CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES AND STOCK MARKET VOLUME

1990 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-425
Author(s):  
YOLANDA K. HENDERSON
2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Gourio ◽  
Jianjun Miao

To study the long-run effect of dividend taxation on aggregate capital accumulation, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model in which there is a continuum of firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We find that a dividend tax cut raises aggregate productivity by reducing the frictions in the reallocation of capital across firms. Our baseline model simulations show that when both dividend and capital gains tax rates are cut from 25 and 20 percent, respectively, to the same 15 percent level permanently, the aggregate long-run capital stock increases by about 4 percent. (JEL D21, E22, E62, G32, G35, H25, H32)


2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 887-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer L. Blouin ◽  
Jana S. Raedy ◽  
Douglas A. Shackelford

ABSTRACT: This study jointly evaluates firm-level changes in investor composition and shareholder distributions following a 2003 reduction in the dividend and capital gains tax rates for individuals. We find that directors and officers, but not other individual investors, rebalanced their portfolios to maximize after-tax returns in light of the new tax rules. We also find that firms adjusted their distribution policy (specifically, dividends versus share repurchases) in a manner consistent with the altered tax incentives for individual investors. To our knowledge, this is the first study to employ simultaneous equations to estimate both shareholder and managerial responses to the 2003 rate reductions. We find that the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates are substantially stronger than OLS estimates, consistent with our expectation that investor and manager responses are simultaneously determined. Failure to estimate systems of equations may account for some of the weak and conflicting results from prior studies of the 2003 rate reductions.


Author(s):  
John R. Aulerich ◽  
James Molloy

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-small;">A reduction in the long-term capital gains tax rate provides investors with new strategies to minimize taxes and protect investment gains.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>One such opportunity exists when an investor decides to sell a profitable stock with a holding period of less than one-year, resulting in short-term ordinary taxes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The investor would find it more beneficial to sell the stock after one-year lapses, resulting in lower long-term capital gain taxes, although the longer holding period exposes the investor to the uncertainty of stock price movement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>A strategy to extend the holding period without excess risk would be to use the protective put option strategy, sometimes referred to as &ldquo;investment insurance&rdquo;.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The strategy involves the purchase of a put option to protect against the possible decline in the stock price, to take advantage of the lower long-term capital gains tax rate, and to preserve the upside potential of the stock.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Pursuant to IRS Publication 550, the IRS does not allow the use of a protective put to extend the holding period on the same security considered for sale.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Since the IRS does not allow a direct protective put hedge, this study will explore an alternative strategy involving the purchase of a put on a highly correlated investment to extend the holding period to recognize lower capital gains tax rates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The paper presents example situations when an investor benefits from utilizing the correlated protective put option strategy.</span></p>


2020 ◽  
pp. 0000-0000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Hanlon ◽  
Rodrigo Verdi ◽  
Benjamin P. Yost

We hypothesize that prior evidence of target shareholder capital gains tax liabilities affecting acquisition features is driven by the tax liabilities of the target firm CEO. To test this, we estimate CEOs' capital gains tax liabilities for a large sample of acquisitions and examine the effects of such liabilities on acquisition outcomes. Results indicate that the previously documented positive relations between shareholder-level capital gains tax rates and 1) the likelihood of a nontaxable acquisition (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2004) and 2) acquisition premiums (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2003) are largely driven by CEO tax effects. We also find evidence consistent with 1) CEOs' tax incentives leading to potential agency conflicts under certain conditions and 2) acquisition structure or premium being adjusted in response to CEOs' taxes depending on the alternatives available to the acquirer. Our study contributes to our understanding of what and whose taxes affect acquisition structure and value.


2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1356-1383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clemens Sialm

The tax burden on equity securities has varied substantially over time and remains a source of continuing policy debate. This paper investigates whether investors were compensated for the tax burden of equity securities over the period between 1913 and 2006. Taxes on equity securities vary over time due to changes in dividend and capital gains tax rates and due to changes in corporate payout policies. Equity taxes also vary across firms due to persistent differences in propensities to pay dividends. The results indicate an economically plausible and statistically significant tax capitalization over time and cross-sectionally. (JEL G10, G12, H22, H24, N21, N22)


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-416
Author(s):  
Ole Agersnap ◽  
Owen Zidar

This paper uses a direct-projections approach to estimate the effect of capital gains taxation on realizations at the state level and then develops a framework for determining revenue-maximizing rates at the federal level. We find that the elasticity of revenues with respect to the tax rate over a 10-year period is −0.5 to −0.3, indicating that capital gains tax cuts do not pay for themselves and that a 5 percentage point rate increase would yield $18 to $30 billion in annual federal tax revenue. Our long-run estimates yield revenue-maximizing capital gains tax rates of 38 to 47 percent. (JEL E62, H25, H71)


1986 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
S. Breckenridge

Eleven years after a previous abortive attempt, another Federal Labor Government has announced its intention to incorporate into the Australian fiscal scene a capital gains tax. The tax is to be levied at marginal and corporate income tax rates on 100 per cent of inflation adjusted gains realised on assets acquired on and after 20 September 1985.Whilst the Government expects its revenue yield to be low even at the end of five years of operation, the cost of protective administration and compliance to be incurred by taxpayers will be substantial.There are substantial areas of uncertainty in the capital gains tax proposals generally, and in particular as they relate to the petroleum industry. These issues, coupled with the prospect of significant legislative delay, will detract further from Australia's appeal as a focal point for essential exploration dollars.The capital gains tax proposals outlined to date deal, superficially, with basic and very tangible property. However, they do not come to grips with issues such as the potential duplication of this tax and resource rent tax, the need to protect the position of non-residents from double taxation, the basis for imposition of capital gains tax upon changes in licence and permit interest through direct or indirect transfers, to avoid bunching distortions, and to more fully provide for rollover relief.The capital gains tax proposals will exacerbate the substantial stress upon the Australian Taxation Office and, coupled with the forthcoming requirement of the Income Tax Assessment Act to accommodate the proposed resource rent tax, will only serve to highlight the fact that in reality the petroleum industry has not been a winner in this area of the tax reform process.The scope for unexpected capital gains tax exposures to arise is marked and will require a clear analysis of several long-established legal concepts to ensure that even reasonable results are obtained.


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