Part VII Structure and Operations, Ch.38 Executive Heads

Author(s):  
Chesterman Simon

The executive head of an international organization (e.g. president, secretary-general, managing director, or some other title) exists in a curious limbo. He or she is entrusted to lead an organization that may employ tens of thousands of people and administer a budget in the billions of dollars. At the same time, however, his or her ability to operate independently of member states may be severely constrained by the powers entrusted to the office or tight constraints over finances. This tension is evident in the United Nations (UN), where the Secretary-General heads the Secretariat and is nominal commander-in-chief of 100,000 peacekeepers but is formally appointed as the organization's ‘Chief Administrative Officer’. This chapter examines the appointment of executive heads and the formal functions ascribed to them. It then turns to the question of how the various officeholders have implemented those functions in practice, focusing on the ability to operate independently of member-state interests.

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-360

The primary difficulty in the current question of the representation of Member States in die United Nations is that this question of representation has been linked up with the question of recognition by Member Governments.It will be shown here that this linkage is unfortunate from the practical standpoint, and wrong from the standpoint of legal theory.


Author(s):  
Cristina Fasone ◽  
Nicola Lupo

The shape and content of the EU budget define what the EU wants to be, what it can actually do, its nature, and its aspirations. As often happens with the EU, much depends on the terms of comparison: the Union budget, which is slightly higher than 1 per cent of the EU Gross National Income (GNI), is much smaller than the budgets of most Member States but, at the same time, it is three times bigger than that of the United Nations. Its size and, even more so, the EU procedures which set its expenditures—apart from its revenues—reveal that the EU aims to be something different from a mere international organization.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 190-202

1. On 21 November 1947, by its resolution 117 (II), the General Assembly requested the Interim Committee to:“1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of die General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;“2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;“3. Report, with its conclusions, to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General not later than 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Member States and to the General Assembly.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 31-47
Author(s):  
András Nagy

After nearly G5 years of the Hungarian 195G Revolution, several questions remained unanswered, mainly concerning the international responses to the Revolution and the brutal suppression of the revolt. The article examines the possibilities and the limitations of the international organization when two member states violate the Charter ofthe very organization,they are members of. Based on current archival research concerning recently declassified documents, the (mainly behind the scenes) activity and the (mainly demonstrative) passivity of the UN are analyzed and explained, without offering any excuse for the political pragmatism of the organization that was once built on moral principles.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-235
Author(s):  
Magnus Lundgren

Studies of conflict management by international organizations have demonstrated correlations between institutional characteristics and outcomes, but questions remain as to whether these correlations have causal properties. To examine how institutional characteristics condition the nature of international organization interventions, I examine mediation and ceasefire monitoring by the Arab League and the United Nations during the first phase of the Syrian civil war (2011–2012). Using micro-evidence sourced from unique interview material, day-to-day fatality statistics, and international organization documentation, I detail causal pathways from organizational characteristics, via intervention strategies, to intervention outcomes. I find that both international organizations relied on comparable intervention strategies. While mediating, they counseled on the costs of conflict, provided coordination points, and managed the bargaining context so as to sideline spoilers and generate leverage. While monitoring, they verified violent events, engaged in reassurance patrols, and brokered local truces. The execution of these strategies was conditioned on organizational capabilities and member state preferences in ways that help explain both variation in short-term conflict abatement and the long-term failure of both international organizations. In contrast to the Arab League, the United Nations intervention, supported by more expansive resources and expertise, temporarily shifted conflict parties away from a violent equilibrium. Both organizations ultimately failed as disunity among international organization member state principals cut interventions short and reduced the credibility of international organization mediators.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-373
Author(s):  
Hans Corell

On October 29 and 30, 1990, a meeting was held of the heads of the offices responsible for international legal services of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the United Nations—the Legal Advisers. The meeting was organized at the invitation of the Legal Advisers of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Canada, India, Mexico, Poland and Sweden, and with the assistance of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Under-Secretary-General Carl-August Fleischhauer. Some twenty-five Legal Advisers and thirty-two of their deputies or other representatives attended, including all five colleagues representing the permanent members of the Security Council.


1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuen-Li Liang

The question of recognition by an international organization of the representation of a Member State, a question recently considered by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a result of a proposal by Cuba, had previously engaged the attention of several international bodies. For instance, after the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, the Credentials Committeeof the Assembly of the League of Nations was confronted with the issue of the seating of Ethiopian representatives in the Assembly.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-100 ◽  

Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1966 and Information Annexes; Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: In its report to the General Assembly on the budget estimates for the financial year 1966, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions noted that the Secretary-General had proposed for 1966 a gross expenditure budget of $116,737,110, an increase of $8,361,405 over the total 1965 gross level of $108,375,705 recommended by the Committee. Of the total estimated income of $17,918,800 for 1966, income from staff assessment (for distribution to Member governments as credits through the Tax Equalization Fund) was calculated at $11,530,000 and income from all other sources (for deduction from gross appropriations for purposes of the assessment of contributions) at $6,388,800. After deduction of estimated income, the net expenditure level for 1966 would be $98,818,310, an increase of $7,402,505 over the total 1965 net level of $91,415,805 recommended by the Advisory Committee. In its report the Advisory Committee recommended reductions in the expenditure estimates totaling $2,130,590. These, together with adjustments in the income estimates, would reduce the net expenditure level for 1966 from $98,818,310, as proposed by the Secretary-General, to $96,814,220. After detailing the contributions made to other organizations in the United Nations family during the years 1961–1966, the Advisory Committee pointed out that, with the 1966 budget estimates submitted by the Secretary-General for the United Nations, the aggregate which member states of the various organizations would be asked to appropriate for the year 1966 would amount to approximately $254·3 million as against $234·7 million for 1965 and $213·3 million for 1964.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 682-683

In May 1950 the United Nations Secretary-General (Lie) and the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Bodet) submitted a joint report to the Economic and Social Council entitled “Teaching about the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies”. This was in response to resolution 203 (VIII) of ECOSOC which requested the Secretary-General and the Director-General of UNESCO to submit jointly, not later than June 1, 1950, a complete, analytical report on the progress achieved in teaching about the United Nations in educational institutions of member states. The report was based largely on information received from nineteen member countries during 1949, but use also was made of statements received and included in two interim reports on teaching about the United Nations submitted to ECOSOC in 1948 and 1949. Altogether reports from 37 members were analyzed.


1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-328
Author(s):  
Hans Corell

On October 26 and 27, 1992, a meeting was held of the heads of the offices responsible for international legal services of the foreign ministries of the member states of the United Nations—the Legal Advisers. The meeting—the third of its kind—was organized at the invitation of the Legal Advisers of Canada, India, Mexico, Poland and Sweden, and with the assistance of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Under-Secretary-General Carl-August Fleischhauer. Thirty Legal Advisers and sixteen of their deputies attended, together with nearly fifty other interested participants. All five colleagues representing the permanent members of the Security Council were present.


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