Cyber Operations, Legal Secrecy, and Civil-Military Relations

2020 ◽  
pp. 245-262
Author(s):  
Dakota S. Rudesill
Keyword(s):  
Decision Process ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Decision Processes ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Planning Decision ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
And Control

What civil-military challenges will arise from the virtual world of cyber warfare? Congress and the president have grown increasingly comfortable with permissive grants of authorities and decentralized delegations—including via classified documents with legal force (secret law)—, allowing military commanders to operationalize cyber tools in both defensive and offensive modes with greater ease and frequency. These cyber tools are unusually complex in their variety, design, and potential uses, at least relative to more traditional and conventional weapons. Their technical attributes render them difficult to monitor and regulate because those responsible for decisions to use such weapons—civilian officials—are often least likely to have experience or familiarity with them. The relatively low-cost, rapid-effect nature of cyberwar also encourages not just use in armed conflict, but also below the standard threshold of war. Cyber operations initiated without careful inter-agency planning, decision process, and presidential review drive up operational risk and undermine civil-military norms. To foster more effective civilian oversight and control of the nation’s military’s cyber sword, and to encourage more deliberative application of ever-evolving technologies, Congress should use its constitutional authorities over “the [cyber] land and naval Forces” to craft better decision processes and better civil-military and legal transparency balances.

The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision

2011 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 87-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Feaver
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid Approach ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
The Right ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
President Bush ◽  
Primary Problem ◽  
Better Than

President George W. Bush's Iraq surge decision in late 2006 is an interesting case for civil-military relations theory, in particular, the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists over how much to defer to the military on decisions during war. The professional supremacists argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations during war is ensuring the military an adequate voice and keeping civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging matters. Civilian supremacists, in contrast, argue that the primary problem is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction. A close reading of the available evidence—both in published accounts and in new, not-for-attribution interviews with the key players—shows that the surge decision vindicates neither camp. If President Bush had followed the professional supremacists, there would have been no surge because his key military commanders were recommending against that option. If Bush had followed the civilian supremacists to the letter, however, there might have been a revolt of the generals, causing the domestic political props under the surge to collapse. Instead, Bush's hybrid approach worked better than either ideal type would have.

Policy and System in Defense: The Australian Case

1963 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-261
Author(s):  
B. B. Schaffer
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Australian Case ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
And Control

Defense policy and civil-military relations are now well established fields for political science. They raise problems that are important and exciting in their own right and as dramatic instances of general institutional problems of policy-making and control. Comparative and particular aspects of this field should be appreciated. What are the special characteristics of the Australian type of situation?

India

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Optimization Theory ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Nuclear Tests ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
And Control ◽  
Control Apparatus

This chapter explores India's nuclear posture. Like China's, India's nuclear posture is classified as one of assured retaliation. There have been various dramatic moments in India's nuclear weapons history that were often driven by domestic political considerations, most notably its nuclear tests in May of 1974 and 1998. Nonetheless, the capabilities, envisioned use, and command-and-control apparatus that Delhi has erected for its nuclear forces have been persistent and consistent with an assured retaliation posture since 1974. The reason for this, as illustrated by optimization theory, is that India is in a relatively secure position but with highly assertive civil–military relations, driving it toward an assured retaliation nuclear posture that emphasizes firm civilian control over the arsenal.

Formal Strategic Analyses and Organizational Performance: Decomposing the Rational Model

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 853-883 ◽  
Author(s):  
George C. Mueller ◽  
Mark A. Mone ◽  
Vincent L. Barker
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Organizational Performance ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Top Management Teams ◽  
Decision Processes ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Performance Effects ◽  
Communication Control ◽  
And Control

Although a substantial body of literature suggests a positive relationship between decision process rationality and organizational performance, there is also compelling evidence that this relationship is negative. We argue that these equivocal findings may be due, in part, to a lack of construct specificity and different methodologies employed to assess decision process rationality. Drawing from Langley's (1989) framework of decision process rationality, we examined the effects of formal analysis for purposes of information, persuasion and communication, control and direction, and symbolism, considering also their effects in the context of environmental dynamism. Using survey data from top management teams in 42 organizations, we found that in both high and low dynamism environments, the instrumental use of information in decision processes was positively linked with organizational performance. In dynamic environments, while analyses for symbolic and control purposes were positively associated with performance, analysis for persuasion was negatively associated with performance. By unraveling the performance effects of different elements of decision-making rationality, we can better understand the nature of relationships between strategic decision processes and organizational performance. This understanding might ultimately lead to better strategic decision making in organizations.

Military Effectiveness

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Biddle
Keyword(s):  
Humanitarian Assistance ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Per Se ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Amphibious Warfare ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Analytical Approaches

Military effectiveness is defined as the ability to produce favorable military outcomes per se, incluuding the outcomes of minor skirmishes at the tactical level of war and the outcomes of wars or even long-term politico-military competitions at the strategic or grand strategic levels of war. An alternative, narrower definition equates “effectiveness” with skill, the ability to make the most of one’s material resources, or qualities such as “integration” and “responsiveness.” Regardless of definition, military effectiveness is a central issue for international relations and lies at the heart of key policy debates. Until very recently, military effectiveness had generated little sustained interest from scholars. However, a new generation of academics, armed with new methodologies and analytical approaches, has begun to pay more attention to the subject. Contemporary literature on effectiveness describes three classes of candidate determinants: numerical preponderance, technology, and force employment. Despite increasing attention to effectiveness per se and to non-material contributors to effectiveness, especially force employment, many topics deserve further consideration in future research. These include maritime warfare, amphibious warfare, space warfare, and cyber warfare, chemical, biological, or nuclear combat operations; effectiveness in non-combat missions such as peacekeeping, nation building, signaling, or humanitarian assistance; systematic differences in military behavior for non-state actors, or for state actors in the developing world; and the roles of organization, logistics, leadership, morale, ethnic homogeneity, civil–military relations, and social structure, for example, as determinants of military effectiveness.

Civil–Military Relations and Democratic Stability

2020 ◽  
pp. 297-318
Author(s):  
Steven I. Wilkinson
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Rank One ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Democratic Stability ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The One ◽  
Military Relations

Steven Wilkinson builds on the Rudolphs’ (1964) seminal analysis of India’s civilian–military relations to explain why India, in contrast to many other countries, has succeeded in preventing military intervention in domestic politics. He reviews recent concerns arising from the efforts by retired military leaders to become involved in politics, the widespread mobilization among India’s three million veterans by leaders of the ‘One Rank One Pension’ campaign, and disagreements between military leaders and political leaders in the Ministry of Defense. Wilkinson finds that the biggest threat to the stability of civilian–military relations results from the diminishing insulation of soldiers from conflicts and tensions in their villages, states, and the wider society due to developments in telecommunication and social media. He sees no threatening conflict on the horizon at the moment. Wilkinson views the failure to modernize conventional weapons systems as the most serious problem now confronting the military.

Organizing evaluation: Assessing combat leadership quality

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Wagstaff
Keyword(s):  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Leadership Quality ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
The Us ◽  
Informative Signals ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

What determines military effectiveness? Previous literature has examined factors such as military doctrine, culture, and capabilities, as well as regime type and civil–military relations, but has largely ignored military leadership quality. Competent military leaders positively influence battle outcomes by ensuring proper implementation of battleplans and quick reaction to an increasingly dynamic battlefield. This paper formally models the relationship between high-ranking military commanders and their immediate subordinates to examine the commander’s ability to evaluate her personnel. I vary the ability of the subordinates to signal their commander to determine how different signaling structures influence what commanders may learn. This analysis reveals that commanders opt for less informative signals from subordinates as the military professionalizes, potentially impeding their ability to identify and remove incompetent subordinates. Leaving incompetent subordinates in command reduces the ability of the military to improve. Evidence from the US Army’s leadership decisions after the Battle of Kasserine Pass and Operation Avalanche illustrates these results.

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