Globalization and domestic politics: parties, elections and public opinion

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-402
Author(s):  
Derek Hawes
2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Kruke

From the beginning of the West German state, a lot of public opinion polling was done on the German question. The findings have been scrutinized carefully from the 1950s onward, but polls have always been taken at face value, as a mirror of society. In this analysis, polls are treated rather as an observation technique of empirical social research that composes a certain image of society and its public opinion. The entanglement of domestic and international politics is analyzed with respect to the use of surveys that were done around the two topics of Western integration and reunification that pinpoint the “functional entanglement” of domestic and international politics. The net of polling questions spun around these two terms constituted a complex setting for political actors. During the 1950s, surveys probed and ranked the fears and anxieties that characterized West Germans and helped to construct a certain kind of atmosphere that can be described as “Cold War angst.” These findings were taken as the basis for dealing with the dilemma of Germany caught between reunification and Western integration. The data and interpretations were converted into “security” as the overarching frame for international and domestic politics by the conservative government that lasted until the early 1960s.


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-146
Author(s):  
Terrence L. Chapman

Despite increased attention to the linkages between domestic politics and international relations in political science literature over the last 20 years, considerable debate remains about how well equipped citizens are to act as informed constraints on governments or how attentive and responsive government actors are to public opinion. Debates about citizens' ability to act as a check on government behavior are not new, of course, and have a long tradition in political philosophy and in public discourse. Yet the proliferation of theories of domestic–international linkages in contemporary IR scholarship has unfortunately been accompanied by incomplete dialogue between public opinion and IR scholars and often by claims of unidirectional or unconditional causality regarding domestic constraints, elite framing and opinion leadership, citizens' informational capacities, and the role of the media. The relationship among these factors in shaping foreign policy is quite complex, however, and fortunately Thomas Knecht acknowledges this complexity and advances a conditional argument about the relationship between public attitudes and presidential decision making.


Author(s):  
Catherine E. De Vries

Public contestation regarding European integration is becoming increasingly important for the future of the European project. While traditionally European Union (EU) scholars deemed public opinion of minor importance for the process of European integration, public support and scepticism is now seen as crucial for the survival of the European project. One important reason for this change in perspective is the increasing politicization of the EU in domestic politics. In recent years, a burgeoning literature on public contestation concerning European integration has developed. Students of public opinion in the EU have primarily focused their attention on the explanations of fluctuations in support and scepticism. This work stresses both interest- and identity-based explanations showing that support for European integration increases with skill levels and more inclusive identities. Less attention has been given to the conceptualization of the precise nature of public opinion and its role in EU politics. When it comes to the politicization of European integration and its effects on public opinion, many scholarly contributions have aimed to explore the conditions under which EU attitudes affect voting behavior in elections and referendums. Yet, the way in which public opinion affects policy making and responsiveness at the EU level has received much less scholarly attention. This suggests that more work needs to be undertaken to understand the conditions under which public contestation of the EU constrains the room to maneuver of domestic and European elites at the EU level, and the extent to which it poses a challenge to, or opportunity for, further integrative steps in Europe. Only by gaining a better understanding about the ways public opinion limits the actions of domestic and European elites or not at the EU level, will scholars be able to make predictions about how public opinion might affect the future of the European project.


1975 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 470-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Gribbin

For the last several decades, scholars concerned with America's foreign relations have paid increasing attention to public opinion, to national images, to the ties between domestic politics and international events. And because contemporary American diplomacy seems entangled in webs of mass behavior, the same wisdom has been applied to earlier times to investigate the way foreign policy has sometimes been an extension of passions and forces from the country's street corners, kitchen tables, and church pews. In this regard, great attention has lately been paid to American stereotypes of the Orient, as sages attempt to find in age-old popular attitudes the reasons for enduring problems of statecraft. Inasmuch as public interest shifts from one area of crisis to the next with each morning's headlines, it should be useful to examine, for areas other than the Far East, how the methods and goals of American diplomacy have been influenced or shaped, sometimes thwarted or transformed, by a kind of people's diplomacy growing out of the limited knowledge and unrestrained emotions of the man in the street.


2020 ◽  
Vol V (II) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Aiman Amjad Ali ◽  
Fozia BiBi ◽  
Muhammad Imran Ashraf

President Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan is tilted in favour of Israel. The prime motivation behind it is to put a favourable end to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Peace Plan has drawn great global response with those terming the Peace Plan as unreasonable outnumbering those who claim that the Peace Plan is devised to perfection. Despite the negative public opinion, President Trump still happens to be very confident about the prospects of his Peace Plan. The Peace Plan has very conveniently diverted attention from the domestic politics of both, President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and is thereby, suspected to be a part of another possible political strategy. With a multitude of players in action, this paper shall attempt to draw a comprehensive account of all the prospects of Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan.


Author(s):  
Christian Lequesne ◽  
Avtansh Behal

The European Union (EU) is a multilevel governance whose dynamics of change cannot be understood outside the perspective of each member state. France has contributed to the politics and policies of the EU, but the EU has also had an impact on French domestic politics and policies. As a founding member state of the European Communities (EC), France has played since the 1950s a major role in the development of European institutions, policies, and reforms leading to the EU. France has also, however, always had a paradoxical position regarding the institutional design of the EU. On one side, France has supported the principle of supranationality in the economic areas of EU integration (market and monetary policy). On the other side, it has preferred the intergovernmental method for foreign policy and defense. France’s influence in the EU was for a long time exercised in co-leadership with Germany. The return of Germany to full sovereignty after its reunification, the enlargements of the EU toward the East, and a growing asymmetry between French and German economies made the Franco-German partnership less central in the 1990s. France’s influence on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has diminished to the benefit of Germany, while it has remained central for the definition of a EU foreign and security policy. Like most of the EU member states, France has also to cope domestically with a growing politicization of the EU issue in the domestic context since the middle of the 1990s. Opposition to the EU has arisen among French public opinion and has restrained the autonomy of the French executive (president of the republic and government) in the EU negotiations. The dominant narrative in France about EU membership has four main components: being a founding member state, being a big member state, co-leading the EU with Germany, and making sure that the EU maximizes the French national interest. The relationships of the main French institutional actors with the EU focus on the president of the Republic, the prime minister, and the National Parliament, as well as major national courts and interest groups. The political debates on the EU in the French public sphere involve the mainstream political parties, the rise of Euroskepticism, the referendum campaigns on EU issues, and general trends in the public opinion. France’s contributions to the main EU policies include membership in the EMU, the commitment to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the attitudes toward the enlargement processes, and the future of the EU institutional reforms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 750-773
Author(s):  
Sanshiro Hosaka

AbstractThe leaked email accounts of Putin’s aide on Ukraine, Vladislav Surkov, are vast primary source collections that shed light on the backstage happenings of the Kremlin’s politics in the Donbas war. Surkov is an excellent dramaturg; he writes scripts, casts actors, analyzes their performance and narratives, runs promotions, and puts the repertoire into motion to achieve intended reactions of the target audience. Methods and resources employed against Ukraine have much in common with political technology that helps the Kremlin to manipulate public opinion as well as election systems using pseudo-experts, technical parties, fake civic organizations and youth movement such as Nashi, and covert media techniques. Moscow tactically promoted the myth of “Novorossiya”—later the circumstances forced Surkov to replace it with “Donbas.” These tactics gave false credibility to “separatists” who would voice Moscow’s objections to any attempts of Ukraine to drift westward, creating an illusion in the domestic and international audience: the separatists are not puppets of Moscow but desperately fight against Kyiv junta for their localized identity, and Russia is just there to offer them a helping hand. The Russian policy toward Ukraine after the 2013 fall is an extension of its “virtual” domestic politics, but not traditional diplomacy at all.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Hildebrandt ◽  
Courtney Hillebrecht ◽  
Peter M. Holm ◽  
Jon Pevehouse

1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 569-601 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON

This article argues that citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to survey questions about the European integration process. It develops a model of public opinion toward European integration based on attitudes toward the political system, the incumbent government, and establishment parties. With the help of data from Eurobarometer 34.0, the study tests political and economic models of public support for membership in the European Union in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. The analyses show that system and establishment party support are the most powerful determinants of support for membership in the European Union. The results also suggest that the relationship between economic factors and support previously reported in research on public opinion toward European integration is likely to be mediated by domestic political attitudes.


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