scholarly journals Fixing Technology with Society: The Coproduction of Democratic Deficits and Responsible Innovation at the OECD and the European Commission

2021 ◽  
pp. 016224392199910
Author(s):  
Nina Frahm ◽  
Tess Doezema ◽  
Sebastian Pfotenhauer

Long presented as a universal policy-recipe for social prosperity and economic growth, the promise of innovation seems to be increasingly in question, giving way to a new vision of progress in which society is advanced as a central enabler of technoeconomic development. Frameworks such as “Responsible” or “Mission-oriented” Innovation, for example, have become commonplace parlance and practice in the governance of the innovation–society nexus. In this paper, we study the dynamics by which this “social fix” to technoscience has gained legitimacy in institutions of global governance by investigating recent projects at two international organizations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Commission, to mainstream “Responsible Innovation” frameworks and instruments across countries. Our analysis shows how the turn to societal participation in both organizations relies on a new deficit logic—a democratic deficit of innovation—that frames a lack of societal engagement in innovation governance as a major barrier to the uptake and dissemination of new technologies. These deficit politics enable global governance institutions to present “Responsible Innovation” frameworks as the solution and to claim authority over the coproduction of particular forms of democracy and innovation as intertwined pillars of a market-liberal international order.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 294-298
Author(s):  
Maria Sapignoli

Under the banner “AI (artificial intelligence) for good,” new technologies are becoming more and more central to the agendas of global and regional institutions, as technologies to be embraced and regulated at the same time. This is indicated by the 2018 UN Secretary General's Strategy on New Technology, and by the most recent European Commission proposal to regulate artificial intelligence systems. In this essay, I discuss how anthropology and its ethnographic method could contribute to our understanding of the AI-turn in global governance, by shedding greater light on the effects that the use of this technology has for society, the work of institutions, and the production and application of international law. I argue that engaging ethnographically with AI techniques and knowledge could also bring about a transformation in governance, policy-making, and anthropological theory.


Author(s):  
Daniele Archibugi ◽  
Marco Cellini

The chapter explores the methods to introduce democratic devices in global governance. The first part makes an attempt to define what a democratic deficit is. The second part provides some benchmark to identify when and how international organizations, the most important and visible part of global governance, correspond to the values of democracy. The third part presents the internal and external levers. The internal lever is defined as the ways in which democratization within countries helps to foster more transparent, accountable, and participatory forms of global governance. The external lever is defined as the ways in which international organizations contribute to promote democratic transition and consolidation in their members. Neither the internal nor the external levers work effectively if they are left to intergovernmental bargaining only. An active participation of non-governmental actors is needed to ensure efficiency. The chapter finally discuss a list of proposals to democratize global governance.


2013 ◽  
pp. 4-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Grigoryev ◽  
A. Kurdin

The coordination of economic activity at the global level is carried out through different mechanisms, which regulate activities of companies, states, international organizations. In spite of wide diversity of entrenched mechanisms of governance in different areas, they can be classified on the basis of key characteristics, including distribution of property rights, mechanisms of governance (in the narrow sense according to O. Williamson), mechanisms of expansion. This approach can contribute not only to classifying existing institutions but also to designing new ones. The modern aggravation of global problems may require rethinking mechanisms of global governance. The authors offer the universal framework for considering this problem and its possible solutions.


Author(s):  
Jonas Tallberg ◽  
Karin Bäckstrand ◽  
Jan Aart Scholte

Legitimacy is central for the capacity of global governance institutions to address problems such as climate change, trade protectionism, and human rights abuses. However, despite legitimacy’s importance for global governance, its workings remain poorly understood. That is the core concern of this volume, which engages with the overarching question: whether, why, how, and with what consequences global governance institutions gain, sustain, and lose legitimacy. This introductory chapter explains the rationale of the book, introduces its conceptual framework, reviews existing literature, and presents the key themes of the volume. It emphasizes in particular the volume’s sociological approach to legitimacy in global governance, its comparative scope, and its comprehensive treatment of the topic. Moreover, a specific effort is made to explain how each chapter moves beyond existing research in exploring the book’s three themes: (1) sources of legitimacy, (2) processes of legitimation and delegitimation, and (3) consequences of legitimacy.


Author(s):  
Gisela Hirschmann

How can international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations (UN) and their implementing partners be held accountable if their actions and policies violate fundamental human rights? Political scientists and legal scholars have shed a much-needed light on the limits of traditional accountability when it comes to complex global governance. However, conventional studies on IO accountability fail to systematically analyze a related, puzzling empirical trend: human rights violations that occur in the context of global governance do not go unnoticed altogether; they are investigated and sanctioned by independent third parties. This book puts forward the concept of pluralist accountability, whereby third parties hold IOs and their implementing partners accountable for human rights violations. We can expect pluralist accountability to evolve if a competitive environment stimulates third parties to enact accountability and if the implementing actors are vulnerable to human rights demands. Based on a comprehensive study of UN-mandated operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the European Union Troika’s austerity policy, and global public–private health partnerships in India, this book demonstrates how competition and human rights vulnerability shape the evolution of pluralist accountability in response to diverse human rights violations, such as human trafficking, the violation of the rights of detainees, economic rights, and the right to consent in clinical trials. While highlighting the importance of studying alternative accountability mechanisms, this book also argues that pluralist accountability should not be regarded as a panacea for IOs’ legitimacy problems, as it is often less legalized and might cause multiple accountability disorder.


Author(s):  
Tyler Pratt

Abstract Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Christian Downie

Abstract In policy domains characterised by complexity, international organizations (IOs) with overlapping mandates and governance functions regularly interact in ways that have important implications for global governance. Yet the dynamics of IO interactions remain understudied. This article breaks new ground by building on the theoretical insights of organizational ecology to examine IO competition, cooperation, and adaptation in the domain of energy. Drawing on original empirical data, I consider three related hypotheses: (1) competition between IOs in the same population is likely to centre on material resources; (2) IOs are more likely to cooperate when they have a shared governance goal; and (3) individual IOs can adapt by changing their goals and boundaries. In considering these hypotheses, this article highlights the limits of the organizational ecology approach and the need to broaden it to account for the possibility that IOs do cooperate, and that individual IOs, such as the International Energy Agency, have the capacity to adapt to changes in their environment.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Aart Scholte ◽  
Soetkin Verhaegen ◽  
Jonas Tallberg

Abstract This article examines what contemporary elites think about global governance and what these attitudes might bode for the future of global institutions. Evidence comes from a unique survey conducted in 2017–19 across six elite sectors (business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, research) in six countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, the United States) and a global group. Bearing in mind some notable variation between countries, elite types, issue-areas and institutions, three main interconnected findings emerge. First, in principle, contemporary leaders in politics and society hold considerable readiness to pursue global-scale governance. Today's elites are not generally in a nationalist-protectionist-sovereigntist mood. Second, in practice, these elites on average hold medium-level confidence towards fourteen current global governance institutions. This evidence suggests that, while there is at present no legitimacy crisis of global governance among elites (as might encourage its decline), neither is there a legitimacy boom (as could spur its expansion). Third, if we probe what elites prioritize when they evaluate global governance, the surveyed leaders generally most underline democracy in the procedures of these bodies and effectiveness in their performance. This finding suggests that, to raise elites' future confidence in global governance, the institutions would do well to become more transparent in their operations and more impactful problem-solvers in their outcomes.


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