scholarly journals Concessions and Repression in Conflict

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 865-899
Author(s):  
Akifumi Ishihara ◽  
Prakarsh Singh
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
The State ◽  
Electoral Participation ◽  
Threshold Estimation ◽  
Perpetual Peace ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government

Abstract We build a model for predicting civil wars where the government bargains with a rebel group using concessions and repression. The equilibrium is either a state of perpetual peace where there are concessions but no repression or a state of repressive equilibrium that can lead to civil wars. At the lowest levels of political competition, a move towards open electoral participation decreases the ability of the state to use repression to limit challengers, increasing the likelihood of war. At higher levels, an increase in competition decreases the probability of war by increasing concessions to the rebel group. Increasing concessions makes war less likely because it decreases the spoils of war and provides one explanation for the non-monotonicity found between probability of civil war and democracy. We test the prediction of this non-linearity using the technique in [Hansen (2000). “Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation.” Econometrica 68:575–603] and find evidence consistent with the model.

scholarly journals Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis

2009 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars-Erik Cederman ◽  
Andreas Wimmer ◽  
Brian Min
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
State Power ◽  
The State ◽  
Central State ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
The Government

Much of the quantitative literature on civil wars and ethnic conflict ignores the role of the state or treats it as a mere arena for political competition among ethnic groups. Other studies analyze how the state grants or withholds minority rights and faces ethnic protest and rebellion accordingly, while largely overlooking the ethnic power configurations at the state's center. Drawing on a new data set on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to central state power around the world from 1946 through 2005, the authors analyze outbreaks of armed conflict as the result of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power. The findings indicate that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict with the government (1) the more excluded from state power they are, especially if they have recently lost power, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past.

Who Wins, Who Loses, Who Negotiates Peace in Civil Wars: Does Regime Type Matter?

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 482-498
Author(s):  
Anup Phayal ◽  
T David Mason ◽  
Mehmet Gurses
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
The State ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Peace Research ◽  
Conflict Duration ◽  
Regime Types ◽  
The Government ◽  
Competing Risk Models

Abstract Previous research has shown that the outcome of a civil war is related to conflict duration: military victory by either the government or the rebels occurs early if it occurs at all, and the longer a civil war lasts, the more likely it is to end in a negotiated settlement. The models of civil war duration and outcome that have produced these findings are built on characteristics of the civil war and less on attributes of the state itself, other than where the state lies on the Polity autocracy-democracy scale. We propose that how civil wars end varies not only between democracies and authoritarian regimes but among the different authoritarian regime types identified by Geddes, Wright, and Franz. The distinguishing attributes of these regime types—democracy, one-party, personalist, military, monarchical—should lead to different likelihood in defeating a rebel movement, being defeated by a rebel movement, and negotiating a peace agreement with a rebel movement. Results from a series of competing-risk models using the Uppsala–Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset demonstrate support for our claim that how civil wars end is partly a function of the characteristics of the regime.

Fractionalization and Civil War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
The State ◽  
Limited Extent ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
The Government

Civil wars have becoming increasingly complex in the last 50 years, the role of fragmentation in contemporary civil wars needs to be addressed. Two primary dimensions of fractionalization are: (1) fragmented conflict (i.e., those with many different actor) and (2) fragmented actors (i.e., internally divided “sides” of a conflict). In addition to the two types of fragmentation, there are also various causes of fragmentation. The primary causes of fractionalized conflicts are rooted in the interplay between opposition actors and the government, and among opposition actors. Peace negotiations, accommodation, and the process of war all put stress on opposition actors (and to perhaps a more limited extent, on governments). Lastly, there is a set of conflict-related outcomes and processes that have been linked empirically to fractionalization. These include accommodation of opposition demands, higher rates of violence (against the state and civilians), infighting, duration of conflict, and side-switching.

The Rebels’ Credibility Dilemma

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakana L. Thomas ◽  
William Reed ◽  
Scott Wolford
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government ◽  
Conflict In Africa

AbstractThis article examines why rebel groups make large demands of governments that are inconsistent with their fighting capacity, especially when such demands are almost always rejected. We show that making large demands, even if ultimately rejected by the government, makes sense for rebels who face a credibility dilemma. Such a dilemma is most likely to arise when militarily weak rebel groups face governments of uncertain strength and can commit to fight credibly only when they believe the government is also weak. This results in a counterintuitive set of strategic incentives for weak rebels, who choose their demands to ensure that they are rejected even when the government is weak. Thus, to make their threat to fight credible, weak rebels make large demands that, when rejected, result in inefficient fighting. Since most civil wars are characterized by weak rebels bargaining with much stronger governments, it is important to understand how this particular feature of civil war shapes intrawar negotiations between the rebels and the government. We develop a model of bargaining between a government and rebel group and evaluate its implications using historical data on civil conflict in Africa from 1989 to 2010. The results suggest that the tendency for the government to be significantly stronger than rebels induces rebel groups to make unrealistically large demands.

scholarly journals Lasting peace or temporary calm? Rebel group decapitation and civil war outcomes

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirssa Cline Ryckman
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Lasting Peace ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
The Government

Existing research has found that killing or capturing rebel group leaders can lead to the termination of civil wars. This paper considers the quality of those terminations, examining how wars end and whether this produces a lasting peace or only a temporary reprieve from violence. Decapitation is expected to weaken rebel groups, shifting the balance of power to the government; however, results suggest that killing or capturing a rebel group leader tends to produce termination through inactivity rather than outright government victories. Decapitation is also found to have no effect on the chances of civil war recurrence. This suggests that the removal of rebel group leaders is effective primarily as a short-term strategy that does not tend to generate a lasting peace.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

Sources of the recognition of belligerent status

1977 ◽  
Vol 17 (192) ◽  
pp. 111-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Zorgbibe
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
The State ◽  
Sovereign Power ◽  
Equal Status ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Right ◽  
The 19Th Century

“Whenever a large organized group believes it has the right to resist the sovereign power and considers itself capable of resorting to arms, war between the two parties should take place in the same manner as between nations…” This statement by de Vattel in the 19th century seemed destined to take its place as a part of positive law, constituting part of what was known as recognition of belligerency, tantamount to the recognition by the established government of an equal status for insurgents and regular belligerents. When a civil war became extensive enough, the State attacked would understand that it was wisest to acknowledge the existence of a state of war with part of the population. This would, at the same time, allow the conflict to be seen in a truer light. The unilateral action of the legal government in recognizing belligerency would be the condition for granting belligerent rights to the parties. It would constitute a demonstration of humanity on the part of the government of the State attacked and would also provide that government with prospects for effective pursuit of the war. By admitting that it was forced to resort to war, it would at least have its hands free to make war seriously.

Rethinking the Conflict “Resource Curse”: How Oil Wealth Prevents Center-Seeking Civil Wars

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Paine
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Revenue Sources ◽  
Societal Challenges ◽  
The Government ◽  
Oil Wealth ◽  
Oil Revenues ◽  
Civil War Onset

AbstractA broad literature on how oil wealth affects civil war onset argues that oil production engenders violent contests to capture a valuable prize from vulnerable governments. By contrast, research linking oil wealth to durable authoritarian regimes argues that oil-rich governments deter societal challenges by strategically allocating enormous revenues to enhance military capacity and to provide patronage. This article presents a unified formal model that evaluates how these competing mechanisms affect overall incentives for center-seeking civil wars. The model yields two key implications. First, large oil-generated revenues strengthen the government and exert an overall effect that decreases center-seeking civil war propensity. Second, oil revenues are less effective at preventing center-seeking civil war relative to other revenue sources, which distinguishes overall and relative effects. Revised statistical results test overall rather than relative effects by omitting the conventional but posttreatment covariate of income per capita, and demonstrate a consistent negative association between oil wealth and center-seeking civil war onset.

The Geopolitics of Major Power Interventions in Civil Wars

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292097691
Author(s):  
Joe Clare ◽  
Vesna Danilovic
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Humanitarian Interventions ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
The Government

What factors influence third parties to intervene in civil wars? Our focus on major powers, which are disproportionately more likely than other states to intervene in civil conflicts, directs us to the factors that uniquely shape their interests. While our study does not rule out humanitarian interventions by collective security international institutions and individual states, we do not find that humanitarian concerns motivate major powers. We argue and demonstrate that their decisions to intervene are principally motivated by their drive to establish, consolidate, or expand influence in different geopolitical regions. Past research with the strategic approach stressed the importance of an intervener’s prior ties with a civil war state for this decision. Though important, we show the effect of these ties is subordinate to other factors. In our argument, their role is primarily relevant for determining whether an intervener will be on the side of the government or opposition. The key issue of whether major powers are likely to intervene in the first place, however, is contingent on how much the entire region is strategically relevant to warrant intervention. The empirical analysis of civil war interventions over nearly fifty years lends strong support to our theoretical expectations.

scholarly journals Art. XX.—An Account of the Country of Sindh; with Remarks on the State of Society, the Government, Manners, and Customs of the People

1834 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M‘Murdo
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
The State ◽  
Satisfactory Explanation ◽  
The North ◽  
The People ◽  
River Indus ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Universe

The author of the Tohfat-al-Giráni states, that “the country of Sindh takes its name from Sind, the brother of Hind, the son of Noah. It is reckoned the forty-third of the sixty-one countries of the universe. The line of the second climate passes, from the north, directly through its centre; and although Sindh is situated in the five first climates, it nevertheless chiefly appertains to the second, and, consequently, lies in the region of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.” It would be difficult to discover where the author quoted has found these grandsons of the patriarch; indeed, as is usual in such genealogies, they are probably altogether imaginary. The Hindú writings may, perhaps, afford some more satisfactory explanation of the name; but I have not been so fortunate as to meet with it. As far as I can learn from such sources, this country was called Sindhúdès, or “the country of the ocean,” alluding doubtless to the river Indus, which receives that dignified appellation in their sacred writings. The same authorities also state Sindh to have been governed by a Xhuthi, named Jayadrat'ha, who was slain in the civil wars of the Pandús; and it has, in consequence, sometimes received the name of Jayadrat'hadès, after that chieftain.

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