5 Obligations of International Organizations, 5.2 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt , Advisory Opinion, [1980] ICJ Rep 73

Author(s):  
Brölmann Catherine

The 1980 WHO Advisory Opinion elaborates on the general legal obligations (grounded in the duty of co-operation and good faith) that are part of the relationship between an international organization and its host state. In this opinion the ICJ possibly for the first time articulated this relationship as a set of mutual obligations between legal equals. The opinion moreover enunciates the sources of international legal obligations binding upon international organizations (IOs): the treaties they conclude (uncontroversial); I customary international law; their constitutions. The Court uses the proverbial reassurance of UN member states in saying that the WHO is not a ‘super-state’. Finally, in accepting jurisdiction the Court explicitly separated the legal character of the question from the political considerations motivated by that question.

Author(s):  
Miriam Bak McKenna

Abstract Situating itself in current debates over the international legal archive, this article delves into the material and conceptual implications of architecture for international law. To do so I trace the architectural developments of international law’s organizational and administrative spaces during the early to mid twentieth century. These architectural endeavours unfolded in three main stages: the years 1922–1926, during which the International Labour Organization (ILO) building, the first building exclusively designed for an international organization was constructed; the years 1927–1937 which saw the great polemic between modernist and classical architects over the building of the Palace of Nations; and the years 1947–1952, with the triumph of modernism, represented by the UN Headquarters in New York. These events provide an illuminating allegorical insight into the physical manifestation, modes of self-expression, and transformation of international law during this era, particularly the relationship between international law and the function and role of international organizations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-233
Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas

Abstract This article argues that international organizations ‘as such’ can contribute directly to the creation of customary international law for three independent reasons. First, the states establishing an international organization may subjectively intend for that organization to be able to contribute to the creation of at least some kinds of customary international law. Second, that capacity may be an implied power of the organization. Third, that capacity may be a byproduct of other features or authorities of the international organization – specifically, the combination of international legal personality and the capacity to operate on the international plane. Affirming international organizations’ direct role in making customary international law will not dramatically change the content of customary international law or the processes by which rules of customary international law are ascertained. But recognizing that role is significant because it will reinforce other conclusions about how international organizations fit into the international legal system, including that customary international law binds international organizations. Such recognition may also shift the way lawyers within international organizations carry out their work by affecting the sources they consult when answering legal questions, the materials they make publicly available and the kinds of expertise that are understood to be necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Finally, affirming international organizations’ role in creating customary international law may make international organizations more willing to comply with those rules.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-197
Author(s):  
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral

AbstractThe Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda Judgement of 3rd February 2006 marked the first occasion in which the International Court of Justice expressly pronounced on the jus cogens character of a norm of international law. The Court did also expressly extend, for the first time, the scope of the principle of consensual jurisdiction to cover the relationship between peremptory norms of general international law and the establishment of the Court's jurisdiction. Against this backdrop, this piece revisits some of the main ICJ milestones regarding community interests in light of recent doctrine on the question of ius standi in disputes involving obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms. It does so in order to examine the main alternatives put forward by the doctrine to circumvent the requirement of state consent for the protection of community interests by jurisdictional means at the international level.


2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Folk

On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s construction of a security wall on occupied Palestinian territory, declaring that the wall was in violation of international law. The advisory opinion also indicated that Israel should forthwith cease construction of the wall, dismantle what had been so far constructed, and make reparations to the Palestinians for all damages caused by the project. On July 20, 2004, at the Tenth Emergency Session of the General Assembly, Resolution ES-10/15 was adopted by a vote of 150 in favor, 6 opposed, and 10 abstentions, demanding that Israel comply with the legal obligations as specified by the advisory opinion.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marija Đorđeska

Abstract Article 38, para.1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines customary international law as evidence of general practice accepted as law, understood as State practice and opinio juris. However, by identifying certain norms as an international custom without referring to the traditional evidence of State practice and opinio juris, international courts and tribunals are contributing to the formation of customary international law. This paper presents an analysis of how the International Court of Justice contributes to the formation of customary international law by relying on the draft articles of the International Law Commission (ILC). Th e International Court of Justice, in “deciding in accordance with international law”, also authoritatively declares what the current international law is, while the International Law Commission, although constituted of highly qualified publicists from various States, is drafting only non-binding international instruments. By relying on the ILC draft articles and declaring them to be reflecting customary international law-although the draft articles may not be necessary the expression of the States’ practice and their opinio juris, the ICJ creates and generates the creation of customary international law. Interestingly, the ICJ tends to rely mostly on ILC draft articles that refer to the jurisprudence of either the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) or the ICJ itself. Th e paper presents research of approximately 70 ICJ decisions and individual opinions that cite to the work of the ILC. The author notes the evolution of the relationship between the ICJ and the ILC through three different time periods, and presents the findings on how, when and why the ICJ relies on the ILC draft articles. In addition, the author gives examples in which the ICJ rejected the reliance on the ILC’s work, mainly due to the divergent interpretation on the specific area of international law. The ICJ, by relying on the ILC draft articles that in turn refer to the jurisprudence of the ICJ or PCIJ, is not only generating norms of customary international law, but is also reaffirming the importance of its (and PCIJ’s) jurisprudence for the future of international law. Although ICJ decisions are binding only between the parties to the dispute (Art.59 ICJ Statute), the clarification of whether a norm is customary or not, affects the international community of States. Noting the present reluctance of States to adopt treaties, and- hence their potentially decreasing role in international law-making, this research offers an insight into an alternative venue of international law-making. As the international community, and the ILC itself, is regaining interest in the sources of international law, this paper aims to identify the mechanisms of international law-making, the understanding of which will contribute to international law’s needed predictability and a more uniform and reliable interpretation of international law.


Author(s):  
John H. Currie

SummaryThe majority Supreme Court of Canada judgment inHape— a case concerning extraterritorial applicability of theCanadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms— is premised on three aspects of the relationship between international and Canadian law: (1) the interaction of customary international law and Canadian common law; (2) the role of Canada’s international legal obligations inCharterinterpretation; and (3) the potential role of customary international law as a source of unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. This article reviews pre-existing law in all three of these areas and analyzes a number of innovations apparently introduced thereto, with little or no explanation, by the majority inHape. It concludes thatHapeseriously exacerbates an already uncertain relationship between international and Canadian law, with fundamental consequences for the rule of law in Canada.


Lex Russica ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 72-90
Author(s):  
A. S. Gulasaryan

For the first time in the Russian science of international law the author of the paper performs a comprehensive analysis of the legal nature of international energy associations, their role in international administration in the sphere of energy.International energy associations are grouped into four categories depending on their legal nature: 1) associations in the form of public international organizations (IAEA; Eurato/ESAE; OPEC; EES CIS; CECH; EC; FEG; IRENA);2) associations functioning as a body of a public international organization (IEA OECD); 3) associations that can be considered as international non-governmental (transnational) organizations (WEC, IGU, IOC), (4) associations that can be classified as informal international associations (G7/G8; G20; IEF). It is noted that the international energy administration involves not only public international organizations, but also non-legal actors of international relations— international non-governmental(transnational) organizations and informal international associations. In order to determine the legal nature of international energy associations, the author considers constituent instruments, resolutions (decisions), headquarters agreements, agreements regarding privileges and immunities of international organizations, treaties and the contemporary doctrine of international law.Provisions, generalizations and conclusions provided for in the article, can be used for the development of strategies of interaction of the Russian Federation with the above-mentioned associations in the field of energy.


Author(s):  
Joel P. Trachtman

The essence of an international organization is the delegation of decision-making authority from individual states to the organization, representing the collectivity of member states. In simple terms, international organizations are to international law as firms are to contracts: states form international organizations in order to reduce the transaction costs associated with cooperation, as compared to the entry into international legal rules without organizations. The core questions are the same: why are these institutions formed, what powers do they have, and how are they exercised? This chapter analyzes the reasons for the creation of international organizations, as well as the reasons why particular structures of international organizations are utilized. It assesses the relationship among assignment of subject matter authority, legislative capacity, adjudicative capacity, enforcement capacity, and membership. It examines how these features correspond to particular contexts of international cooperation.


Author(s):  
Ryngaert Cedric

In League of Arab States, the Belgian Court of Cassation held that the League could not rely on its immunity from jurisdiction before Belgian courts, as, absent parliamentary approval, the Headquarters Agreement between Belgium and the League could not have domestic legal consequences. The Court added that there was no general principle of public international law in the sense of art. 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute to the effect of international organizations enjoying immunity from jurisdiction. This decision is in line with decisions from other jurisdictions, which require a treaty basis for international organization immunity to be successfully invoked. It contrasts however with an earlier decision by the Dutch Supreme Court (Spaans), pursuant to which the immunity of international organizations follows from customary international law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 213-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Welsh ◽  
Maria Banda

AbstractThe Responsibility to Protect (R2P) invokes one of the most powerful moral and legal terms in contemporary international politics – namely, responsibility. The nature of the relationship between R2P and international law and morality, however, remains contested, giving rise to questions lying at the core of R2P's normative foundations. What is the source of R2P? To whom is this responsibility attributable, and under what circumstances? Does R2P give rise to legal obligations? Such questions challenge International Relations (IR) theorists to look beyond their discipline for more insightful tools and methods of analysis. In this article, we apply a broadened theoretical framework to explain the ongoing controversy about R2P. In Part II, we borrow tools from moral philosophy to identify the source and the bearer of the responsibility to protect in today's international society. In Part III, we draw on international legal scholarship to analyse whether R2P has emerged as a 'new' norm of customary international law. We find that international endorsement of R2P has helped to clarify existing obligations in international law, but that intrinsic ambiguities in its articulation currently limit R2P's capacity to entrench new obligations for states to protect strangers. At the same time, our finding that R2P is an example of 'soft law' leads us to conclude that R2P can nonetheless exert significant influence on how states interpret their legal obligations and, in the coming decade, it may also help catalyse diplomatic efforts to reform the international architecture for preventing and responding to mass atrocities.


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