Analysing group contract design using a threshold public goods experiment

Abstract This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a university (study 1) and a farm management training centre (study 2), the subjects of the second study most resembling the subjects in the field. The experiment consists of several treatments and each treatment has two different distribution rules, which are varied in a within-subjects manner. After subjects have experienced both, they can vote for one of the two rules: either a differentiated bonus that results in equal payoff for all, or an undifferentiated, equal share of the group bonus. In a between-subjects manner, subjects can vote for a (minimum or average) threshold or are faced with an exogenous threshold. The results indicate that exogenous thresholds perform better, possibly because the focal point they provide facilitates coordination. With regard to the two distribution rules, the results are mixed: in study 1, average contributions and payoffs are higher under the ‘equal-payoff’ rule, but there is no significant difference between the two in study 2. Overall, our results suggest that environmental payment schemes should consider cost heterogeneity in the design of group contracts, and pay explicit attention to coordination problems too.

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Engineering students’ attitudinal beliefs by gender and student division: a methodological comparison of changes over time

International Journal of STEM Education ◽

10.1186/s40594-020-00269-6 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 8 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Madison E. Andrews ◽

Anita D. Patrick ◽

Maura Borrego

Keyword(s):

Self Efficacy ◽

Engineering Students ◽

Focal Point ◽

Value Engineering ◽

Longitudinal Analyses ◽

Utility Value ◽

Cross Sectional ◽

Targeted Interventions ◽

Significant Difference ◽

Over Time

Abstract Background Students’ attitudinal beliefs related to how they see themselves in STEM have been a focal point of recent research, given their well-documented links to retention and persistence. These beliefs are most often assessed cross-sectionally, and as such, we lack a thorough understanding of how they may fluctuate over time. Using matched survey responses from undergraduate engineering students (n = 278), we evaluate if, and to what extent, students’ engineering attitudinal beliefs (attainment value, utility value, self-efficacy, interest, and identity) change over a 1-year period. Further, we examine whether there are differences based on gender and student division, and then compare results between cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses to illustrate weaknesses in our current understanding of these constructs. Results Our study revealed inconsistencies between cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of the same dataset. Cross-sectional analyses indicated a significant difference by student division for engineering utility value and engineering interest, but no significant differences by gender for any variable. However, longitudinal analyses revealed statistically significant decreases in engineering utility value, engineering self-efficacy, and engineering interest for lower division students and significant decreases in engineering attainment value for upper division students over a one-year period. Further, longitudinal analyses revealed a gender gap in engineering self-efficacy for upper division students, where men reported higher means than women. Conclusions Our analyses make several contributions. First, we explore attitudinal differences by student division not previously documented. Second, by comparing across methodologies, we illustrate that different conclusions can be drawn from the same data. Since the literature around these variables is largely cross-sectional, our understanding of students’ engineering attitudes is limited. Our longitudinal analyses show variation in engineering attitudinal beliefs that are obscured when data is only examined cross-sectionally. These analyses revealed an overall downward trend within students for all beliefs that changed significantly—losses which may foreshadow attrition out of engineering. These findings provide an opportunity to introduce targeted interventions to build engineering utility value, engineering self-efficacy, and engineering interest for student groups whose means were lower than average.

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Framing in a threshold public goods experiment with heterogeneous endowments

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ◽

10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.006 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 138 ◽

pp. 99-110 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Kjell Arne Brekke ◽

James Konow ◽

Karine Nyborg

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Public Goods Experiment ◽

Threshold Public Goods

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Evolution of Global Cooperation in Multi-Level Threshold Public Goods Games With Income Redistribution

Frontiers in Physics ◽

10.3389/fphy.2018.00067 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 6 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Jinming Du ◽

Baokui Wang

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Income Redistribution ◽

Public Goods Games ◽

Multi Level ◽

Threshold Public Goods

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Dynamics of Provision of Threshold Public Goods

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1919154 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Arnaud Z. Dragicevic ◽

Jim Engle-Warnick

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Threshold Public Goods

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A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198915500048 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 17 (03) ◽

pp. 1550004 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Friedel Bolle

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Equilibrium Selection ◽

Costs And Benefits ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Public Project ◽

Binary Decision ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽

Stag Hunt Game ◽

Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

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