Wrongful Birth and the Supreme Court of South Africa

1991 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-442
Author(s):  
Kenneth Mck Norrie
2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-113
Author(s):  
Nana Tawiah Okyir

This article argues for the strengthening and entrenchment of socio-economic rights provisions in Ghana's jurisprudence. The purpose of this entrenchment is to engender judicial activism in promoting more creative pathways for enforcing socio-economic rights in Ghana. The article traces the development of socio-economic rights in Ghana's jurisprudence, especially the influence of the requirements of the international rights movement, particularly of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The article delves into the constitutional history of Ghana and its impact on the evolution of rights in the country. Of particular historical emphasis is the emergence of socio-economic rights under the Directive Principles of State Policy in the 1979 Constitution. However, the significance of the socio-economic rights only became profound with the return to democratic rule under the 1992 Constitution, again under a distinct chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy. However, unlike its counterpart, the chapter on the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, which is directly enforceable, the Directive Principles of State Policy were not. It took the Supreme Court of Ghana a series of landmark decisions until finally, in 2008, it arrived at a presumption of justiciability in respect of all of the provisions in the 1992 Constitution. It is evident that prior to this, the Supreme Court was not willing to apply the same standards of adjudication and enforcement as it ordinarily applies in respect of rights under the chapter on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms. Having surmounted the non-justiciability hurdle, what is left is for the courts to begin to vigorously pursue an agenda that puts socio-economic rights at the centre of Ghana's rights adjudication framework. The article draws on comparative experiences from India and South Africa to showcase the extent of judicial creativity in rights adjudication. In India, the courts have been able to work around provisions restricting the enforcement of Directive Principles by often connecting them to Fundamental Freedoms. In South Africa, there is no hierarchy between civil and political rights on the one hand and socio-economic rights on the other; for that reason, the courts give equal ventilation to both sets of rights. The article further analyses these examples in the light of ongoing constitutional reforms in Ghana. It argues that these reforms fall short of the activism required to propel socio-economic rights adjudication to the forefront in Ghana's jurisprudence. In this regard, the article proposes social movements as a viable tool for socio-economic rights advocacy by recounting its success in previous controversial issues in Ghana. The article also connects this to other important building blocks like building socio-economic rights into a national development blueprint. Overall, the article calls for an imaginative socio-economic rights enforcement approach that is predicated on legislation, judicial activism, social movements and a national development blueprint aimed at delivering a qualitative life for the Ghanaian.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


Author(s):  
Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae

This article reflects on the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In particular, it assesses whether the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndaba v Ndaba had adequately clarified how this area of law should be understood. In light of the inconsistent approaches from various divisions of the High Court, it has not always been clear how the courts should interpret the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In this paper, aspects of this area of law which have been clarified by the Supreme Court of Appeal are highlighted. This paper further demonstrates aspects of this area of law which the Supreme Court of Appeal did not settle and would potentially be subject to future litigation. This paper is based on the premise that while Ndaba v Ndaba is welcomed, the Supreme Court of Appeal nonetheless, missed a golden opportunity to authoritatively provide a basis upon which the law relating to pension interest in South Africa should be understood. 


Author(s):  
Shaun De Freitas

Scholarship on the protection of religious rights and freedoms in the context of religious associations in South Africa has gained in momentum since the decision by the Equality Court in Johan Daniel Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente Moreleta Park some years ago. Emanating from this were diverse scholarly insights on what the parameters of religious associations should be, with specific focus on sexual conduct, religious doctrine and membership of religious associations. The South African judiciary has not been confronted with a similar challenge since the decision. However, with the advent of the judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ecclesia De Lange v The Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa in 2014, questions as to the parameters of the rights of religious associations in the context of sexual conduct and religious doctrine again present themselves. This article consequently analyses the mentioned judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal to further an understanding of the parameters of associational rights of religious institutions against the background of a truly plural and democratic society, as supported by the Constitution of South Africa.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-145
Author(s):  
Ekokoi Solomon

This paper examines the attitude of the Supreme Court of Nigeria towards the political question doctrine. It interrogates the decisions of the Court in selected landmark cases involving political questions since the First Republic to the Fourth Republic which commenced in 1999. The paper identifies three core approaches espoused by the Court in cases involving political questions – the deference approach, the necessity approach and the avoidance approach. This paper argues that in a constitutional democracy, it is inevitable – considering that the Court is both a political and a legal institution – that the Court, like in other jurisdictions such as Germany, India, South Africa and the United States, will be called upon to adjudicate cases involving political questions. As such, the paper recommends that the Court openly asserts the ‘politicality’ of its decisions, whether they are predicated on the need to defer to the political branches, exigency/necessity or to avoid the political questions brought before it.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 642-650
Author(s):  
Rasheed Keith-Bandath

Section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), has over the years proven to be a controversial section. At the heart of the controversy is the question as to whether an employer may terminate employees’ contracts of employment based on operational requirements in circumstances where they refuse to accept changes to terms and conditions of employment. This question came before the courts on a number of occasions and answered in the affirmative by the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA ((2003) 21 ILJ 133 (LAC)), and confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeal in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005 (5) SA 433 (SCA)). However, the LRA has since been amended with the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014 (LRAA). Whether an employer may, in light of the amendments, adopt this approach, was recently considered by the LabourAppeal Court in National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Aveng Trident Steel (a division of Aveng Africa Proprietary Ltd) ((JA25/18) [2019] ZALAC 36; (2019) 40 ILJ 2024 (LAC); [2019] 9 BLLR 899 (LAC) (13 June 2019) (Aveng case (LAC)). The judgment is noteworthy as it is the first time that the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) delivered judgment relating to section 187(1)(c) of the LRA post-amendment, thus providing a degree of judicial certainty on the interpretation to be accorded to the amended section.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winston Anderson

The general principle, best articulated in the leading case of British South Africa Company v. Companhia de Mocambique,1 is that a court in the Commonwealth will not entertain an action involving the title to foreign realty. However, there are two established exceptions. First, a court of equity will not refuse jurisdiction if the plaintiff's claim is based on contract, trust or fraud affecting the foreign land, and the court has jurisdiction in personam over the defendant.2In personam jurisdiction may be established if the defendant is present within the jurisdiction, submits to the court, or the court grants leave to serve notice of the writ out of the jurisdiction under Order 11, rule 1(1) (or its equivalent) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Second, “in the exercise of the undoubted jurisdiction of the courts it may become necessary incidentally to investigate and determine the title to foreign lands”.3 Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to administer a trust or the estate of a deceased person, and the property includes property (whether movables or immovables) situated locally, and immovables situated abroad, the court will have jurisdiction to determine questions of title to the foreign immovables for the purposes of the administration.4 No contractual or fiduciary relationship need exist between the parties, and it seems unlikely that in personam jurisdiction is required.5


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