The Absent Dialogue

Promotion Policies ◽

Weapons Procurement ◽

Military Relations ◽

Postcolonial States ◽

Civilian control over the military is widely hailed as among the biggest successes of India’s democracy. This is a rarity, especially among postcolonial states, and is rightfully celebrated. But has this come at a cost? The Absent Dialogue argues that the pattern of civil–military relations in India has hampered its military effectiveness. Indian politicians and bureaucrats have long been content with the formal and ritualistic exercise of civilian control, while the military continues to operate in institutional silos, with little substantive engagement between the two. In making this claim, the book closely examines the variables most associated with military effectiveness—weapons procurement, jointness (the ability of separate military services to operate together), officer education, promotion policies, and defense planning. India’s pattern of civil–military relations—best characterized as an absent dialogue—adversely affects each of these processes. Theoretically, the book adopts the “unequal dialogue” framework proposed by Eliot Cohen but also argues that, under some conditions, patterns of civil–military relations may more closely resemble an “absent dialogue.” Informed by more than a hundred and fifty interviews and recently available archival material, the book represents a deep dive into understanding the power and the limitations of the Indian military. It sheds new light on India’s military history and is essential reading for understanding contemporary civil–military relations and recurring problems therein. While the book focuses on India, it also highlights the importance of civilian expertise and institutional design in enhancing civilian control and military effectiveness in other democracies.

Forging the Sword

The Absent Dialogue ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190905903.003.0002 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 14-37

Author(s):

Anit Mukherjee

Keyword(s):

Institutional Design ◽

Analytical Framework ◽

Military Education ◽

Military Effectiveness ◽

Professional Military Education ◽

Promotion Policies ◽

Weapons Procurement ◽

Military Relations ◽

Defense Planning

This chapter explains the book’s theoretical underpinnings. It begins by discussing the contrasting views of Samuel Huntington and Eliot Cohen on the preferred role and “balance” of civil–military relations. Next, it examines patterns of democratic civil–military relations to argue that they are shaped largely by three factors—the struggle over military autonomy, the issue of civilian expertise, and institutional design, specifically the manner in which the Ministry of Defence interacts with the services. The next section discusses the concept of military effectiveness as adopted in this book. Drawing inspiration from previous works, it examines five processes associated with effective militaries. These variables, analyzed subsequently in separate chapters, are weapons procurement, jointness, professional military education, officer promotion policies, and defense planning. The chapter then discusses the study of the Indian military and its effectiveness and concludes by describing the analytical framework adopted in the rest of the book.

Conclusion

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0016 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 283-298

Author(s):

Risa Brooks

Keyword(s):

Future Research ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Effectiveness ◽

Us Military ◽

The Individual ◽

Military Relations ◽

Military Activity ◽

The Military ◽

The Relationship

The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.

Civil-Military Relations

International Law ◽

10.1093/obo/9780199796953-0184 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Thomas Bruneau

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Political Power ◽

The United States ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Effectiveness ◽

Democratic Transitions ◽

Democratic Regimes ◽

Military Relations ◽

The literature encompassed within the area of civil-military relations (CMR) is extremely broad. The focus in this bibliography is primarily on CMR as a subfield of comparative politics in that it deals with the power relations between the military and civilians. This bibliography is concerned with the classic question, raised in the 1st century ce by Juvenal: Who will guard the guardians? From this perspective, CMR is generally about power and politics of an organization with a monopoly in arms to exercise political power. While foreign states and international organizations may influence CMR, particularly during democratic transitions, it is essentially a national phenomenon. International law does, however, pertain in most of the roles and missions the military are tasked with. Not included in this bibliography are the following topics: military history, strategy and doctrine, sociology of the armed forces including recruitment, gender, race, and health. Thus, important authors such as Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos will not be included. This bibliography will break new ground in four ways: First, in giving attention to military effectiveness as well as the traditional focus on civilian control; second, in giving attention to roles and missions currently executed by the military; third, in including non-democracies, democracies, and those in transition; and fourth, in including the roles of private contractors in the mix of civil-military relations. The six primary sections in this bibliography are the following: Democratic Civilian Control is mainly about the United States and its emphasis is on the military taking political power, even though the American military has never sought to take power. CMR in Contemporary Non-Democratic Regimes focuses on China, Russia, and Egypt as they are all globally important non-democratic regimes, with varied relationships between the military and civilians. CMR in Democratic Transitions is included as the military is a key actor in virtually every transition from the beginning of Third Wave of democratization, starting in Lisbon, Portugal, on April 25, 1974. CMR in the Context of Roles and Missions is included as it details that the military mainly implements roles and missions not involving conflict with other militaries, and includes the role of international law. The section on CMR Including Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness is included as attention must be paid to effectiveness in the different roles and missions for military organizations. And, finally military roles and missions assumed by Non-Military For-Profit Private Enterprises are included as involvement of private enterprise raises questions regarding the state’s putative monopoly of power and roles of the military.

NEUČINKOVITOST VOJSKE KOT POKAZATELJ NEUSTREZNOSTI CIVILNEGA NADZORA (2)

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES ◽

10.33179//bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.17.3.1 ◽

2015 ◽

pp. 11-23

Author(s):

BRANIMIR FURLAN

Keyword(s):

First Generation ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Methodological Framework ◽

Military Effectiveness ◽

The Republic ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

The Impact

Prispevek je nadaljevanje analize o vzročno-posledični povezavi med civilnim nadzorom in učinkovitostjo vojske. V prvem delu je bil predstavljen teoretično- metodološki okvir analize, v tem delu pa avtor predstavlja rezultate raziskave o stanju civilno-vojaških odnosov v Republiki Sloveniji ter vplivih civilnega nadzora na učinkovitost Slovenske vojske. Raziskava je pokazala, da se v Sloveniji uveljavlja praksa civilnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami po vzoru drugih demokratičnih držav, vendar problematika prve generacije civilno-vojaških odnosov še ni končana. Uveljavljanje nadzora v praksi zagotavlja podrejenost vojske civilnim oblastem, pri čemer mehanizmi nadzora ne krepijo sposobnosti Slovenske vojske, da učinkovito izpolni svoje poslanstvo. Posledično lahko povzročijo nezadovoljstvo vojske ali izgubo kredibilnosti v javnosti. This article is a continuation of the analysis of cause-effect relations between civilian control and military effectiveness. The first part presented the theoretical and methodological framework, while in the second part, the author presents the results of the study of civil-military relations in the Republic of Slovenia, focusing on the impact of civilian control on the effectiveness of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The study showed that the practice of civilian control over the armed forces in Slovenia follows the example of those in other democratic states. However, the issue of the first-generation civil-military relations has not yet been completed. The enforcement of civilian control in practice provides for a complete subordination of the military to civilian authorities; however, it does not contribute to the ability of the military to effectively execute its missions. Rather, civilian control can cause military dissatisfaction and reluctance, as well as loss of credibility with the society.

Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis

Comparative Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0010414021989757 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 001041402198975

Author(s):

Polina Beliakova

Keyword(s):

Comparative Analysis ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Intrastate Conflict ◽

Large N ◽

Military Relations ◽

Comprehensive Framework ◽

The Military ◽

New Framework

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democracy. While democracies are less coup-prone, studies treating civilian control as a dependent variable mostly focus on coups. In this paper, I argue that the factors predicting coups in autocracies, weaken civilian control of the military in democracies in different ways. To capture this difference, I advance a new comprehensive framework that includes the erosion of civilian control by competition, insubordination, and deference. I test the argument under conditions of an intrastate conflict—a conducive environment for the erosion of civilian control. A large-N analysis confirms that while intrastate conflict does not lead to coups in democracies, it increases the military’s involvement in government, pointing to alternative forms of erosion taking place. Further case study—Russia’s First Chechen War—demonstrates the causal logic behind the new framework, contributing to the nuanced comparative analysis of civil-military relations across regimes.

The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

Journal of Latin American Studies ◽

10.1017/s0022216x0000465x ◽

1993 ◽

Vol 25 (2) ◽

pp. 283-299 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Jorge Zaverucha

Keyword(s):

Third World ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The Political ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Political Autonomy ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Third World ◽

The Military ◽

Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

The Control-Effectiveness Framework of Civil–Military Relations

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1874 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Florina Cristiana Matei ◽

Carolyn Halladay

Keyword(s):

Law Enforcement ◽

Democratic Governance ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Century Model ◽

Security Sector ◽

Control Effectiveness ◽

Law Enforcement Officials ◽

Military Relations ◽

Civil–military relations—particularly the principles and practices of civilian control of the security sector—have changed significantly since the 1990s as more and more states around the world seek to consolidate democracy. The scholarly focus and the policy that it informs remain stuck in a mid-20th-century model, however. While civilian control remains central, this civilian oversight must, itself, uphold the requirements of democratic governance, ensuring that the uniformed forces are well integrated into the democracy that they are sworn to protect. Moreover, this democratic civilian control also must ensure the effectiveness of the security sector in the sense that soldiers, law enforcement officials, and intelligence agencies can fulfill the range of their missions. Thus, democratic civilian control requires ongoing attention from both the civilian and the military sides.

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0015 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 263-282

Author(s):

Sarah Sewall

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The United States ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Gray Zone ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

The Face ◽

Military Relations ◽

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

The Best of Intentions

The Absent Dialogue ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190905903.003.0008 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 222-249

Author(s):

Anit Mukherjee

Keyword(s):

Institutional Design ◽

History Of ◽

Conceptual Discussion ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

Defense Planning

This chapter examines defense planning in the Indian military. It begins with a conceptual discussion on the role of civilians in defense planning, mainly by examining the experience of other democracies. Next, it describes the history of defense planning in India, focusing on the formulation and implementation of five-year defense plans. There are three main arguments in this chapter. First, effective defense planning requires a close partnership between civilians and the military. Second, defense planning in India is marked by a lack of civilian guidance and institutional discordance, creating friction in civil–military relations. To an extent, this is because of a lack of expertise, on the part of civilians, and an institutional design that creates strong civil–military silos. Third, notwithstanding the above, there have been periodic attempts at reforming defense-planning structures. Progress has been achieved in some sectors, but much remains to be done.

Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

Armed Forces & Society ◽

10.1177/0095327x19877211 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 0095327X1987721 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Julián González Guyer ◽

Nicole Jenne

Keyword(s):

Empirical Test ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Policy Management ◽

Democratic State ◽

Democratic Rule ◽

Per Capita ◽

Military Relations ◽

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.