Stressing the (Other) Three Rs in the Search for Empirically Supported Treatments: Review Procedures, Research Quality, Relevance to Practice and the Public Interest

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Weisz ◽  
Kristin M. Hawley ◽  
Paul A. Pilkonis ◽  
Sheila R. Woody ◽  
William C. Follette
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelly Kamin-Friedman ◽  
Maya Peled Raz

AbstractAs of the beginning of March 2021, Israeli law requires the presentation of a Green Pass as a precondition for entering certain businesses and public spheres. Entitlement for a Green Pass is granted to Israelis who have been vaccinated with two doses of COVID-19 vaccine, who have recovered from COVID-19, or who are participating in a clinical trial for vaccine development in Israel. The Green Pass is essential for retaining immune individuals' freedom of movement and for promoting the public interest in reopening the economic, educational, and cultural spheres of activity. Nonetheless, and as the Green Pass imposes restrictions on the movement of individuals who had not been vaccinated or who had not recovered, it is not consonant with solidarity and trust building. Implementing the Green Pass provision while advancing its effectiveness on the one hand, and safeguarding equality, proportionality, and fairness on the other hand may imbue this measure with ethical legitimacy despite involving a potential breach of trust and solidarity.


Prawo ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 323 ◽  
pp. 211-221
Author(s):  
Konrad Kopystyński

Exclusion of the application provisions of freedom of economic activity act in the scope of concession for operating casino games and the protection of the public interestThis article presents the comparison between provisions of freedom of economic activity act and the law on gambling in scope of conditions related to revoking concession for operating casino games. To revoke that concession, only provisions of law on gambling can be applied because of provisions of freedom of economic activity act are excluded in that cases. That regulation allows the raising of freedom economic activity, but the other hand — also causes the limitation in the protec­tion of public interest.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 197-215
Author(s):  
Renata Kamińska

Roman law accorded a broad scope of protection for public places. Te magistrates responsible for securing it were the curule and plebeian aediles, the censors, and the praetors. Praetors conducted this duty by promulgating interdicts. Ne quid in loco publico fat, which prohibited any activity or installation in a public place which could cause damage, stands out among the other praetorian interdicts. What made it special was that it could be applied both when the potential damage concerned the public interest (utilitas publica), and/or the interest of a private individual (utilitas privata). The damage (damnum) was defned as the loss of a beneft of whatsoever kind the private individual drew from his enjoyment of the public place in question.


2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1011-1055 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Slane

This article uses the various intellectual property protections afforded to the classic children’s novel Anne of Green Gables as a means of illustrating the blurring between copyright, trademark, and official marks regimes in Canada. By not keeping these regimes distinct, the author argues, Canadian intellectual property law seriously threatens the integrity of the public domain, a central means by which an appropriate balance is struck between the interests of authors, other cultural producers, and the public at large. The blurring between regimes is located in three conceptual sites: origin in copyright versus source in trademark; reputation in copyright versus goodwill in trademark; and the weak requirement that a public authority serve a "public benefit" in order to qualify for official marks protection, without any consideration of the public interest served by the limitations on protections built into the other intellectual property regimes. Reinforcing the distinctions between regimes and clarifying the public benefit requirement for official marks would help protect the public domain from unjustified encroachments that potentially deprive us of access to creative works of shared cultural significance.


2009 ◽  
Vol 160 (8) ◽  
pp. 244-246
Author(s):  
Olivier Guex

Does the principle of multifunctionality mean that the forest must fulfill every requirement put forward? Does the modern notion of “commodity”, drawn from the laws of supply and demand, give forest owners the right to expect payment for every service provided? In view of the current difficult economic situation and the increase and diversification of these requirements, the questions are justified. This article does not have the pretension to provide all the answers. However, by means of further questions and through the introduction of various examples, the reader is invited to consider the subtly differentiated proportions of the importance of the public interest on the one hand as opposed to that of private interests on the other, and thus to be able to draw conclusions. Thanks to this comparative assessment, possibilities concerning the magnitude and the source of these payments should become clear.


Author(s):  
Richard Morrison

In the month of June, 1862, after the meeting of the second International General Average Congress held in London, a committee was constituted, “for the purpose of establishing one uniform system of general average throughout the mercantile world,” The meeting of the council of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, held in York in the autumn of 1864, set apart three days for the consideration of this branch of jurisprudence; and the 26th of September and two following days were occupied with the discussion of the various disputed points connected with the subject, under the presidencies of Sir James Wilde and Sir Fitzroy Kelly. The last-named gentleman, in closing the sitting, in the course of his speech gave his opinion as to the course to be pursued in order to give the force of law to the amendments which had been proposed, with the view to promote the uniformity which is so desirable in connection with the adjustment of claims for general average. He considered that “in order to obtain a legislative sanction to the code which had just been completed, it would be advisable to obtain the distinct approval of the leading commercial bodies, particularly the Chambers of Commerce in the great towns; and to obtain, if possible, assurances on the part of the foreign Governments that they would be prepared to adopt the code upon its adoption in this country. …If possible, the code or rules should be made a Government measure; failing this, it should be entrusted to at least two independent members, one of whom must be a mercantile man, representing a mercantile constituency, and the other a lawyer of eminence; and that it would be desirable to go to work at once, while the public interest was alive to the measure.”


2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (S2) ◽  
pp. 52-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anita Silvers

The idea that disability insurers would benefit if the use of predictive genetic testing expands may seem little short of obvious. If individuals with higher than species-typical genetic propensities for illness or disease are identified, and barred or discouraged from participating in disability insurance programs, is it not obvious that the amount that disability insurers pay out will decrease? Is there any reason to doubt that insurers thus would gain advantage by promoting genetic testing? Writers on this subject typically have taken on faith that advantage goes to whoever knows most about the genetic characteristics of the individual seeking insurance. They therefore have assumed, without proving, that insurers’ interests lie with proliferating genetic information about insurance seekers.Consequently, from a perspective that gives priority to commercial interests, denying insurers the freedom to obtain genetic information about insurance seekers or holders appears obviously damaging and even unfair. On the other hand, from a perspective that gives priority to the interests of citizens who may use insurance, the greater use of and access to predictive genetic testing sets off ethical alarms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoolo 'Nyane ◽  
Tekane Maqakachane

In Lesotho, standing to litigate is still based on the private law doctrine of locus standi in judicio. This doctrine requires the person who institutes an action in a court of law, regardless of whether it is in the private or public interest, to satisfy the court that he or she is directly and substantially interested in the outcome of the decision. Section 22(1) of the Constitution of Lesotho provides that any person who alleges that the Bill of Rights in the Constitution has been violated 'in relation to him' may approach the court of law for redress. Although the Constitution is silent about the enforcement of the other non-Bill of Rights parts of the Constitution, the courts have readily invoked section 22(1) to exclude litigants who are not 'directly and substantially' interested in the outcome of the case. This restrictive approach notwithstanding, a more liberal approach has been adopted in pockets of public law decisions of the superior courts in Lesotho. The purpose of this article is to amplify this liberal approach. The article argues that constitutional democracy in Lesotho will benefit from a liberal approach as opposed to a restrictive approach to standing. This is supported by a discernible movement in modern-day public law towards a more liberal approach to standing.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Bartosz Szolc-Nartowski

Participation of Unauthorised Persons in Issuance of Decisions in Civil Proceedings - Remarks on the Basis D. 1,14,3 and D. 41,3,44 pr.SummaryAccording to Polish civil procedure a sentence given by an unauthorized person is invalid. This was not always the case in ancien Roman law. Ulpianus declared that when a slave, who escaped from his master, became a praetor, his acts were valid. He took into consideration serious problems of those who had put their trust in the praetor’s office as well as the respect for humanitas. A basic common sense requires that what was well decided, should be considered valid. According to the author, Ulpianus realized that the rule of ius civile which determined the requirements for entering in a praetor’s duties had the character of a guarantee. If the purpose, for which this rule was established, was achieved, such acts should be accepted as valid.The question arises whether that approach could be applied to contemporary cases of iudex incompetens. Furthermore, whether it would be justifiable to extend this solution to other - not only procedural – but also material, guarantee rules?The answer is not easy. In D. 41,3,44 pr., a pater familias conducted the procedure of adrogation (adoption) improperly. Papinianus decided that, although pater familias made a justifiable mistake, all that the son enacted in the name of the father, was invalid. Nevertheless a different rule, as the jurist says in D. 41,3,44 pr., must be observed in the case of homo liber bona fide serviens - a person, who being unaware of his free man status, served as a slave. Actions taken by such a person were valid (the purchaser of a slave had to be protected), since transactions of that kind happened very often. More importantly, any other solution would be against the public interest. O n the other hand, it was very rare for a pater familias to wrongly adrogate, therefore the example of pater familias did not create a general rule.It seems quite difficult to indicate one principle which could be applied to all the guarantee rules. As far as the case of an unauthorized person giving sentence is concerned, the Roman private law shows that the regard for the public interest may sometimes justify solutions different from those preferred by Polish law.


Once the conviction has been set aside, there could be no public policy objection to an action for negligence against the legal advisers. There could be no conflict of judgments. On the other hand, in civil, including matrimonial, cases, it would seldom be possible to say that an action for negligence against a legal adviser or representative would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Whether the original decision was right or wrong was usually a matter of concern only to the parties and had no wider implications. There was no public interest objection to a subsequent finding that, but for the negligence of his lawyers, the losing party would have won. But again there might be exceptions. The action for negligence might be an abuse of process on the ground that it was manifestly unfair to someone else. Take, for example, the case of a defendant who published a serious defamation which he attempted unsuccessfully to justify. Should he be able to sue his lawyers and claim that if the case had been conducted differently, the allegation would have been proved to be true? It seemed unfair to the plaintiff in the defamation action that any court should be allowed to come to such a conclusion in proceedings to which he was not a party. On the other hand, it was equally unfair that he should have to join as a party and rebut the allegation for a second time. A man's reputation was not only a matter between him and the other party. It represented his relationship with the world. So it might be that in such circumstances, an action for negligence would be an abuse of the of the court. Having regard to the power of the court to strike out actions which had no prospect ofsuccess, the doctrine unlikely in that context to be invoked very often. The first step in any application to strike out an action alleging negligence in the conduct of a previous action had to be to ask whether it had a real prospect of success. Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse delivered judgments in which they agreed that the immunity from suit was no longer required in relation to civil proceedings but dissented to the extent of saying that the immunity was still required in the public interest in the administration of justice in relation to criminal proceedings. Comment This decision is of major and historic importance in the English legal system for several reasons. It can be seen as a bold attempt by the senior judiciary to drag the legal profession (often a metonymy for the whole legal system) into the 21st century world of accountability and fair business practice. In his judgment, Lord Steyn makes this dramatic observation:

2012 ◽  
pp. 506-508

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