Trouble for Virtue Ethics? Some Implications for Normative Ethics

Author(s):  
Christian Miller
2010 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 1049-1069 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Huang

As the ethics of virtue, with a focus on cultivating admirable traits of character instead of commanding adherence to rigid rules, becomes increasingly popular in contemporary moral discourses, scholars have tried to find evidence of virtue ethics in such ancient traditions as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. This article explores the possibility of a virtue ethics in a tradition that has been largely neglected, Chinese Daoism, by focusing on one of the most important classics in this tradition, the Zhuangzi. Contrary to a common misconception of the Zhuangzi as skeptical, relativistic, and therefore empty of any guide to moral life, it presents a solid normative ethics through various stories, and this normative ethics is a virtue ethics. The most important trait of character in this Daoist virtue ethics is respect for different ways of life—a virtue not discussed in any familiar versions of virtue ethics in the West and yet most valuable to contemporary life in a global and pluralistic society.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 1040-1047
Author(s):  
Rajesh K ◽  
Rajasekaran V

Purpose of the study: The present study mainly argues the limitations of normative ethics and analyzes the anthropocentrism in Kim Stanley Robinson’s 2312 based on the actions or duties of the characters. Methodology: The article used normative ethics as a methodology. Normative ethics is the study of ethical actions that has certain rules and regulations about how we ought to do and decide. So, this study has chosen a normative ethic that consists of three ethical theories Utilitarian approach, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics to judge duties that are right and wrong.   Main Findings: As a result, normative ethics compact with a one-dimensional approach. All three ethics deal with its own specific code of ethics. Utilitarianism has focused on good outcomes. Kantian ethics has paid attention to good rules with duty. Virtue ethics focused on the good people but all three theories have a strong common objective of focusing on only human beings (sentient entities) and omit other entities (plants and animals). So all normative ethics have certain limitations and do their duties without thinking about consequences and situations. In conclusion, this code of normative ethics has provoked as anthropocentric. In addition that Swan’s actions and the rational behavior made her miserably failed in Mercury through the construction of the biome and creation of quantum computers. So this cause, in the end, the space people want to move from space to earth to rebuild the biome. Applications of this study: The prudent study analyses the normative ethics in a detailed manner under the Utilitarian approach, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics. These philosophical domains can be benefitted for researchers to practice and implement during the research process in Humanities and Social Sciences especially. Novelty/Originality of this study: The study analyzed the anthropocentric attitude of the character Swan in 2312 based on her actions or duties through the code of normative ethics (Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and Virtue ethics).


Author(s):  
Richard Galvin

This chapter focuses on the obligations that individuals who are not designated care-givers have toward those whose disability involves severe cognitive impairment in “non-structured contexts”. This might include casual encounters in routine day-to-day activities. The argument is that familiar accounts of normative ethics, including virtue ethics and (broadly) utilitarian and Kantian views, if unsupplemented and unmodified, fail to provide an adequate account of both the content of and the ground for such obligations. A more promising alternative account suggests that such obligations should be seen as aiding the severely cognitively impaired in acquiring three important human goods: engaging in cooperative efforts, achieving some level of agency, and developing self-respect. Those of us who are not designated care-givers both can and should interact with the severely cognitively impaired in non-structured contexts in ways that assist them in achieving these goods.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 19-32
Author(s):  
Adam Zadroga

From the beginning of the 1990s, a considerable interest in business ethics has been observed in Poland. It seems that the legacy of Polish researchers concerned with this academic discipline is already rich enough, and at the same time so diverse, that it is worth making an attempt to systematise it, exploring and appropriately naming the basic approaches to deal with business ethics in Poland. The carried-out analyses allowed to determine the following leading methods in the formal aspect: firstly, metaethics of business ethics; secondly, business ethics practised in the framework of various modifications of normative ethics (mostly deontology, utilitarianism, virtue ethics and ethics of responsibility; on the other hand, it has been observed that there is a complete lack of clear references to personalistic ethics); thirdly, business ethics practised as descriptive ethics in economic life.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Halbig

AbstractThe present article sets out to defend the thesis that among the more or less familiar enemies or challenges an adequate theory of virtue has to cope with is another, less obvious one – virtue ethics itself. The project of establishing virtue ethics as a third paradigm of normative ethics at eye level with consequentialism and deontological approaches to ethics threatens to distort not just our ethical thinking but the theory of virtue itself. A theory of virtue that is able to meet the demands of a full-blown virtue ethics necessarily has to face three fundamental dilemmas and thus seems to fail as an adequate theory of virtue. And vice versa: An ontologically and normatively viable theory of virtue will be unsuited to provide a promising starting point for virtue ethics as the “third kid on the block” among the options of self-standing paradigms of normative ethics.


Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump

The project of this book requires the ethics and value theory presupposed in Christian theology, and for purposes of the book the author takes the ethics and value theory of Aquinas as exemplary. It is an ethics that accepts an objective goodness which is tied to the nature of God and which is founded on a correlation of being and goodness. In its normative ethics, it is built around the virtues; but it is a non-Aristotelian virtue ethics, and it privileges relationship and the second-personal among the things it values most. Its most central virtue is love, and all the rest of its normative ethical theory rests on this virtue. This chapter contains an account of love, and it explains guilt and shame in terms of that account of love. It also considers the remedies for guilt and shame, including forgiveness, satisfaction or penance, and the remaining stain on the soul.


This handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions to consequentialist ethics by leading scholars, covering what’s happening in the field today as well as pointing to new directions for future research. Consequentialism is a rival to such moral theories as deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. But it’s more than just one rival among many, for every plausible moral theory must concede that the goodness of an act’s consequences is something that matters even if it’s not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories will accept both that the fact that an act would produce good consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it and that the better that act’s consequences the greater the moral reason there is to perform it. Now, if this is correct, then much of the research concerning consequentialist ethics is important for ethics in general. For instance, one thing that consequentialist researchers have investigated is what sorts of consequences matter: the consequences that some act would have or the consequences that it could have—if, say, the agent were to follow up by performing some subsequent act. And it’s reasonable to suppose that the answer to such questions will be relevant for normative ethics regardless of whether the goodness of consequences is the only thing that matters (as consequentialists presume) or just one of many things that matter (as nonconsequentialists presume).


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