20. Unconscionability and Inequality of Bargaining Power

Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

This chapter considers a group of cases in which the courts have been asked to grant relief on the basis that the contract concluded between the parties was, in some way, unfair, outlining examples drawn both from the common law (including equity) and from statutes. The rise and fall of a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power is also noted. It then considers the arguments in favour of drawing these disparate cases together into one general doctrine, and concludes by drawing on some academic reflections on the case-law and the role of fairness in the law of contract more generally.

Contract Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 662-679
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

This chapter considers a group of cases in which the courts have been asked to grant relief on the basis that the contract concluded between the parties was, in some way, unfair, outlining examples drawn both from the common law (including equity) and from statutes. The rise and fall of a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power is also noted. It then considers the arguments in favour of drawing these disparate cases together into one general doctrine, and concludes by drawing on some academic reflections on the case-law and the role of fairness in the law of contract more generally.


Author(s):  
Роман Рыбаков ◽  
Roman Rybakov

The article is devoted to legal fictions in regulating property relations in the English medieval common law (XIII—XVII centuries). Fictions are explained as features influencing the development of law, means of expansion of courts’ jurisdiction and mechanisms of the development of remedies protecting property relations. The article focuses on the role of fiction during the appellate review stage. Relevant case law is analyzed in this article. In this research the author uses the following set of methods of scientific cognition: dialectical method, historical method as well as special scientific research methods, such as technical legal method, comparative law method, formal legal method and legal interpretation method. This research results in better understanding of the role of fictions during the appellate review stage and provides analysis of differences between legal fictions used in the medieval civil law and the common law. In conclusion, the author suggests a classification of legal fictions’ functions in the medieval English common law.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD HARRIS

Abstract H. Meyer‐Laurin has claimed that the Athenian courts took a stricti iuris approach to the law and did not take extenuating circumstances into account. Other scholars (Mirhady, Todd) have claimed that the courts sometimes ignored the law and took extra‐legal considerations into account, which was called ‘fairness’ (epieikeia). The essay begins with a careful reading of Aristotle's analysis of ‘fairness’ (epieikeia) in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric and draws on an important essay by J. Brunschwig. Fairness was not a doctrine that attempted to undermine the authority of the law or placed the law of the city in opposition to the unwritten laws or the common law of mankind. Nor did the application of fairness introduce non‐legal factors into adjudication. Rather, fairness dealt with the problem of treating exceptions to the general rule contained in a specific written law. The essay then shows how litigants used arguments based on fairness and how the courts sometimes took extenuating circumstances into account. When Athenian judges swore to decide according to the laws of Athens, they did not just consider the law under which the accuser had brought his case. They could also take into account general principles of justice implicit in the laws of Athens as a whole. In this way, they avoided a rigid positivist approach to law. Finally, the essay sheds some light on the relationship between Aristotle's Rhetoric and the arguments used in the Athenian courts.


2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Bryden ◽  
Jula Hughes

The "reasonable apprehension of bias" test for judicial disqualification has been a fixture in the common law world for centuries; despite this settled state of the law, judges and commentators have been concerned that the application of the test might be contentious in a significant number of cases. In this article, the authors report on an empirical study surveying Canadian provincial and territorial judges on common scenarios which raise the possibility of recusal. Situated in the applicable case law, the findings demonstrate a wide divergence of opinion on substance and procedure among respondents in their attitudes toward recusal in situations that are analytically marginal, but not rare. The article concludes with some possible explanations for the divergence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-74
Author(s):  
Richard Kirkham ◽  
Anita Stuhmcke

In both Australia and the United Kingdom, the ombudsman sector plays a specific role in the oversight of the administration of government, but there exists no clear overarching theoretical framework within which the institution is aligned with common law constitutionalism. An ombudsman’s functionality is secured by gaining legal authority from parliament and effective power through executive acquiescence, but simultaneously to function effectively it must maintain a degree of separation from the executive and parliament. This situation creates a regulatory gap which the courts fill by acting in a supervisory relationship over the ombudsman sector. In turn, this raises the danger that the legitimacy gained through judicial oversight results in a loss of flexibility and uniqueness in the ombudsman institution. Through an empirical study of the case law on the sector, this article confirms that the courts have shaped and legitimised the role of the ombudsman institution under the common law constitution. Yet this study also suggests that there is a risk that over-reliance upon the judiciary to perform a retrospective, reactive and intermittent control function can lead to an inappropriate imposition of judicial values on the ombudsman sector as well as the courts performing an unsuited regulatory role.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter explains briefly the origins and development of the common law tradition in order to better understand the rise of judicial review in the seven common law countries discussed in this volume. The common law legal tradition is characterized historically, in public law, by limited, constitutional government and by forms of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. In private law, the common law tradition is characterized by judge-made case law, which is the primary source of the law, instead of a massive code being the primary source of the law. The common law tradition is also characterized by reliance on the institution of trial by jury. Judges, rather than scholars, are the key figures who are revered in the common law legal tradition, and this is one of the key things that distinguishes the common law legal tradition from the civil law legal tradition. The common law legal tradition emphasizes judicial power, which explains why it has led to judicial review in the countries studied in this volume. It is the prevailing legal tradition in the four countries with the oldest systems of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation: the United States, Canada, Australia, and India. Thus, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in these four countries is very much shaped by common law attitudes about the roles of judges.


2021 ◽  
pp. 500-533
Author(s):  
André Naidoo

This chapter examines undue influence, which is largely about pressure and influence arising from a relationship. It begins with the basic role of the law on undue influence before moving to the substantive case law. The case law is divided into three categories, which are based on the different ways of proving undue influence. The first relates to what is known as ‘actual undue influence’, which is where a complainant proves undue influence. The second is where undue influence between two parties can be presumed from the circumstances. The third category has been a major problem in modern cases and it involves undue influence coming from a third party. The chapter then turns to the wider issues that complete the ‘bigger picture’. The first of these is the area often referred to as ‘unconscionability’, which is about the exploitation of weakness. The second is the attempt to create a wider ‘inequality of bargaining power’ principle. Finally, the chapter looks at the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Practices Regulations 2008, which can cover conduct otherwise classed as duress, undue influence, and harassment.


2019 ◽  
pp. 175-184
Author(s):  
George P. Fletcher

This chapter explores the role of mental state in criminal cases, considering the concept of negligence. Lawyers trained in the common law tradition are familiar with the concept of mens rea and the maxim actus non facit reus nisi mens sit rea. Literally this means that there is no criminal (or guilty) act without a criminal (or guilty) mind. The problem is that there are both descriptive and normative interpretations of mens rea and of the maxim. The normative or moral interpretation of mens rea holds that the term equivalent to a guilty mind, for example, a basis for blaming the actor for their conduct, is something not possible in the face of the defenses considered in the last chapter. Meanwhile, negligence is based, as in the classic definition from the law of torts, on the conduct of “a reasonable person under the circumstances.” The important point is that negligence is based on the fault of not knowing.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith J. B. Rix

SummaryThis article sets out the complicated and confused law on automatism and identifies the role of the psychiatrist, including paradoxically a role in cases of non-psychiatric disorder where the law requires evidence from a doctor approved under section 12 of the Mental Health Act. Legal definitions of automatism are introduced. The internal/external distinction, evidential burden, burden of proof, standard of proof, prior fault, intoxication and the degree of impairment illustrate how the courts limit the defence. Detailed accounts are given of cases in which the defence of automatism has been based on psychiatric disorder and on the effects of psychotropic drugs. Suggestions are made for approaches to assessment and medicolegal reporting.


Author(s):  
D. S. Alyakin

Introduction. In the paper, the author analyzes the principle of good faith in contractual performance under the common law of Canada and carry out a legal analysis of one of the key judicial precedents that is in relation to the designated area and that was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2014, i.e. Bhasin v. Hrynew case. The study is focused on the principle of good faith contractual performance under the law of the Canadian province of Quebec as well.Materials and methods. The material for the study consists of the judicial precedents of Canadian courts as well as the papers of foreign and Russian researchers in the field of civil law. The methodological basis of research comprises general scientific methods of cognition (analysis, synthesis, analogy) as well as specific ones, i.e. the comparative legal method, the formal logical method, the systematic method, methods of structure and function and the method of interpretation.Results. The author conducts a detailed analysis of Bhasin v. Hrynew case and determines the role of this precedent in the common law of Canada as well as the criteria for identifying the principle and a duty of good faith contractual performance. The author also analyzes the principle of good faith under the law of Quebec, i.e. the relevant jurisprudence and the codification of this principle in the legislation of Quebec.Discussion and conclusion. The distinction of the principle of good faith in the performance of contractual obligations as a freestanding principle of Canada’s common law is justified. The Bhasin v. Hrynew case is a vivid illustration of the growing role of the principle of good faith in the countries of the common law tradition. Furthermore, the convergence of Canada’s common law and the law of the province of Quebec, the only one among ten provinces and three territories of Canada that clearly adheres to civil law tradition, is an impact on this precedent.


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