scholarly journals Core–periphery segregation in evolving prisoner’s dilemma networks

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunkyu Sohn ◽  
Jung-Kyoo Choi ◽  
T K Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Cooperative Networks ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Self Organization ◽  
Interaction Structure ◽  
Social Settings ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

Abstract Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for prosperous societies. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings, network structures evolve endogenously as agents exit relationships and build new ones. However, the interplay between game strategy and interaction structure by which evolutionary dynamics leads to self-organization of dense cooperative networks has not been understood. Our prisoner’s dilemma experiments with exit and partner choice options show that core–periphery segregation of cooperators and defectors drives the emergence of cooperation. Cooperators’ Quit-for-Tat and defectors’ Roving strategy lead to a highly asymmetric core and periphery structure. Densely connected to each other at the core, cooperators successfully isolate defectors at the periphery and earn larger payoffs.

scholarly journals Learning dynamics explains human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma on networks

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (94) ◽  
pp. 20131186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Cimini ◽  
Angel Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Social Factors ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Cooperative behaviour lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas, recent experimental findings on networked Prisoner's Dilemma games suggest that conditional cooperation also depends on the previous action of the player—namely on the ‘mood’ in which the player is currently in. Roughly, a majority of people behave as conditional cooperators if they cooperated in the past, whereas they ignore the context and free ride with high probability if they did not. However, the ultimate origin of this behaviour represents a conundrum itself. Here, we aim specifically to provide an evolutionary explanation of moody conditional cooperation (MCC). To this end, we perform an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics for players' behavioural traits—ranging from standard processes used in game theory based on pay-off comparison to others that include non-economic or social factors. Our results show that only a dynamic built upon reinforcement learning is able to give rise to evolutionarily stable MCC, and at the end to reproduce the human behaviours observed in the experiments.

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Seyhun Saral
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Initial Move ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Strategy Types

Conditional cooperation has been a common explanation for the observed cooperation, and its decline in social dilemma experiments. Numerous studies showed that most of the experimental subjects can be categorized into three types: conditional cooperators, self-maximizers and hump-shaped (triangle) cooperators. In this study, I investigate conditional strategy types and their role on the emergence of cooperation and their evolutionary success. For this purpose, I use an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The agents are characterized by their initial move and their conditional responses to each level of cooperation. By using simulations, I estimate the likelihood of cooperation for different probability of continuations.I show that, when the continuation probability is sufficiently large, high levels cooperation is achieved. In this case, the most successful strategies are those who employ an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation, followed by perfect conditional cooperators. In intermediate levels of continuation probabilities, however, hump-shaped contributor types are the ones that are most likely to thrive, followed by imperfect conditional cooperators. Those agents cooperate in a medium level of cooperation within themselves and each other. The results explain the existence of hump-shaped type of cooperators with a purely payoff-based reasoning, as opposed to previous attempts to explain this strategy with psychological mechanisms.

Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Dalibor Roháč
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
The Difference

Abstract In this paper, we discuss several issues related to public goods provision. Unlike many Austrians, we do not think that the concept of public goods - or of collective action - is an inherently flawed idea, even though we reject the alleged welfare implications of public goods theory, as proposed by orthodox public finance literature. We then argue that the structure of a generic public goods problem is more a game of chicken or an assurance game than a prisoner's dilemma and that this has important implications with regard to the plausibility of cooperative outcomes. Namely, when the public goods problem has the weakest-link structure and can be represented as an assurance game, then the cooperative outcome will be self-enforcing. In many cases, the public goods problems can be transformed into weakest-link games or different mechanisms can be found to ensure cooperation. We also discuss the difference between a public goods problem and collusion. We assert that, unlike public goods problems, collusive agreements have the structure of a prisoner's dilemma. Overall, our paper suggests that there are reasons to be optimistic about stability and efficiency of stateless societal orders.

scholarly journals Evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with expellers

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 015011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Wang ◽  
Guofeng Zhang ◽  
Weijian Kong
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

scholarly journals Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Prétôt ◽  
Gorana Gonzalez ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe
Keyword(s):  
Child Development ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Human Adults ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Children’S Behaviour

Abstract Human adults use a range of social cues to obtain information about potential partners in cooperative contexts: we prefer partners who are competent, wealthy and generous, and those who abide by moral and social rules. One factor that carries particular weight is whether a prospective partner is fair. Here we ask whether children share this preference for fair partners and, if so, whether a prospective partner’s past fair behaviour influences children’s behaviour in a cooperative dilemma. Six- to nine-year-olds chose between partners who accepted or rejected resource allocations that were either strongly advantageously unequal, strongly disadvantageously unequal, or equal. They then played a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with their chosen partner. Children overwhelmingly preferred to play with the partner who accepted rather than rejected allocations. Regardless of their partner choice decisions, children tended to defect in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, yet expected that their partners would be relatively more cooperative. Finally, children were more likely to cooperate with those they believed would cooperate. Together, these findings shed new light on the links between partner choice, fairness and cooperation in child development.

MORE SPATIAL GAMES

1994 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN A. NOWAK ◽  
SEBASTIAN BONHOEFFER ◽  
ROBERT M. MAY
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Reproductive Rate ◽  
Spatial Effects ◽  
Random Drift ◽  
Low Frequencies ◽  
Spatial Games

We extend our exploration of the dynamics of spatial evolutionary games [Nowak & May 1992, 1993] in three distinct but related ways. We analyse, first, deterministic versus stochastic rules; second, discrete versus continuous time (see Hubermann & Glance [1993]); and, third, different geometries of interaction in regular and random spatial arrays. We show that spatial effects can change some of the intuitive concepts in evolutionary game theory: (i) equilibria among strategies are no longer necessarily characterised by equal average payoffs; (ii) the strategy with the higher average payoff can steadily converge towards extinction; (iii) strategies can become extinct even though their basic reproductive rate (at very low frequencies) is larger than one. The equilibrium properties of spatial games are instead determined by “local relative payoffs.” We characterise the conditions for coexistence between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that cooperation can be maintained if the transition rules give more weight to the most successful neighbours, or if there is a certain probability that cells may remain unoccupied in the next generations when they are surrounded by players with low payoffs. In this second case the cooperators can survive despite a very large payoff advantage to defectors. We also compute average extinction times for random drift in neutral spatial models. Finally we briefly describe the spatial dynamics of an interaction among three species which dominate each other in a cyclic fashion. The emphasis of this paper is presenting a variety of ideas and possibilities for further research in the evolutionary dynamics of spatial games. The overall conclusion is that interactions with local neighbours in 2- or 3-dimensional spatial arrays can promote coexistence of different strategies (such as cooperators and defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma), in situations where one strategy would exclude all others if the interactions occurred randomly and homogeneously.

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