The Principles

Author(s):  
Casey-Maslen Stuart ◽  
Clapham Andrew ◽  
Giacca Gilles ◽  
Parker Sarah

This chapter discusses the eight principles of the ATT. Article 5(1) requires parties to implement the treaty while bearing in mind the principles set out. The principles cover the following issues: the right of states to self-defence; the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state; respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law and human rights; the responsibility of states to regulate international trade in conventional arms and prevent diversion and to establish national control systems; respect for the interests of states to acquire, produce, export, import, and transfer conventional arms; and implementation of the ATT in a consistent, objective, and non-discriminatory manner.

Author(s):  
William A. Schabas

This chapter examines the rules and principles of the international humanitarian law (IHL) governing the right to life. It discusses the origins and scope of the right to life and clarifies that the protection provided by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does not cease in times of war. It also considers some widely-recognized exceptions to or limitations upon the right to life, including killing in self-defence and the lethal use of force by the authorities in order to prevent crime. This chapter argues that while resorting to armed force may be necessary to prevent human rights violations, its benefits should not be exaggerated.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 881-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

AbstractThis article describes the relevant interpretation of the right to life by human rights treaty bodies and analyses how this might influence the law relating to the use of force in armed conflicts and occupations where international humanitarian law is unclear. The concurrent applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights law to hostilities in armed conflict does not mean that the right to life must, in all situations, be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law. The author submits that the human rights law relating to the right to life is suitable to supplement the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the use of force for non-international conflicts and occupation, as well as the law relating to civilians taking a “direct part in hostilities”. Finally, by making reference to the traditional prohibition of assassination, the author concludes that the application of human rights law in these situations would not undermine the spirit of international humanitarian law.


Author(s):  
Peterke Sven ◽  
Wolf Joachim

This chapter analyses the interplay of the use of force in international law and transnational organised crime (TOC). It suggests understanding organised criminal groups as addressees of certain parts of the international legal order that deal with the use of force. For instance, Article 51 United Nations (UN) Charter gives states the right to self-defence following an armed attack without specifying that the armed attack must be carried out by a state. Such an attack can equally emanate from organised criminal groups which, in turn, makes them partial subjects of international law. If gangs engage in TOC, often their action also poses a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 UN Charter. It lies thus within the mandate of the Security Council to deal with such action. The Council has started to do so in recent years and it is called upon to continue this line of work.


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 431
Author(s):  
Sophie Rondeau

Le présent article fait état d’un questionnement sur l’état actuel du rôle des normes juridiques émanant du système de droit international humanitaire (DIH) en ce qui a trait au droit à la réparation, en prenant soin de mettre la personne en tant que victime de la guerre au centre de notre réflexion. En considérant la notion de réparation sous l’angle de la victime comme un tout à décrire et à analyser, nous cherchons à savoir s’il existe un droit à la réparation que possède la victime d’un conflit armé régi par le droit international humanitaire. Le fondement même de cette recherche s’appuie donc sur le cadre normatif conventionnel du DIH régissant la notion de réparation, que cette dernière accorde ou non un droit à une victime.This paper presents a series of questions on the present state of the role of judicial standards arising from the system of international humanitarian law [IHL] as regards the right to compensation, by making it a point to place the person as a war victim at the center of our reflection. In considering the concept of compensation from the angle of the victim as a whole, we seek to know whether there exists a right to compensation to which the victim of an armed conflict governed by international humanitarian law is entitled. The very foundation of this research is thus based on the conventional normative framework of IHL governing the concept of compensation, whether or not it grants a right to a victim.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 619-653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita H. Petrova

AbstractThe article examines the roles of NGOs in banning cluster munitions that resulted in the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the campaign against landmines in the 1990s. It argues that NGOs have managed to move questions about the use of force from the closed decision-making sphere of military commanders and arms control diplomats into open public debate. Thus NGOs have simultaneously desecuritised the use of force by states, securitised certain weapons technologies, and made human beings the referent object of security. This has marked a shift from state security and strategic disarmament to human security and humanitarian disarmament, without fundamentally challenging the laws of war. However, in contrast to realist views that only militarily useless weapons ever get banned and radical critical perspectives that see new legal regimes as legitimating war and US hegemony, I argue that NGOs have engaged in immanent critique of military arguments and practices based on prevailing principles of international humanitarian law. The resulting weapon ban treaties have both restrained US policy and undermined its legitimacy. The article explores the discursive choices that underpinned the remaking of the security agenda by NGOs and their role as de/securitising actors and emancipatory agents of change.


Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

This chapter provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. It argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the jus ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The chapter then considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the application of the right to life in armed conflict, particularly in territory not controlled by the state conducting the strike. The chapter then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes, such as the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section considers the law relating to the use of force by states against non-state groups abroad.


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