Rwanda: Civil–Military Relations

Practical Experiences ◽

The One ◽

Military Relations ◽

The army has been a central part of Rwanda’s political system from the precolonial period until the early 21st century and is intrinsically part of the construction and politics of the state. Civil–military relations in Rwanda demonstrate not only the central features of transitioning a rebel group to a national defense sector but also how some states construct their armed forces after a period of mass violence. Since the civil war and genocide in the early 1990s, the Rwandan military has been the primary actor in politics, the economy, and state building as well as in regional wars in central Africa and the Great Lakes region. Practical experiences of guerrilla insurgency and conflict in Uganda and Rwanda, postconflict military integration, and the intertwining of political and economic agendas with the ruling party have shaped civil–military relations in Rwanda and have been central to how the Rwandan defense sector functions. Contemporary Rwandan civil–military relations center around the two elements of service delivery and control, which has resulted in the development of an effective and technocratic military in terms of remit and responsibilities on the one hand, and the creation of a politicized force of coercion on the other hand. The military in Rwanda therefore reflects the pressures and dynamics of the wider state and cannot be separated from it. The Rwandan army is thus a “political army” and is part and parcel of the political structures that oversee and govern the Rwandan state.

The Philippines: Civil-Military Relations, from Marcos to Duterte

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1845 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Terence Lee

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

The Philippines ◽

National Defense ◽

Internal Security ◽

Military Organization ◽

Military Relations ◽

Philippine Politics ◽

The Military ◽

Elite Recruitment

The Philippines has been beset by several instances of military mutinies since the end of the Marco dictatorship. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were also actively involved in pressuring the resignation of President Joseph Estrada and in propping up the presidency of Estrada’s successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The military’s actions suggested that that the armed forces’ influence in Philippine politics was on the rise. Since that time, with no instances of coups and mutinies under the presidencies of Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III and Rodrigo Roa Duterte, military adventurism appears to be on the decline. Could it be that civilian supremacy is ascendant in the Philippines and the AFP have abandoned their “interventionist tendency” in civilian affairs? An examination of the patterns in post-Marcos Philippine civil-military relations in five domains—elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization—indicates that the AFP remain a highly politicized institution. Although institutional guardrails to preserve civilian supremacy have been instituted, with positive moves to professionalize and reorient the armed forces toward an external security posture, challenges in the areas of elite-dominated and clientelistic governance and the country’s protracted insurgencies remain obstacles to civilian political leaders’ authority over the military.

EL PLANEAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO MILITAR EN ARGENTINA (2003-2013): REFLEXIONES EN TORNO AL GOBIERNO POLÍTICO DE LA DEFENSA

Austral Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations ◽

10.22456/2238-6912.44875 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 3 (6) ◽

Author(s):

Luciano Anzelini ◽

Iván Poczynok

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

Defense Policy ◽

Point Of View ◽

The Political ◽

National Defense ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

First Time ◽

Core Problem

The national defense policy of Argentina has experienced advances and regressions since the democratic return in 1983. This result has been connected to the dynamics that civil-military relations have inherited from the dictatorial period. The necessity to subordinate the Armed Forces dominated the defense agenda during most part of the democratic period, constituting the core problem of this jurisdiction.The democratic governments implemented various initiatives that underpinned the civil control of the Armed Forces and that also caused, from a normative point of view, what has been characterised as a “basic consensus”. These measures restricted the autonomy of the men in uniform, whether through the demilitarization of civil functions or through the specific delimitation of the martial responsibilities.The habilitation of the spaces required for the exercise of the political administration of the jurisdiction did not necessarily implied, however, that civilians have fully developed this task. The performance of the democratic authorities in the area of defense had its ups-and-downs. At times, these deficiencies were associated to the very restraints of the domestic political conjuncture; at others, they resulted from the planning of the specific agenda of the sector, though.This paper studies the performances of the Ministry of Defense demarches during 2003-2013. The analysis focuses on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the sector; punctually, on the relative responsibilities of the military strategic planning. In this frame, the demarches of ministers José Pampuro (2003-05), Nilda Garré (2005-10) and Arturo Puricelli (2010-13) are resorted to.The temporal cutout of the study object assumes that a battery of unprecedented measures were implemented. For the first time since the return of democracy, for example, an effective debate on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the defense policy was addressed. Nevertheless, for reasons that are object of analysis during this article, the empowerment process of the political conduction survived along with ambiguities and retrogressions that, during the same period, made the absence of solid consensus regarding the results of the sectorial agenda evident.

Introduction to the Armed Forces & Society Forum on Military Reserves in the “New Wars”

Armed Forces & Society ◽

10.1177/0095327x21996220 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 0095327X2199622

Author(s):

Sergio Catignani ◽

Nir Gazit ◽

Eyal Ben-Ari

Keyword(s):

Conceptual Models ◽

Armed Forces ◽

New Wars ◽

Recent Trends ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

Critical Perspectives

This Armed Forces & Society forum is dedicated to exploring recent trends in the characteristics of military reserves and of the changing character of reserve forces within the armed forces within the military, the civilian sphere, and in between them. To bring new and critical perspectives to the study of reserve forces and civil–military relations, this introduction and the five articles that follow draw on two organizing conceptual models: The first portrays reservists as transmigrants and focuses on the plural membership of reservists in the military and in civilian society and the “travel” between them. The second model focuses on the multiple formal and informal compacts (contracts, agreements, or pacts) between reservists and the military.

Civil–Military Relations and Russia’s Post-Soviet Military Culture: A Belief System Analysis

Armed Forces & Society ◽

10.1177/0095327x211062932 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 0095327X2110629

Author(s):

Kirill Shamiev

Keyword(s):

Soviet Union ◽

System Analysis ◽

Belief System ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Military Culture ◽

Institutional Autonomy ◽

The Government ◽

Military Relations ◽

This article studies the role of military culture in defense policymaking. It focuses on Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations and military reform attempts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s armed forces were in a state of despair. Despite having relative institutional autonomy, the military neither made itself more effective before minister Serdyukov nor tried to overthrow the government. The paper uses the advocacy coalition framework’s belief system approach to analyze data from military memoirs, parliamentary speeches, and 15 interviews. The research shows that the military’s support for institutional autonomy, combined with its elites’ self-serving bias, critically contributed to what I term an “imperfect equilibrium” in Russian civil–military relations: the military could not reform itself and fought back against radical, though necessary, changes imposed by civilian leadership.

The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

Journal of Latin American Studies ◽

10.1017/s0022216x0000465x ◽

1993 ◽

Vol 25 (2) ◽

pp. 283-299 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Jorge Zaverucha

Keyword(s):

Third World ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The Political ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Political Autonomy ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Third World ◽

The Military ◽

Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1887 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Marco Bünte

Keyword(s):

Political Institutions ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Veto Power ◽

Internal Security ◽

Military Regimes ◽

The Government ◽

Military Relations ◽

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

The Role of Defence in National Cybersecurity

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198800682.013.27 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 446-462

Author(s):

Mika Kerttunen

Keyword(s):

Information And Communication Technologies ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Communication Technologies ◽

Industrial Complex ◽

Policy And Strategy ◽

Information And Communication ◽

Defence Sector ◽

Military Relations ◽

Essential to states organizing and regulating civil-military relations, the author analyses the actual and potential role and tasks that the defence sector and armed forces can take up in national cybersecurity policy and strategy. After identifying competences and capabilities that the defence sector could employ for national cybersecurity, the chapter identifies generic roles, from being an independent actor to being another integrated stakeholder, for the defence sector and the armed forces. The author notices how inclusion of the defence sector into national cybersecurity updates the concerns of the ‘military-industrial complex’ influencing not only cybersecurity policy but also how information and communication technologies are to be used in a society. Therefore, the chapter ultimately encourages states to implement strong political control in order to avoid unnecessary securitization and militarization of information technology and cyber development policies, misuse of public mandate and funds, and, ultimately, abuses of power by any elite.

normally only gradually, and this situation is not universally the case. There is growing understanding of the need for security arrangements which underpin the economic and political co-operation whose value is so clear to most decision-makers. Those who wish to see greater co-operation from the Latin American states in the non-proliferation and arms control fields should attempt to understand these phenomena and make a greater effort to bring the Latin Americans along. The North can help a great deal in educating key members of the civilian elites in these countries about defence matters. This would go a long way to easing some of the issues of civil-military relations mentioned. Showing more transparency ourselves in the working of arms control groupings can help to reduce concerns in these countries about their ability to resist excessive northern pressures if they accept the objectives sought by those countries in such groups. Working with nascent but interested elements of civil society, from universities and research centres for example can help to build the constituency for these objectives in key countries. And efforts to show the military that collaboration does not necessarily mean the end of a legitimate degree of armed forces influence in the security area and more widely in foreign policy, and that arms control does not necessarily imply ruin for them and their families, need to be made and indeed should be more closely studied in order to address these real concerns. There is thus a good deal which can be done. But culture remains formative and vital to states and individuals. These societies are the result of a lived historic experience and only an understanding of the very real security concerns they have will allow us to obtain more support from them in security fields which are, as in the past, still offering great challenges globally and regionally.

Culture and Security ◽

10.4324/9780203044766-12 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 193-196

Keyword(s):

Latin American ◽

Arms Control ◽

Good Deal ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Decision Makers ◽

The North ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

Research Centres

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0015 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 263-282

Author(s):

Sarah Sewall

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The United States ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Gray Zone ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

The Face ◽

Military Relations ◽

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

Armed Forces & Society ◽

10.1177/0095327x19877211 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 0095327X1987721 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Julián González Guyer ◽

Nicole Jenne

Keyword(s):

Empirical Test ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Policy Management ◽

Democratic State ◽

Democratic Rule ◽

Per Capita ◽

Military Relations ◽

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.