Ecuador: Military Autonomy Under Democratic Rule

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maiah Jaskoski
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
The North ◽  
Border Dispute ◽  
Southern Border ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
The Military

Under Ecuador’s “third wave” democracy that began in 1979, the armed forces have exhibited considerable autonomy vis-à-vis civilians in government, as measured by (a) military intervention in politics and (b) the armed forces’ spread into internal security. Perhaps most noteworthy, military participation in politics and internal security increased significantly during the second half of the 1990s, in a permissive environment: as a result of their rule in the 1970s, the armed forces enjoyed a positive reputation within society as an institution capable of getting things done, without committing human rights abuses. Within that context, a traumatic military role crisis prompted the armed forces to expand their political and internal security roles. The armed forces lost their traditional mission of defending Ecuador’s southern border against Peru in the late 1990s, due to the resolution of that border dispute. In its search for institutional justification, the military proactively intensified its participation in politics and internal security. That extensive internal security work not only served as an indicator of military autonomy vis-à-vis civilians but it also made the armed forces ineffective and unreliable in responding to the civilian government’s basic national defense requirements, as evinced by the military’s response to a new sovereignty threat. When Colombian guerrilla crossings into northern Ecuador became a salient border threat in the 2000s, the armed forces focused on internal security in the north and not border defense.

The Philippines: Civil-Military Relations, from Marcos to Duterte

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence Lee
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Military Organization ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Philippine Politics ◽  
The Military ◽  
Elite Recruitment

The Philippines has been beset by several instances of military mutinies since the end of the Marco dictatorship. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were also actively involved in pressuring the resignation of President Joseph Estrada and in propping up the presidency of Estrada’s successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The military’s actions suggested that that the armed forces’ influence in Philippine politics was on the rise. Since that time, with no instances of coups and mutinies under the presidencies of Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III and Rodrigo Roa Duterte, military adventurism appears to be on the decline. Could it be that civilian supremacy is ascendant in the Philippines and the AFP have abandoned their “interventionist tendency” in civilian affairs? An examination of the patterns in post-Marcos Philippine civil-military relations in five domains—elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization—indicates that the AFP remain a highly politicized institution. Although institutional guardrails to preserve civilian supremacy have been instituted, with positive moves to professionalize and reorient the armed forces toward an external security posture, challenges in the areas of elite-dominated and clientelistic governance and the country’s protracted insurgencies remain obstacles to civilian political leaders’ authority over the military.

Rwanda: Civil–Military Relations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Jowell
Keyword(s):  
Central Africa ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Mass Violence ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Practical Experiences ◽  
The One ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

The army has been a central part of Rwanda’s political system from the precolonial period until the early 21st century and is intrinsically part of the construction and politics of the state. Civil–military relations in Rwanda demonstrate not only the central features of transitioning a rebel group to a national defense sector but also how some states construct their armed forces after a period of mass violence. Since the civil war and genocide in the early 1990s, the Rwandan military has been the primary actor in politics, the economy, and state building as well as in regional wars in central Africa and the Great Lakes region. Practical experiences of guerrilla insurgency and conflict in Uganda and Rwanda, postconflict military integration, and the intertwining of political and economic agendas with the ruling party have shaped civil–military relations in Rwanda and have been central to how the Rwandan defense sector functions. Contemporary Rwandan civil–military relations center around the two elements of service delivery and control, which has resulted in the development of an effective and technocratic military in terms of remit and responsibilities on the one hand, and the creation of a politicized force of coercion on the other hand. The military in Rwanda therefore reflects the pressures and dynamics of the wider state and cannot be separated from it. The Rwandan army is thus a “political army” and is part and parcel of the political structures that oversee and govern the Rwandan state.

The “Legacy Problem” and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea and the Philippines

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nae Young Lee
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Arduous Task ◽  
Power Base ◽  
New Democracy ◽  
The Military

New democracies face the arduous task of determining how to deal with gross human rights violations committed during their authoritarian pasts, or the “torturer problem,” to quote Samuel P. Huntington (1991). A new democracy can enhance its legitimacy if it brings human rights violators to justice, thus demonstrating the supremacy of democratic values, including the rule of law. By ensuring that no wrongdoer will go unpunished, the democratic regime prevents the danger of a future military coup d'état and future human rights abuses. Equally critical, it strengthens the power base of democratic forces by delegitimizing or even occasioning a purge of key authoritarian leaders, who often wield influence within the institutions of power, including the military, even after democratic transition. Punishing past wrongdoings constitutes an act of preempting a democratic reversal. In this sense, the question of the past becomes a struggle over power with today's authoritarian forces and for the future of third-wave democracy.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

Coup-Proofing in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) Region

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Lutterbeck
Keyword(s):  
Arab Spring ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Arab Countries ◽  
Common Finding ◽  
North African ◽  
Mena Region ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
The Arab Spring ◽  
The Military

Coup-proofing—that is, measures aimed at preventing military coups and ensuring military loyalty—has been a key feature of civil–military relations in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states. Just as the MENA region has been one of the most coup-prone regions in the world, coup-proofing has been an essential instrument of regime survival in Arab countries. The most commonly found coup-proofing strategies in the region include (a) so-called “communal coup-proofing,” involving the appointment of individuals to key positions within the military based on family, ethnic, or religious ties; (b) providing the military with corporate and/or private benefits in order to ensure its loyalty; (c) creating parallel military forces in addition to the regular military, so as to “counter-balance” the latter; (d) monitoring of the military through a vast internal security and intelligence apparatus; and (e) promoting professionalism, and thus political neutrality, within the military. The experiences of the “Arab Spring,” however, have shown that not all of these strategies are equally effective in ensuring military loyalty during times of popular upheavals and regime crises. A common finding in this context has been that communal coup-proofing (or militaries based on “patrimonialism”) creates the strongest bonds been the armed forces and their regimes, as evidenced by the forceful suppression of the popular uprising by the military in countries such as Syria, or by parts of the military in Libya and Yemen. By contrast, where coup-proofing has been based on the provision of material benefits to the military or on counterbalancing, as in Tunisia or Egypt, the armed forces have refrained from suppressing the popular uprising, ultimately leading to the downfall of these countries’ long-standing leaders. A further lesson that can be drawn from the Arab Spring in terms of coup-proofing is that students of both military coups and coup-proofing should dedicate (much) more attention to the increasingly important role played by the internal security apparatus in MENA countries.

normally only gradually, and this situation is not universally the case. There is growing understanding of the need for security arrangements which underpin the economic and political co-operation whose value is so clear to most decision-makers. Those who wish to see greater co-operation from the Latin American states in the non-proliferation and arms control fields should attempt to understand these phenomena and make a greater effort to bring the Latin Americans along. The North can help a great deal in educating key members of the civilian elites in these countries about defence matters. This would go a long way to easing some of the issues of civil-military relations mentioned. Showing more transparency ourselves in the working of arms control groupings can help to reduce concerns in these countries about their ability to resist excessive northern pressures if they accept the objectives sought by those countries in such groups. Working with nascent but interested elements of civil society, from universities and research centres for example can help to build the constituency for these objectives in key countries. And efforts to show the military that collaboration does not necessarily mean the end of a legitimate degree of armed forces influence in the security area and more widely in foreign policy, and that arms control does not necessarily imply ruin for them and their families, need to be made and indeed should be more closely studied in order to address these real concerns. There is thus a good deal which can be done. But culture remains formative and vital to states and individuals. These societies are the result of a lived historic experience and only an understanding of the very real security concerns they have will allow us to obtain more support from them in security fields which are, as in the past, still offering great challenges globally and regionally.

2012 ◽  
pp. 193-196
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The North ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Research Centres

Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julián González Guyer ◽  
Nicole Jenne
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Test ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Policy Management ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS IN HANDLING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 175
Author(s):  
Marina Ika Sari ◽  
Yuli Ari Sulistyani ◽  
Andhini Citra Pertiwi
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Health Security ◽  
Health Crisis ◽  
Strategic Role ◽  
The Military ◽  
Adaptation Phase

<p>The involvement of the military in the global health crisis has begun since the COVID-19 outbreak broke out in Indonesia, starting from the implementation of Large-Scale Social Distancing to the implementation of the new normal adaptation phase. However, the involvement has received mixed responses. Some parties consider it as natural, while others question the urgency of the military involvement. This study focuses on the role of two defense institutions, namely the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense in handling the COVID-19. It employs a qualitative research method and the theory of role, the concept of national defense, and the concept of Pandemic Management to analyze the problem. This study finds that the Indonesian National Armed Forces has a strategic role in several fields such as health, security and socio-economic as part of the efforts to contain COVID-19. The Ministry of Defense also plays a strategic role both internally and externally, by cooperating with other ministries, domestic private companies, state-owned enterprises in the defense industry sector, and with other countries in containing the COVID-19 pandemic.</p><p><strong>Keywords: </strong>role, defense, military, pandemic, COVID-19.</p>

Building Security through Insecurity: The Nigerian Military and Counter-Violence Campaigns in the Fourth Republic

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Segun Joshua ◽  
Daniel Gberevbie ◽  
Kester Onor
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Human Security ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Fourth Republic ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
The Military

Since independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria has been a victim, at one time or the other, of intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic, religious, and communal conflicts which have undermined the human security of her citizens. Nigeria’s corporate existence had also been threatened by 3 years (1967–1970) civil war which impacted negatively on the well-being of its people. In addition, the inability of the Nigerian Police to cope with the magnitude of the surge of violence in recent years has brought about the idea of involving the military, a core component of traditional security apparatus to deal with internal insecurity. This article is anchored on human security paradigm with reliance on secondary data to analyze the operations of the Nigerian Military in counterviolence campaigns between 1999 and 2017. This article points out that the involvement of the military in internal security has worsened the problem of insecurity due to the military’s unprofessional approach and, at times, deliberate targeting the civilian populace which it is supposed to protect. It, therefore, recommends among others, the need for the Federal Government of Nigeria to urgently review the role of the armed forces in addressing internal security situations in a way that will bring about respect for the rule of engagement in internal security operations and adherence to global best practices.

Honduras: All-Purpose Militarization

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Mani
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The State ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Civic Action ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
The Public ◽  
History Of ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
The Military

The Honduran military has a long history of established roles oriented toward both external defense and internal security and civic action. Since the end of military rule in 1982, the military has remained a key political, economic, and social actor. Politically, the military retains a constitutional mandate as guarantor of the political system and enforcer of electoral rules. Economically, its officers direct state enterprises and manage a massive pension fund obscured from public audit. Socially, the military takes on numerous civic action tasks—building infrastructure, conserving forests, providing healthcare, and policing crime—that make the state appear to be useful to its people and bring the military into direct contact with the public almost daily. As a result, the military has ranked high in public trust in comparison with other institutions of the state. Most significantly, the military has retained the role of arbiter in the Honduran political system. This became brutally clear in the coup of 2009 that removed the elected president, Manuel Zelaya. Although new rules enhancing civilian control of the military had been instituted during the 1990s, the military’s authority in politics was restored through the coup that ousted Zelaya. As no civilian politician can succeed without support for and from the military, the missions of the armed forces have expanded substantially so that the military is an “all-purpose” institution within a remarkably weak and increasingly corrupt state.

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