Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses

Author(s):  
Halson Roger

This book focuses on liquidated damages and penalty clauses, and analyses the common law jurisdiction to control stipulated damages clauses, as well as the distinction between enforceable liquidated damages clauses and unenforceable penalty clauses. The first part of the book examines the historical origin of the control of these clauses; the second part describes the current control of such clauses and their legal effect, while the third part of the book critically examines the various rationales that have been proposed to justify their regulation. The final part of the book describes analogous provisions and how to avoid drafting contractual clauses that are rendered unenforceable by the penalty rule. The book examines approaches in several common law jurisdictions in addition to England and Wales, including the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, and brings together principles developed in distinct commercial law contexts (such as shipping contracts) to enable comparison between particular contractual settings.

2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Graves

Commercial agreements often provide for “fixed sums” payable upon a specified breach. Such agreements are generally enforced in civil law jurisdictions. In contrast, the common law distinguishes between “liquidated damages” and “penalty” clauses, enforcing the former, while invalidating the latter as a penalty. The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) does not directly address the payment of “fixed sums” as damages, and the validity of “penalty” clauses has, traditionally, been relegated to otherwise applicable domestic national law under CISG Article 4. This traditional orthodoxy has recently been challenged—suggesting that the fate of a penalty clause should be determined by reference to the general principles of the CISG and that such a clause should generally be enforced. The validity of fixed sums, as penalties, is currently under consideration by the CISG Advisory Council, so further exploration of the issue would seem particularly timely. This article examines the basis for the traditional view, along with two distinct challenges to that view—ultimately concluding that these challenges fail to support their respective solutions to the issue and suggesting the continuing vitality of the traditional view.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-185
Author(s):  
Edyta Sokalska

The reception of common law in the United States was stimulated by a very popular and influential treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone, published in the late 18th century. The work of Blackstone strengthened the continued reception of the common law from the American colonies into the constituent states. Because of the large measure of sovereignty of the states, common law had not exactly developed in the same way in every state. Despite the fact that a single common law was originally exported from England to America, a great variety of factors had led to the development of different common law rules in different states. Albert W. Alschuler from University of Chicago Law School is one of the contemporary American professors of law. The part of his works can be assumed as academic historical-legal narrations, especially those concerning Blackstone: Rediscovering Blackstone and Sir William Blackstone and the Shaping of American Law. Alschuler argues that Blackstone’s Commentaries inspired the evolution of American and British law. He introduces not only the profile of William Blackstone, but also examines to which extent the concepts of Blackstone have become the basis for the development of the American legal thought.


1967 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 916
Author(s):  
Lord Denning ◽  
Erwin N. Griswold

Author(s):  
Andrews Neil

This Part mostly concerns judicial remedies for breach of contract (the self-help remedy of forfeiture of a deposit is noted at [27.109]). The chapter sequence reflects both the division between Common Law (chapters 27 and 28) and Equity (chapter 29) but, more importantly, the practical importance of the judicial remedies, debt mattering more than damages, and in turn damages more than specific performance or injunctions. And so chapter 27 concerns ‘Debt’ (but agreed damages, ie liquidated damages clauses, are treated in the same chapter because the sum payable is, by definition, fixed or calculable in advance; but technically, agreed damages are damages and not a cause of action sounding in debt). Chapter 28 concerns damages, that is, compensation. Damages is a branch of the law which continues to generate a mass of intricate case law. Finally, chapter 29 concerns the equitable remedies of specific performance, injunctions, account of profits, and declarations. It is a fundamental principle that specific performance can be granted only if the Common Law remedies (debt and damages) are inadequate on the relevant facts. Chapter 27: The predominant claim for contractual default is the action for debt, to compel payment. Statistically this is the front-runner amongst remedies for breach. The availability of interest is also noted in this chapter.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.


2021 ◽  
pp. 307-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

Poole’s Casebook on Contract Law provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally, it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.


Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter discusses the problem of when a duty of care arises in respect of negligent omissions, or for the actions of a third party. The common law takes the view that it would be too great a burden to impose liability upon a person for a mere omission, or for the actions of others. Despite this, duties can in fact be imposed in various ways, all of which focus on the reliance of the claimant upon the defendant. This can come about either by the previous conduct of the defendant, which induces reliance by the claimant that the defendant will continue to act in that way, or by reliance which comes out of a relationship of dependence between the parties. As regards third parties, a duty may arise where the defendant has control over or responsibility for the third party’s actions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document