Do it once, get it right: Wholesale regulatory intervention in price and cost disclosure

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 110-116
Author(s):  
Nicholas Morris ◽  
Rob Nicholls
2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Armstrong ◽  
John Vickers

Contingent charges for financial services, such as fees for unauthorized overdrafts, are often controversial. We study the economics of contingent charges in a stylized setting with naive and sophisticated consumers. We contrast situations where the naive benefit from the presence of sophisticated consumers with situations where competition works to subsidize the sophisticated at the expense of the naive, arguably unfairly. The case for regulatory intervention in these situations depends in good part, but not only, on the weight placed on distributional concerns. The economic and legal issues at stake are well illustrated by a case on bank charges recently decided by the U.K. Supreme Court. (JEL D14, D18, G21, G28, L51)


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Farrell

In this short comment, I provide my views on "The Effect of Regulatory Intervention in Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of Interchange-Fee Capping in Australia" (published in this issue) that was presented at the Antitrust Activity in Card-Based Payment Systems: Causes and Consequences conference.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saqib Sharif

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the market reaction to the decision made by the management of the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) to impose a price floor that resulted in trading curbs in 2008. The paper analyzes if regulatory intervention helped in restoring investor confidence. Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines the effect of enforcement of a price floor and trading curbs by splitting the time period studied into two periods: pre-floor and post-floor period. The parametric t-statistics and non-parametric Mann-Whitney test are used to compare the abnormal returns (ARs), abnormal trading volume, bid-ask spread, Amihud illiquidity ratio, and price volatility between the two periods. Event study was conducted to observe the behavior of market returns surrounding market-wide price floor. Finally, multivariate regression analysis was also applied by controlling for factors that might influence valuation, liquidity, and volatility. The standard errors have been corrected for cross-sectional clustering due to market-wide restrictions. Findings – The study found an adverse impact of price freeze and trading curb in the KSE, following the relaxation of floor (resumption of active trading). First, the price of securities (or ARs) significantly declined following the relaxation of the price freeze. Second, the market liquidity deteriorated following the relaxation of the price floor. Third, the price volatility increased in the post-floor period. It seems that the decision made by the KSE’s board to implement lower cap on prices for an extended period was ineffective. Practical implications – Market intervention by regulators to bring calm in the financial markets have negative consequences across the globe. The results presented in this paper suggest that implementing price floor brought inefficiency in the market and prevented firms from raising capital to finance their future investments. The author believe this study will add to the knowledge base of regulatory intervention and its impact on the performance of financial markets. Originality/value – There is no empirical evidence on the impact of price limits on volatility in emerging markets. The author selected Pakistan as a case study, where we particularly focus upon impact of the enforcement of a price floor around the peak of Global Financial Crisis (or market intervention) in Pakistan. This study also documents the effect of trading curb on liquidity and volatility in an emerging market, given that a majority of research on trading halt/price limits is based on developed markets.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-342
Author(s):  
Valeria Ferrari

Based on the guidelines issued by the European Securities and Market Authority and by the European Banking Authority, the article deals with the legal qualification of blockchain-based crypto-assets under EU law. Focusing on crypto-assets that function as a) investment instruments (that is, investment tokens) and as b) electronic money (that is, payment tokens), the work outlines shortages and drawbacks in the applicability and enforcement of existing EU legal frameworks regulating investment activities and payment services. With such analysis, the article seeks to inform the ongoing debate within European institutions on the need of regulatory intervention in this area, and it points out pressing questions to be tackled by further research.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
David Antoni ◽  
Freddy Leal

Regulations are often imposed in order to correct any failures in the market, whether the failure is a result of the functioning of a market or the behaviour of a government. However, every regulatory intervention br ings up a question: How ethical is the regulation? Even if a regulatory intervention could achieve more effici ency or more equity, it may not mean that it is ethi cal. The concept of ethics is ne cessarily subjective, it is based on the morals and standards of a society. Yet even though a society may be concerned about ethics, the issues of equity and altrui sm matter as does the way in which firms produce and seek to rationally an d efficiently maximize profit. Defining ethics is a difficul t issue, and defining ethical regu lation is even more difficult. Any form of regulation is a tool for interv ention used to balanc e the trade-off between efficiency and equity to create harmony between a market or economy and the society it functions within. In an ideal world, any go vernment intervention implemented would be for the greater benefit of all. However, this does not always happen in the vicissitudes of the real world when governments regulate an d intervene in markets, which are, in turn, based on the principle of rational self-interest and efficiency. In this paper we discuss the role of society in market regu lation. The discussion will focus on the importance of society on ethics and therefore on what constitutes ethical regulations. In fact we argue that equity, effi ciency or even failures are not the main factors to consider when regulating. It is society that defines ethics and how society understands ethics influences the regulatory environment


Author(s):  
Michela Piccarozzi ◽  
Cecilia Silvestri ◽  
Alessandra Stefanoni

The third mission of the university has developed over the years, becoming a key aspect of university policy. The spin-offs are increasingly prosperous and innovative. Over the last decade University spin-offs in Italy have developed, but there are many difficulties that hinder the creation and success of such initiatives. A recent regulatory intervention, however, has created the conditions to overcome these difficulties by introducing the theme of innovative start-ups. Through the analysis of this issue we want to emphasize if these start-ups can contribute to the optimal development of spin-offs.


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