Game the Oretic Approach for Cloud Service Negotiation

Cloud computing is a booming technology in the area of digital markets. Tackling the nonfunctional characteristics is a big challenge between service consumers (SC) and service providers (SP). Without proper negotiation between the participants specifying their quality of service (QoS) requirements, service level agreement (SLA) cannot be achieved. Two strategies that are commonly prevalent in the negotiation process are concession model and trade off model. The concession model assures the service consumer (SC) receiving the services on time without any deferment. But service consumer has only limited utility. To balance the utility and achievement rates, the authors propose a mixed negotiation approach for cloud service negotiation, which is based on “Game of Chicken.” Extensive results show that a mixed negotiation approach brings equal amount of satisfaction to both service consumer and service provider in terms of achieving higher utility and outperforms the concession approach, while taking fewer time delays than that of a tradeoff approach.

Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria

Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games are investigated in the context of their Pareto efficiency. The examples of the prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes and the game of chicken are studied. Correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. The quantum extension of these games in the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein formalism and the Frąckiewicz–Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It is shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counter-parts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also studied.

Pareto Efficiency of Mixed Quantum Strategy Equilibria

The aim of the paper is to investigate Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games in the context of their Pareto optimality. We study four games: the prisoner's dilemma, battle of the sexes and two versions of the game of chicken. The correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device. We analyze the quantum extension of these games in the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein formalism with the full SU(2) space of players’ strategy parameters. It has been shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counterparts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also analyzed.

The Strategic Environment of the US-Australia Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Era

The strategic environment is best likened to an ever-changing river that consists of a myriad of interacting currents residing at various depths and moving with different speeds. Shaping this environment effectively is not the same as causing changes or making differences, but is similar to swimming efficiently in this river. The most powerful currents in this river are related to climate, demographic, technological and economic changes, great power relations, big catastrophes, and human dynamics. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will have the largest impact on the strategic environment in the short to medium term. Although the directions of many changes brought about by the global plague are still unfathomable as the pandemic continues to unfold, four trends accelerated by the pandemic—the growth in importance of the cyber domain, the bifurcation of the world economy, the intensification of great power competition, and the transformation of international architecture—are constituting the shape of things to come. In the medium to long term, the hegemonic contest between China and the United States will have the largest impact on the strategic environment. Metaphorically speaking, it is creating the largest vortex in the river that is the strategic environment. East Asia and Australia will be drawn into this vortex even against the best effort to stay outside. This chapter argues that, contrary to the belief of many, there is no Thucydides Trap—the structural cause of war—in this hegemonic contest because it is structured as a game of chicken, not a prisoner’s dilemma. It is important for any player in this environment to recognize the strategic structure of the US-PRC hegemonic contest and apply the best strategy for it as suggested by this structure. China has masterfully played the game of chicken with its gray zone tactics, its pursuit of ‘war by other means’, i.e., its weaponization of the non-military, even of risks. The US-PRC hegemonic contest will not resemble the Cold War much beyond this strategic structure. It will be very different from the Cold War in important aspects, including the ideological and economic realm. Most strikingly, the main front lines of the contest will be in the maritime and cyber domains and, consequently, will be far more fluid and unstable than those of the Cold War.

Great Power Competition: Lessons from the Past, Implications for the Future

Throughout the 52-century long history of great power competition, human dynamics, technology, and geography are the most consequential and most permanent factors that have shaped the interaction among the great powers. This essay mines the past for lessons about great power competition by examining the structural impact of these factors on the rise and fall of great powers, the balance of power among them, and the character of their relations. In order to aid its analysis, the essay introduces three concepts that have not been discussed in the literature: 1) The system-changers: actors that are not system-makers like the great powers but have the power to change the international system and disrupt the balance of power among the system-makers.2) The strategic structure of great power competition: a structure that emerges from the interaction of the players’ preferences and determines the best strategies for the players as well as the stable outcomes of their game. The essay argues that the Thucydides Trap does not exist in the US-China rivalry because the strategic structure of this rivalry is that of either a Game of Chicken or a Peace-lover’s Dilemma. Using game theory and geopolitics, the essay is able to make long-term predictions and strategy implications for the US-China rivalry.3) The peace-lover’s dilemma: an asymmetric game whose stable outcome is the dominance of the more aggressive player (who prefers its own supremacy to sharing power with the other) over the less aggressive player (who prefers sharing power with the other to its own supremacy), hence this is a dilemma for the game’s peace-loving player.

Transformasi Tabuh Rah Menjadi Tajen Di Desa Adat Batur Rening Kecamatan Abiansemal Kabupaten Badung Propinsi Bali: Kajian Teologi Hindu

<p><em>Tabuh rah is the sowing of blood as a ritual for the implementation of bhuta yajña. Blood is a liquid that is used as a means of balancing the bhuana agung and the bhuana alit. The ceremony in the Patur Penataran Agung Batur Rening was held for 11 days as an aci-aci. In addition, this activity was carried out as a feeling of gratitude and to strengthen the brotherhood between communities. In line with the implementation of the piodalan, the community filled in the blanks by doing tajen at the temple jaba sisi. People assume that every chicken is a tajen because they have blood droplets. So that by labeling tabuh rah the community can safely carry out tajen.</em></p><p><em>The concept of belief in the existence of supernatural beings gives rise to beliefs about Godhead, in Hinduism this concept is called Hindu theology which is contained in the tabuh rah ceremony. Pasupati God is Lord Shiva or his hybrid term is Ratu Gede Bebotoh or Sang Hyang Rare Angon as Bhatara Guru uses the tabuh rah as a medium to invite humans to live the game of chicken fight not to make it as babotoh, but as a person who sided with the authority.</em></p>

Evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria

Social norms regulate and coordinate most aspects of human social life, yet they emerge and change as a result of individual behaviors, beliefs, and expectations. A satisfactory account for the evolutionary dynamics of social norms, therefore, has to link individual beliefs and expectations to population-level dynamics, where individual norms change according to their consequences for individuals. Here, we present a model of evolutionary dynamics of social norms that encompasses this objective and addresses the emergence of social norms. In this model, a norm is a set of behavioral prescriptions and a set of environmental descriptions that describe the expected behaviors of those with whom the norm holder will interact. These prescriptions and descriptions are functions of exogenous environmental events. These events have no intrinsic meaning or effect on the payoffs to individuals, yet beliefs/superstitions regarding them can effectuate coordination. Although a norm’s prescriptions and descriptions are dependent on one another, we show how they emerge from random accumulations of beliefs. We categorize the space of social norms into several natural classes and study the evolutionary competition between these classes of norms. We apply our model to the Game of Chicken and the Nash Bargaining Game. Furthermore, we show how the space of norms and evolutionary stability are dependent on the correlation structure of the environment and under which such correlation structures social dilemmas can be ameliorated or exacerbated.