretical brilliance instead appears as clumsiness and detachment from the needs of Parliament.


2021 ◽  
pp. 25-71
Author(s):  
David Todd

This chapter investigates the political economy of French informal imperialism, revealing a little-known facet of the intellectual origins of globalization, and confirming that the pursuit of empire and the emergence of global consciousness were inextricably linked. It highlights lesser known thinkers, which helps recover what the prevailing attitudes of the informed liberal-leaning public towards empire actually were. After 1815, once the word “liberal” entered the political lexicon, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, the Abbé Dominique de Pradt, and Michel Chevalier described themselves as liberals — with some justification, since they admired Britain's balanced constitution and were stalwart advocates of free trade. Recovering their views on empire therefore helps to suggest that French liberals did not become imperialistic in the mid-nineteenth century, but instead consistently harboured imperial ambitions, even if, for pragmatic reasons, they tended to shun territorial expansion after 1815. Focusing on these neglected but influential figures also helps correct the common perception of France as having withdrawn from the international stage after the fall of Napoleon.


Slavic Review ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 630-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Zimmerman

There are two basic and conflicting views among scholars about the malleability of political culture—a group or nation's basic orientations to politics. By one account, culture is a relatively stable, ethnically or spatially specific predictor variable that shapes a nation's political institutions. In Russian studies, this is an approach that has emphasized the connection between the Russian autocratic past and the similarities between tsarist and bolshevik political institutions. Those attracted by this assessment of political culture are prone to think a statist, authoritarian political economy in Russia will be a constant regardless of the collapse of the Soviet system in 1991. The other approach views political culture as being more malleable. It has two variants. One snares with the first approach the assumption that culture is a predictor variable, but emphasizes the effects of secular changes in education and changes in work experience on the distribution of attitudes in a society.


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