1 Legal Status (Personality), 1.6 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 ( The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v Greece ), Judgment, [2011] ICJ Rep 644

Author(s):  
Barros Ana Sofia

The present case addresses the responsibility of states for their own conduct performed in the framework of international organizations. The matter at stake concerned the responsibility of Greece for its objection to FYROM’s candidacy for membership in NATO, which eventually led to latter’s decision to refuse FYROM’s admission. Contrary to Greece’s contention that the decision had been taken by NATO as a whole, and that it was thus solely attributable to it, the ICJ lifted the institutional veil and rather concentrated on the legality of the individual conduct of Greece. In this decision, the Court confirmed that member state participation in institutional decision-making processes can, in its own right, constitute legally relevant conduct against which state compliance with earlier international law obligations may be judged.

2020 ◽  
pp. 181-203
Author(s):  
Paola Gaeta ◽  
Jorge E. Viñuales ◽  
Salvatore Zappalà

Custom and treaties constitute the two most important formal sources of international law, that are also envisaged in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. In addition, Article 38 refers to general principles of law recognized in domestic systems. This chapter examines these three formal sources of international law as well as some others, in particular unilateral acts of States and binding decisions of international organizations. In addition, it discusses equity and soft law and examines some mechanisms of identification and development of international law, such as jurisprudence, doctrine, and codification.


Author(s):  
Brölmann Catherine

The 1980 WHO Advisory Opinion elaborates on the general legal obligations (grounded in the duty of co-operation and good faith) that are part of the relationship between an international organization and its host state. In this opinion the ICJ possibly for the first time articulated this relationship as a set of mutual obligations between legal equals. The opinion moreover enunciates the sources of international legal obligations binding upon international organizations (IOs): the treaties they conclude (uncontroversial); I customary international law; their constitutions. The Court uses the proverbial reassurance of UN member states in saying that the WHO is not a ‘super-state’. Finally, in accepting jurisdiction the Court explicitly separated the legal character of the question from the political considerations motivated by that question.


Author(s):  
Sarah Williams ◽  
Hannah Woolaver

Abstract An unprecedented number of states have sought to act as amici curiae in the proceedings before the Pre-Trial Chamber of International Criminal Court (ICC) considering the Court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in Palestine. Given the centrality of the issue of Palestinian statehood to this jurisdictional question, these proceedings raise complex and novel questions of international law — and politics. The high number of states seeking to participate as amici either individually or through international organizations reflects the controversial nature of the questions at hand. Conversely, Israel has refused to participate in the proceedings, despite an invitation from the Chamber. In this submission, we consider the challenges raised by state participation as amici curiae, including the role(s) played by state amici, and the impact — if any — such extensive participation has on the legitimacy of the proceedings and its outcome(s) and for the ICC as an institution.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1026-1067
Author(s):  
Cóman Kenny

Abstract A state’s prerogative to legislate for nationality remains subject to international law, with the arbitrary deprivation of nationality prohibited. The human rights implications of statelessness are profound, permeating all aspects of life and resulting in the marginalisation and oppression of those affected. Nonetheless, states have implemented laws depriving particular groups of legal status and making them stateless. In addition to the severe impact on the individual, such targeted discrimination creates a permissive atmosphere of dehumanisation that threatens a group’s existence and has been the precursor to mass atrocity. This article assesses, for the first time, whether individual criminal responsibility could be established for the creation or maintenance of a state policy to arbitrarily deprive a group of its nationality, rendering its members stateless. Based on post-World War ii precedent, it argues that such conduct could constitute a crime under the Rome Statute.


1993 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H.F. Bekker

The UN General Assembly has recently decided to delete from the agenda of the International Law Commission the topic ‘Relations between States and International Organizations’.Over a period of 31 years, fourteen Reports by two successive Special Rapporteurs studied the topic in two parts. The First part of the topic (1963–1975) dealt with the privileges and immunities of representatives of states to international organizations, and resulted in a Convention, that has, however, not yet entered into force; the Second part of the topic (1976–1992) concentrated on the legal status and immunities of organizations themselves.The author analyzes the Draft Articles that have been submitted in the course of the ILC's study of the Second part. This is done by way of a three-step application of the functional necessity concept of organizational immunities:(1) Status, dealing with an organization's functions, legal personality and capacity-(2) Selection, defining a scale of organizational immunities for which an organization may be eligible - and (3) Scope, determining the extent of selected immunities. Finally, the author employs the two statutory functions of the ILC -the codification of international law and the progressive development of international law- to assess the contribution by the ILC to this field of international institutional law.


Author(s):  
Jorge Luis Almeida Estrella

The purpose of this article is to question whether the powers of the United Nations Security Council (SC) are subject to any limitation under international law, especially in the context of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine. And consequently, which organism will be entitled to hold the SC accountable for its actions, and how that organism should do it. The first chapter of this article deals with the possible limitations of the SC, it considers both legal and legitimacy restraints to the broad powers of the SC. Additionally, we will explain how RtoP presents itself as a new challenge to the legitimacy of the SC. Chapter 2 discusses which organisms within the UN system, may be appropriate to hold the SC responsible for its actions. Finally, in Chapter 3, we will review the legal status of RtoP, and explain how the ICJ could use Just War criteria as a valuable tool for a judicial review process of SC decisions based on RtoP.


Author(s):  
Geert De Baere

The present chapter considers the position of the European Union in other international organizations. It is based on the premise that the Union, while arguably also a federal or quasi-federal structure, is legally still itself an international organization. From the perspective of international law, that explains at least partly the complexities involved in an international organization such as the EU acquiring a status in—let alone membership of—another international organization. The term ‘status’ or ‘position’ is understood here as the influence the Union can exercise, either formally or informally, in decision-making processes in other international organizations. As an ever-increasing number of decisions having an impact on the Union’s policies originate in international organizations, its position in such fora matters.


1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 502-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Osakwe

Whether or not we agree with the statement that international law is nothing but “international public morality” or, what amounts to the same thing, that international law is “primitive law” as compared with its municipal counterpart, we are more likely to agree on the question that Soviet doctrinal international law1 is nothing but a mirror reflection of official Soviet governmental and party policies. It is essentially a “fighting international law” 2 which has often proved a valuable weapon in the armory of Soviet foreign policy-makers. The zig-zag development of the Soviet doctrinal approach to the question of international personality in general, and in particular to the international legal status of international organizations, vividly demonstrates this fact. We propose to examine in greater detail just one aspect of the Soviet doctrine of international law—the concept of secondary subjects of international law.


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