3. Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 66-102
Author(s):  
Georg Sørensen ◽  
Jørgen Møller ◽  
Robert Jackson

This chapter examines the realist tradition in international relations (IR), which is best seen as a research programme with several approaches using a common starting point. It highlights an important dichotomy in realist thought between classical realism and contemporary realism, including strategic and structural approaches. After describing the elements of realism, the chapter discusses the international thought of three outstanding classical realists of the past: Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. It then analyses the classical realist thought of Hans J. Morgenthau, along with strategic realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism. Special attention is devoted to the defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz and the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer. Furthermore, the chapter looks at the recent theoretical debate among realist IR scholars concerning the relevance of the balance of power concept and it shows that realists often disagree among themselves. The chapter concludes with an overview of how the different realist theories treat international and domestic factors.

Author(s):  
Robert Jackson ◽  
Georg Sørensen ◽  
Jørgen Møller

This chapter examines the realist tradition in international relations (IR). It highlights an important dichotomy in realist thought between classical realism and contemporary realism, including strategic and structural approaches. After describing the elements of realism, the chapter discusses the international thought of three outstanding classical realists of the past: Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. It then analyses the classical realist thought of Hans J. Morgenthau, along with strategic realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism. Special attention is devoted to the defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz and the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer. Furthermore, the chapter looks at the recent theoretical debate among realist IR scholars concerning the relevance of the balance of power concept and it shows that realists often disagree among themselves. The chapter concludes with an overview of the prospects for the realist tradition as a research programme in IR.


Author(s):  
Robert Jackson ◽  
Georg Sørensen

This chapter examines the realist tradition in international relations (IR). It highlights an important dichotomy in realist thought between classical realism and contemporary realism, including strategic and structural approaches. It also considers both classical and social scientific strands of realist thought. After describing the elements of realism, the chapter discusses the international thought of three outstanding classical realists of the past: Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. It then analyses the classical realist thought of Hans J. Morgenthau, along with strategic realism and neorealism. Furthermore, it looks at the recent theoretical debate among realist IR scholars concerning the relevance of the balance of power concept, as well as two critiques of realist doctrine: an International Society critique and a revisionist and emancipatory critique. The chapter concludes with an overview of the prospects for the realist tradition as a research programme in IR.


Author(s):  
Steven E. Lobell

Structural realism, or neorealism, is a theory of international relations that says power is the most important factor in international relations. First outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics, structural realism is subdivided into two factions: offensive realism and defensive realism. Structural realism holds that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system). The anarchic ordering principle of the international structure is decentralized, meaning there is no formal central authority. On the one hand, offensive realism seeks power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony. On the other hand, defensive realism argues that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain security. Defensive realism asserts that aggressive expansion as promoted by offensive realists upsets the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing the primary objective of the state, which they argue is ensuring its security. While defensive realism does not deny the reality of interstate conflict, nor that incentives for state expansion do exist, it contends that these incentives are sporadic rather than endemic. Defensive realism points towards “structural modifiers” such as the security dilemma and geography, and elite beliefs and perceptions to explain the outbreak of conflict.


Author(s):  
Sean Fleming

States are commonly blamed for wars, called on to apologize, held liable for debts and reparations, bound by treaties, and punished with sanctions. But what does it mean to hold a state responsible as opposed to a government, a nation, or an individual leader? Under what circumstances should we assign responsibility to states rather than individuals? This book demystifies the phenomenon of state responsibility and explains why it is a challenging yet indispensable part of modern politics. Taking Thomas Hobbes' theory of the state as a starting point, the book presents a theory of state responsibility that sheds new light on sovereign debt, historical reparations, treaty obligations, and economic sanctions. Along the way, it overturns longstanding interpretations of Hobbes' political thought, explores how new technologies will alter the practice of state responsibility as we know it, and develops new accounts of political authority, representation, and legitimacy. The book argues that Hobbes' idea of the state offers a far richer and more realistic conception of state responsibility than the theories prevalent today and demonstrates that Hobbes' Leviathan is much more than an anthropomorphic “artificial man.” The book is essential reading for political theorists, scholars of international relations, international lawyers, and philosophers. It recovers a forgotten understanding of state personality in Hobbes' thought and shows how to apply it to the world of imperfect states in which we live.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Evan Kerrane ◽  

A debate between liberal and realist international relations theories centres on the influence of trade interdependence on state action. While liberal theorists tend to see interdependence as only a mechanism for peace, realists view trade dependency as a potential for state vulnerability. Dale Copeland’s trade expectations theory offers a bridge to this divide by arguing perception of future trade accounts for whether states perceive trade as a vulnerability or mechanism for cooperation. Copeland’s novel theory argues when states possess a positive expectation of future trade, they will continue to pursue trading relationships, as argued in liberal theory. However, once these expectations turn negative, states may face a trade-security crisis stemming from the trade vulnerabilities. This thesis applies Copeland’s theory the Russian experience leading up to the 2013 – 2014 Ukraine Crisis. The application of the theory addresses two key criticisms of trade expectations theory: first, the question of what constitutes “reasonableness” within the expectations of trade, and second, grounding the theory within the broader international relations literature. Copeland’s reliance on a “reasonable man” test of trade expectations lacks a nuanced understanding of what a reasonable perception of a state is. Through the addition of militarism as a state bias and belief, this thesis shows the theory’s logic developing within a defensive realist framework. The thesis applies the case study to a two-level security dilemma, grounding the theory’s core contribution, the trade-security dilemma, within defensive realism. Placing Copeland’s theory within this framework reveals trade expectations to be an intervening variable within a balance of power competition. Finally, the application of trade expectations theory to Russia and the Ukraine Crisis gives greater depth in understanding Moscow’s dilemma. Framing a trade-security dilemma within the broader balance of power dynamic exposes the Russian trade crisis which occurred as Kyiv shifted towards the West.


Author(s):  
Al-Rodhan Nayef ◽  
Puscas Ioana-Maria

This chapter evaluates the fundamental starting point in political theory: human nature. In doing so, it goes beyond conventional wisdom in International Relations. To understand conflict and to chart a way forward, we must re-examine our understanding of human nature. The two dominant theories of International Relations, Realism and Idealism/Internationalism, derived their intellectual origins from such contrasting and dichotomous views of human nature. One, exemplified by Thomas Hobbes, was pessimistic both about human nature and States. The other, exemplified by Immanuel Kant and to some extent Jean-Jacques Rousseau, believed in an innate perfectibility of humans, of States and the international society, which would evolve towards peace. Today, a growing body of evidence from neuroscience permits the re-examination of long-held claims about human nature and what it is that truly drives and motivates human behaviour. Neurophilosophy, the interdisciplinary field connecting findings from neuroscience and philosophy, is relevant for global security and for understanding what can propel good governance, peace, and security.


Author(s):  
D. A. Degterev ◽  
M. S. Ramich

Trilateral diplomacy is a common format of interaction in international relations, which forms various configurations of the balance of power within the framework of triangles. The concept of a “triangle” is characterized by ambivalence, has a variety of characteristics and principles of formation.The article provides an overview of the theoretical discourse on strategic triangles, as well as of practical examples of trilateral diplomacy of the past and present day. The main characteristics of strategic triangles and the features of changes in their configuration are identified (the case of USA–PRC–USSR triangle). Classification of both symmetric and asymmetric triangles (unicenter and bicenter) are given, the concept of buffer states, as well as regional conflicts with the participation of a great power as a defender, are presented.The most influential countries at the global and regional levels, forming geopolitical triangles, are identified basing on the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). The concept of pivot states is analyzed permitting to indicate relatively small but geopolitically important countries, forming triangles together with influential states.The main strategic triangles of the modern world order are analyzed, presenting mostly countries of Asia (China, Japan, India), Russian Federation, USA and EU. The main trends of global competition based on geopolitical triangles in the XXI-st century are identified.


Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer

This chapter examines why states pursue power from the perspective of structural realism. It considers a body of realist theories that argue that states have deep concern for the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences among structural realists. The chapter first explains why states want power and how much power they want before discussing the causes of war. These theoretical issues are illuminated with a case study that assesses whether China can rise peacefully according to offensive realism vs. defensive realism. Along the way, concepts such as the security dilemma, offence–defence balance, central war, buck-passing, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, and deterrence are analysed.


Author(s):  
Richard Ned Lebow

This chapter examines the central assumptions of classical realism by analysing the texts of ancient and modern writers and contrasting their ideas with neorealism and other variants of modern realism. Classical realism represents an approach to international relations that dates back to Thucydides and his account of the Peloponnesian War. According to classical realists, power plays a major role in politics, but they also acknowledge its limitations and the ways it can be self-defeating. The chapter begins with a discussion of the position of classical realists regarding order and stability, focusing on the views of Thucydides and Hans J. Morgenthau with respect to the concepts of community, balance of power, and interest and justice. It then considers what classical realists think about change and transformation as well as the nature and purpose of theory. It concludes by commenting on the Iraq war in the context of classical realism.


Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer

This chapter examines why states pursue power from the perspective of structural realism. It considers a body of realist theories that argue that states have deep concern for the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences among structural realists. The chapter first explains why states want power and how much power they want before discussing the causes of war. These theoretical issues are illuminated with a case study that assesses whether China can rise peacefully according to offensive realism vs. defensive realism. Along the way, concepts such as the security dilemma, offence–defence balance, central war, buck-passing, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, and deterrence are analysed.


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