Military Effectiveness

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Biddle
Keyword(s):  
Humanitarian Assistance ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Per Se ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Amphibious Warfare ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Analytical Approaches

Military effectiveness is defined as the ability to produce favorable military outcomes per se, incluuding the outcomes of minor skirmishes at the tactical level of war and the outcomes of wars or even long-term politico-military competitions at the strategic or grand strategic levels of war. An alternative, narrower definition equates “effectiveness” with skill, the ability to make the most of one’s material resources, or qualities such as “integration” and “responsiveness.” Regardless of definition, military effectiveness is a central issue for international relations and lies at the heart of key policy debates. Until very recently, military effectiveness had generated little sustained interest from scholars. However, a new generation of academics, armed with new methodologies and analytical approaches, has begun to pay more attention to the subject. Contemporary literature on effectiveness describes three classes of candidate determinants: numerical preponderance, technology, and force employment. Despite increasing attention to effectiveness per se and to non-material contributors to effectiveness, especially force employment, many topics deserve further consideration in future research. These include maritime warfare, amphibious warfare, space warfare, and cyber warfare, chemical, biological, or nuclear combat operations; effectiveness in non-combat missions such as peacekeeping, nation building, signaling, or humanitarian assistance; systematic differences in military behavior for non-state actors, or for state actors in the developing world; and the roles of organization, logistics, leadership, morale, ethnic homogeneity, civil–military relations, and social structure, for example, as determinants of military effectiveness.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 283-298
Author(s):  
Risa Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Future Research ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Military Activity ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.

Cyber Operations, Legal Secrecy, and Civil-Military Relations

2020 ◽  
pp. 245-262
Author(s):  
Dakota S. Rudesill
Keyword(s):  
Decision Process ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Decision Processes ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Planning Decision ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
And Control

What civil-military challenges will arise from the virtual world of cyber warfare? Congress and the president have grown increasingly comfortable with permissive grants of authorities and decentralized delegations—including via classified documents with legal force (secret law)—, allowing military commanders to operationalize cyber tools in both defensive and offensive modes with greater ease and frequency. These cyber tools are unusually complex in their variety, design, and potential uses, at least relative to more traditional and conventional weapons. Their technical attributes render them difficult to monitor and regulate because those responsible for decisions to use such weapons—civilian officials—are often least likely to have experience or familiarity with them. The relatively low-cost, rapid-effect nature of cyberwar also encourages not just use in armed conflict, but also below the standard threshold of war. Cyber operations initiated without careful inter-agency planning, decision process, and presidential review drive up operational risk and undermine civil-military norms. To foster more effective civilian oversight and control of the nation’s military’s cyber sword, and to encourage more deliberative application of ever-evolving technologies, Congress should use its constitutional authorities over “the [cyber] land and naval Forces” to craft better decision processes and better civil-military and legal transparency balances.

Coup-Proofing Vulnerable Presidencies in Latin America

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Rittinger
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
New Left ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Corporate Identity ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations

In Latin America, democratization in the 1980s and 1990s brought greater military subordination to elected leaders and a promising new era of civil–military relations. Yet the threat of coups lingered—particularly where leaders most threatened elite interests and where coups could be justified as “restoring” democracy. Such was the case in the early 21st century for presidents on the radical, populist side of Latin America’s “New Left,” including Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Manuel Zelaya of Honduras, and Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela. In response, these presidents sought to guard their “contestatory” agenda by diminishing the armed forces’ ability and willingness to derail it. They adopted strategies like increasing spending on military hardware and salaries, stacking the officer corps with loyalists, indoctrinating the armed forces into the government’s political ideology, and raising citizen militias and parallel security forces. To different degrees—and with different degrees of success—they attempted to secure the military’s loyalty and to raise the costs of executing a coup. In other words, they engaged in coup-proofing, a practice used by vulnerable leaders around the world. The study of coup-proofing in Latin America can advance research on comparative civil–military relations and democratization in several ways. First, scholars usually treat coup-proofing strategies as a response to the elevated risk of a coup. But when they threaten the military’s conservative corporate identity or limit its autonomy from civilian control, those strategies themselves could end up elevating that risk. Cases of coup-proofing from Latin America’s New Left would prove relevant for research seeking to disentangle this complicated causal relationship. Second, coup-proofing could jeopardize democratic consolidation, if not survival, if it shifts the military’s loyalty from a democratic, constitutional order to a particular leader and ideology. But if coup-proofing prevents unelected leaders from usurping office, then it might protect democracy. The short and long-term effect of coup-proofing on democratic institutions thus remains an open question. And third, if coup-proofing is to retain its conceptual utility in a region populated by democracies and hybrid regimes, then the definition of a “coup” has to remain limited to an illegal, undemocratic seizure of power involving at least some elements of the armed forces. Otherwise, coup-proofing could become conflated with impeachment-proofing. In practice, however, it becomes difficult to distinguish efforts aimed at preventing a coup from efforts aimed at escaping legal constraints on presidential power. This presents a challenge but also an opportunity for future research. The record of coups and attempted coups in Latin America over the first two decades of the 21st century shows that while the coup d’état is no longer a fixture of political life in the region, it remains a real possibility. That reality calls for more research into coup risk, the ways that leaders respond to it, and the political consequences that follow.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Impact ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter provides an overview of the central claims in the book. It begins by describing some recent vignettes in India’s civil–military relations, which convey the disquiet and its recurring crises. Next, it presents the main argument of this book—India’s pattern of civil–military relations has had an adverse impact on the variables associated with military effectiveness. The pattern, termed an “absent dialogue,” emerges from different factors but, in effect, results in creating strong silos between civilians and the military. Thereafter, the chapter explains why these conditions persist. It then highlights the relevance of this book. The penultimate section describes the sources and methodology, and the chapter concludes with an overview of the rest of the chapters in this book.

The Absent Dialogue

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Deep Dive ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Promotion Policies ◽  
Weapons Procurement ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Postcolonial States ◽  
The Military

Civilian control over the military is widely hailed as among the biggest successes of India’s democracy. This is a rarity, especially among postcolonial states, and is rightfully celebrated. But has this come at a cost? The Absent Dialogue argues that the pattern of civil–military relations in India has hampered its military effectiveness. Indian politicians and bureaucrats have long been content with the formal and ritualistic exercise of civilian control, while the military continues to operate in institutional silos, with little substantive engagement between the two. In making this claim, the book closely examines the variables most associated with military effectiveness—weapons procurement, jointness (the ability of separate military services to operate together), officer education, promotion policies, and defense planning. India’s pattern of civil–military relations—best characterized as an absent dialogue—adversely affects each of these processes. Theoretically, the book adopts the “unequal dialogue” framework proposed by Eliot Cohen but also argues that, under some conditions, patterns of civil–military relations may more closely resemble an “absent dialogue.” Informed by more than a hundred and fifty interviews and recently available archival material, the book represents a deep dive into understanding the power and the limitations of the Indian military. It sheds new light on India’s military history and is essential reading for understanding contemporary civil–military relations and recurring problems therein. While the book focuses on India, it also highlights the importance of civilian expertise and institutional design in enhancing civilian control and military effectiveness in other democracies.

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