scholarly journals A missing touch of Adam Smith in Amartya Sen’s account of public reasoning: the man within for the man without

2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-283
Author(s):  
Laurie Bréban ◽  
Muriel Gilardone
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Weak Point ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Spontaneous Change ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Comparative Theory

Abstract Sen claims that his 2009 theory of justice is based in part upon Smith’s idea of the ‘impartial spectator’. His claim has received criticism: some authors have responded that his interpretation of Smith’s concept is unfaithful to the original; others, focussing on internal features of Sen’s analysis, critique his use of the Smithian impartial spectator, arguing that it is a weak point in his comparative theory of justice. In this paper, we address both sets of criticisms. While agreeing with commentators that Sen’s reading of Smith is somewhat unfaithful, we reiterate that his aim in The Idea of Justice is not to provide an exegesis of Smith but rather to build his own comparative theory of justice by ‘extending Adam Smith’s idea of the impartial spectator’ (IJ: 134) to his own project. After clarifying their distinct approaches to the concept of the impartial spectator, we draw upon our account of these differences to evaluate Sen’s own use of the concept. Despite significant divergences, we show that Sen’s version of the impartial spectator is not inconsistent with Smith’s analysis. Though it does not correspond to Smith’s concept, that is to what the Scottish philosopher sometimes calls the ‘man within’, it is reminiscent of another figure from Smith’s moral philosophy: the ‘man without’. Beyond this analogy, there are further connections between Smith’s imaginary figure of the ‘man within’ and Sen’s account of ‘common beliefs’—both notions are ways of representing our beliefs regarding what is moral or just. But whereas Smith’s moral philosophy offers an analysis of the process by which the ‘man without’ influences the ‘man within’, nothing of that kind is to be found in Sen’s conception of public reasoning. And it is here that Smith’s famous concept of ‘sympathy’ can supplement Sen’s theory, in a way that furnishes an answer to Shapiro’s (2011) criticism regarding the possibility of spontaneous change of beliefs towards greater impartiality.

‘The Man Within’: Adam Smith on Moral Autonomy and Religious Sentiments

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeng-Guo S. Chen
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Autonomy ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Innocent People ◽  
Religious View ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The Mind

This essay analyses the ethical importance and religious implications of ‘the man within’ in Adam Smith's moral philosophy. Not introduced until the second edition of Theory of Moral Sentiments, ‘the man within’ appears as the internalization of the impartial spectator. With the invention of the man within, Smith was able to explain how moral agents pursue virtues and behave morally beyond immediate and quotidian concerns with either praises or blames from society. Having complied with the general dictates of the impartial spectator with conscience, humans become morally autonomous individuals whose moral judgements are derived from constant dialogues with the man within in an ethical microcosm within their breasts. The man within possesses a transcendent nature that preempts social judgements. Because of that transcendent nature, Smith also denominated the man within as ‘the substitute of Deity’. This essay also argues that even conscientious and virtuous individuals can be wronged and misjudged by society. To Smith, religious sentiments were most likely generated among the morally autonomous, innocent people. Afflicted with devastating distranquility of the mind caused by misjudgments of society, the innocent can only find comfort in the hope for the afterlife. The essay concludes that Smith's religious view in this particular regard goes hand in hand with his great concern with justice prevailing in his writings of political economy, government and ethics.

scholarly journals SOBRE A FILOSOFIA MORAL DE ADAM SMITH

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (111) ◽  
pp. 57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo E. A. da Gama Cerqueira
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

Este artigo discute a Teoria dos sentimentos morais de Adam Smith. O argumento central do texto é apresentado, tomando por base o contexto proporcionado pela filosofia moral do Iluminismo escocês. Os conceitos de simpatia e espectador imparcial são discutidos, apontando-se a maneira original como Smith concebe a relação entre a moralidade e a sociabilidade.Abstract: This article examines Adam Smith’s Theory of moral sentiments. The moral philosophy of the Scottish enlightenment is central to the argumentation developed in this paper which analyses the concepts of “sympathy” and of “impartial spectator” and points to the originality of Smith’s argument regarding the relationship between morality and sociality.

3. Sympathetic spectators

2018 ◽  
pp. 28-45
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Berry
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Francis Hutcheson ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

Adam Smith published The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759. What the book sets out to do is investigate or analyse how, in practice, judgments and decisions about what is right or wrong are made. ‘Sympathetic spectators’ first discusses empiricism, a particular tradition of moral philosophy that was especially strong in Scotland. It goes on to consider the views of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume on moral sense and sympathy. It then examines Smith’s thoughts on sociality, morality, negotiated discord, self-interest, the impartial spectator and conscience (an internalized standard or benchmark of what is right or wrong), relativism, and moral judgment.

The Vicegerent of God? Adam Smith on the Authority of the Impartial Spectator

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Lauren Kopajtic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Religious Language ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
Textual Evidence ◽  
Psychological Influence ◽  
Set Up

It has been claimed that Adam Smith, like David Hume, has a ‘reflective endorsement’ account of the authority of morality. On such a view, our moral faculties and notions are justified insofar as they pass reflective scrutiny. But Smith's moral philosophy, unlike Hume's, is also peppered with references to God, to divine law, and to our being ‘set up’ in a specific way so as to best attain what is good and useful for us. This language suggests that there is another strategy available for accounting for the authority of morality, one that would align Smith with teleological accounts of human nature and theological accounts of morality. The authority of Smith's impartial spectator would, on such an account, be derivative – it would be derived from the supreme authority of God. Such a view poses a serious challenge for contemporary interpreters of Smith who seek to read him as an empiricist, naturalist, and sentimentalist moral philosopher. This paper examines the textual evidence for this view, focusing on the role of the explicitly religious language found in a key section of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that this language should neither be interpreted as merely ornamental, nor as providing a theological justification of morality. Rather, it is part of Smith's illustration of the psychological influence of religious beliefs, especially the beliefs in an all-seeing judge and in a just afterlife where all human actions will be accounted for and appropriately rewarded or punished.

Du «spectateur impartial» au «travailleur impartial», un commentaire sur la relation entre philosophie morale et économie politique chez Adam Smith selon Jean Mathiot

Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilles Campagnolo
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
History Of ◽  
Économie Politique ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
The Church

ABSTRACT: As Smith freed moral philosophy from former control bodies (the Church, the state), the Scottish philosopher opened the field for a scientific political economy. In hisAdam Smith. Philosophie et économie(Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1990, p. 45), Jean Mathiot asked :«Should then one wonder that his [Smith’s] audacious stand became the historical grounding stone for political economy, then bringing recognition as an objectively-grounded field of knowledge?»Mathiot’s text and thought have been little debated to this day; this essay is meant to fill that gap, in particular with regard to the history of Smith’s reception in France. Mathiot sought to understand better the “impartial spectator” using a new character whom he claimed Smith was implicitly sketching, and whom he called “the impartial laborer”. To Mathiot’s mind, from theTheory of moral sentiments(1759) to theWealth of Nations(1776), the link is nothing else than Smith’s own philosophy.

Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Civil Society

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Smith
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Commercial Society ◽  
University Of Edinburgh ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
English Speaking World ◽  
The University

Adam Ferguson was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. A friend of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson was among the leading exponents of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to develop a science of man and was among the first in the English speaking world to make use of the terms civilization, civil society, and political science. This book challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about Ferguson’s thinking. It explores how Ferguson sought to create a methodology for moral science that combined empirically based social theory with normative moralising with a view to supporting the virtuous education of the British elite. The Ferguson that emerges is far from the stereotyped image of a nostalgic republican sceptical about modernity, and instead is one much closer to the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment’s defence of eighteenth century British commercial society.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subramanian Rangan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Economic Paradigm ◽  
Modern Economic ◽  
Great Output

Our quest for prosperity has produced great output (i.e. performance) but not always great outcomes (i.e. progress). Despite mounting regulation when it comes to fairness, well-being, and the scope of our humanity, the modern economic system still leaves much to be desired. If practice is to evolve substantively and systematically, then we must help evolve an economic paradigm where mutuality is more systematically complemented by morality. The bases of this morality must rest, beyond the sympathetic sentiments envisaged by Adam Smith, on an expanded and intentional moral reasoning. Moral philosophy has a natural role in informing and influencing such a turn in our thinking, especially when education is the preferred vehicle of transformation. Indeed, rather than just regulate market power we must also better educate market power.

Our Obligation to Future Generations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amartya Sen
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Effective Power ◽  
Basic Plane

Our reasoned sense of obligations to others can arise from at least three possible sources: cooperation, having caused harm, and effective power to improve suffering. The last source, this chapter argues, is particularly important in considering our obligations to future generations. It draws on a line of reasoning that takes us well beyond contractarian motivations to the idea of the “impartial spectator” as developed by Adam Smith. The interests of future generations come into the story because they are important in our attempt to be impartial spectators. The obligation of power contrasts with the mutual obligations for cooperation at the basic plane of motivational justification. In the context of climate concerns and intergenerational justice, this asymmetry-embracing approach seems to allow an easier entry for understanding our obligations.

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