When Organizations Rebel: Introducing the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) Dataset

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Maves Braithwaite ◽  
Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Comparable Data ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
New Information ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government ◽  
National Perspective ◽  
Cross National

Abstract Scholars have spent decades investigating various sources of rebellion, from societal and institutional explanations to individual motivations to take up arms against one's government. One element of the civil war process that has gone largely unstudied from a cross-national perspective is the role preexisting organizations in society play in the formation of rebel groups, principally due to a lack of comparable data on the origins of these armed actors across conflicts. In an effort to fill this gap, we present the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset, which offers information on the “parent” organizations and the founding processes that gave rise to rebel groups active between 1946 and 2011 in intrastate conflicts included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Database. The new information on rebel foundations introduced in this research note should help scholars to reconsider and newly explore a variety of conditions before, during, and after civil wars including rebel-civilian interactions, structures of rebel organizations, bargaining processes with the government, participation in postwar governance, and more.

The Importance of Being Earnest (in Mediation): Rebel Group Structure, Leadership Turnover, and Success in Civil War Mediation

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Keels
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Group Structure ◽  
Statistical Test ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Vested Interests ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
Leadership Turnover ◽  
The Government ◽  
Credible Information

Abstract Within the study of mediation, a common argument is that mediators are often successful because they provide credible information to combatants thereby reducing asymmetries of information. Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons to assume that rebel groups are providing misinformation to mediators as well as to the government. Equally, mediators must also deal with an incumbent government that may not be negotiating in good faith. This study suggests that rebel group structure may assist with this problem. Rebel groups that operate parallel political wings often inadvertently signal their reservation points in an effort to mobilize support. Mediators also seek signals that the government is willing to credibly commit to a settlement. Leadership turnover may be one such signal, as new leaders are not beholden to old vested interests. To evaluate these propositions, a statistical test of mediation efforts in civil wars is conducted from 1989 to 2005.

Rebel Fragmentation and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher M Faulkner ◽  
Austin C Doctor
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Child Soldiers ◽  
Recruitment Strategies ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
Cross National

Abstract The recruitment and use of children in armed conflict remains a prevalent feature of modern civil war. But which conflict actors are more likely to recruit children? We argue that the process by which rebel groups form shapes their recruitment strategies. Specifically, we contend that rebels that form as splinter factions from the ranks of pre-existing rebel organizations are more likely to recruit child soldiers than other rebel groups. Splinter groups face unique constraints as they materialize in the midst of an active conflict environment, necessitating that they mobilize a sufficient force to contend with existing competitors. As a result, rebel factions are more likely to pursue recruitment strategies that are low cost vis-à-vis alternatives, focusing on their immediate survival. Under such conditions, children become especially attractive recruits. Leveraging the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence Dataset, our cross-national investigation of 237 rebel groups active between 1989 and 2011 provides robust support for our hypothesis that splinter factions are strongly associated with the recruitment of children.

The Rebels’ Credibility Dilemma

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakana L. Thomas ◽  
William Reed ◽  
Scott Wolford
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government ◽  
Conflict In Africa

AbstractThis article examines why rebel groups make large demands of governments that are inconsistent with their fighting capacity, especially when such demands are almost always rejected. We show that making large demands, even if ultimately rejected by the government, makes sense for rebels who face a credibility dilemma. Such a dilemma is most likely to arise when militarily weak rebel groups face governments of uncertain strength and can commit to fight credibly only when they believe the government is also weak. This results in a counterintuitive set of strategic incentives for weak rebels, who choose their demands to ensure that they are rejected even when the government is weak. Thus, to make their threat to fight credible, weak rebels make large demands that, when rejected, result in inefficient fighting. Since most civil wars are characterized by weak rebels bargaining with much stronger governments, it is important to understand how this particular feature of civil war shapes intrawar negotiations between the rebels and the government. We develop a model of bargaining between a government and rebel group and evaluate its implications using historical data on civil conflict in Africa from 1989 to 2010. The results suggest that the tendency for the government to be significantly stronger than rebels induces rebel groups to make unrealistically large demands.

scholarly journals Lasting peace or temporary calm? Rebel group decapitation and civil war outcomes

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirssa Cline Ryckman
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Lasting Peace ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
The Government

Existing research has found that killing or capturing rebel group leaders can lead to the termination of civil wars. This paper considers the quality of those terminations, examining how wars end and whether this produces a lasting peace or only a temporary reprieve from violence. Decapitation is expected to weaken rebel groups, shifting the balance of power to the government; however, results suggest that killing or capturing a rebel group leader tends to produce termination through inactivity rather than outright government victories. Decapitation is also found to have no effect on the chances of civil war recurrence. This suggests that the removal of rebel group leaders is effective primarily as a short-term strategy that does not tend to generate a lasting peace.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

scholarly journals Concessions and Repression in Conflict

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 865-899
Author(s):  
Akifumi Ishihara ◽  
Prakarsh Singh
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
The State ◽  
Electoral Participation ◽  
Threshold Estimation ◽  
Perpetual Peace ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government

Abstract We build a model for predicting civil wars where the government bargains with a rebel group using concessions and repression. The equilibrium is either a state of perpetual peace where there are concessions but no repression or a state of repressive equilibrium that can lead to civil wars. At the lowest levels of political competition, a move towards open electoral participation decreases the ability of the state to use repression to limit challengers, increasing the likelihood of war. At higher levels, an increase in competition decreases the probability of war by increasing concessions to the rebel group. Increasing concessions makes war less likely because it decreases the spoils of war and provides one explanation for the non-monotonicity found between probability of civil war and democracy. We test the prediction of this non-linearity using the technique in [Hansen (2000). “Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation.” Econometrica 68:575–603] and find evidence consistent with the model.

Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
DARA KAY COHEN
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Sierra Leone ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Cross National

Why do some armed groups commit massive wartime rape, whereas others never do? Using an original dataset, I describe the substantial variation in rape by armed actors during recent civil wars and test a series of competing causal explanations. I find evidence that the recruitment mechanism is associated with the occurrence of wartime rape. Specifically, the findings support an argument about wartime rape as a method of socialization, in which armed groups that recruit by force—through abduction or pressganging—use rape to create unit cohesion. State weakness and insurgent contraband funding are also associated with increased wartime rape by rebel groups. I examine observable implications of the argument in a brief case study of the Sierra Leone civil war. The results challenge common explanations for wartime rape, with important implications for scholars and policy makers.

Khartoum will resist committing to power sharing

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
South Sudan ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
The West ◽  
Blue Nile ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Government ◽  
South Kordofan

Significance Since South Sudan seceded in 2011, Khartoum has confronted conflict on three fronts. Armed conflict escalated in Blue Nile and South Kordofan in mid-2011, while clashes between pro- and anti-government forces and outbreaks of inter-communal fighting have plagued Darfur and West Kordofan. Impacts Ongoing conflict will dash hopes of Sudan's removal from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Reports about fighting and atrocities in areas to which the government restricts access will further strain relations with the West. Khartoum will continue to pressure Juba against providing support to any rebel groups in Sudan. The government will step up its call that AU-UN peacekeepers withdraw from Darfur.

Politics of Pursuing Justice in the Aftermath of Civil Conflict

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 1165-1192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim ◽  
Mi Hwa Hong
Keyword(s):  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Truth Commissions ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government ◽  
Conflict Outcomes

Why do some states pursue transitional justice (TJ) in the immediate aftermath of armed conflict while others do not? What drives a state to select a particular type of justice mechanism over another? Building on the political explanations of TJ, we argue that postconflict justice (PCJ) decisions are driven by the interests and power of political elites shaped by recently ended conflicts. Our empirical analysis shows that conflict outcomes and their subsequent impact on the balance of power between the government and rebel groups are the most important determinants of PCJ decisions. Domestic trials are most likely to emerge out of a decisive, one-sided victory while truth commissions and reparations are most likely to occur after a negotiated settlement. We also find that conflict severity interacts with conflict outcomes to affect PCJ decisions.

scholarly journals Could rebel child soldiers prolong civil wars?

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roos Haer ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Child Soldiers ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Conflict Duration ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recruitment Practice ◽  
Internal Armed Conflicts ◽  
Child Soldiering

While we know why rebels may recruit children for their cause, our understanding of the consequences of child soldiering by non-state armed groups remains limited. The following research contributes to addressing this by examining how rebels’ child recruitment practice affects the duration of internal armed conflicts. We advance the argument that child soldiering increases the strength of rebel organizations vis-a-vis the government. This, in turn, lowers the capability asymmetry between these non-state actors and the incumbent, allowing the former to sustain dispute. Ultimately, the duration of armed conflicts is likely to be prolonged. We analyse this relationship with quantitative data on child soldier recruitment by rebel groups in the post-1989 period. The results confirm our main hypothesis: disputes are substantially longer when rebels recruit children. This work has important implications for the study of armed conflicts, conflict duration and our understanding of child soldiering.

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