8 Settlement Of Investor–State Disputes

Author(s):  
Gallagher Norah ◽  
Shan Wenhua

The dispute-resolution provisions in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the “ultimate” investor protection in modern investment treaties. This chapter reviews the different types of dispute-resolution provisions of the Chinese BITs. It first looks at the choice of arbitrations made in its treaties, ICSID, ad hoc, or other arbitration rules. It then continues to review the two main types of investor-state dispute-resolution clauses in China's BITs: restrictive—where the BIT permits international arbitration of disputes on the amount of compensation for expropriation only; and more liberal or expansive—which allows access to international arbitration for all disputes between the investor and host state. It then considers a topic of particular interest right now for investors and potential investors in China: the application of the MFN clause to dispute resolution. Finally, it looks at the applicable law to dispute settlement and the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies.

Author(s):  
Parra Antonio R

This chapter examines activities of the Centre from the start of 2011 to the end of June 2015. Almost 50 percent more cases were registered at ICSID in that period compared to the previous five years. The chapter provides some statistics on the cases of this period. As in the decade before, it shows, most the cases were brought to ICSID on the basis of the dispute settlement provisions of investment treaties, mostly bilateral investment treaties (BITs) (in over 60 percent of the cases). A large proportion of the cases (more than ten percent) came to ICSID under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Cases submitted to the Centre pursuant to the dispute resolution clauses of investment contracts made up for a smaller share of the total. A handful (5 percent) of the cases were initiated under dispute settlement provisions of an investment law of the host State. The chapter then looks at institutional developments of ICSID during the period and considers new challenges that ICSID might meet in the future.


Author(s):  
Baumann Antje ◽  
Pfitzner Tanja V

This introduction discusses arbitration as a method for resolving disputes. It first provides an overview of the advantages of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism and a brief historical background on the development of modern international arbitration before exploring the effects of arbitration agreements, taking into account the applicable law for the question of arbitrability (objective arbitrability and subjective arbitrability). It then considers two options between which parties can choose when deciding to settle their dispute by arbitration: institutional arbitration and ad hoc arbitration. It also analyses the parties’ right to choose—based on the principle of party autonomy—the place and language of arbitration, the substantive law applicable to the merits of the dispute, and number of arbitrators. Finally, it explains the applicable rules and general structure of arbitral proceedings as well as the enforceability of arbitral awards.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Yvonne Zielinski

Abstract ICSID arbitration is witnessing a debate over the competing spheres of application between host State and international law: Under the second sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention (and under similarly worded applicable law provisions contained in investment contracts or bilateral investment treaties), arbitral tribunals possess large discretionary powers over the decision of which law to apply to which aspect of a dispute. However, the recent partial annulment of the Mobil v. Venezuela award, on the basis of the original tribunal’s manifest failure to apply domestic law to certain aspects of the case, redefines the contours of this discretion by requiring the application of domestic law to proprietary determinations of investments. This article reviews the different approaches to the dichotomy between domestic and international law and the tribunals’ discretionary powers in this respect, and analyzes the limits imposed in the field of property determinations by the case law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-600
Author(s):  
Chitransh Vijayvergia ◽  
Pavan Belmannu

Abstract While the regime of investment treaty arbitration has evolved manifold over the decades, has the position of the host-states as a Respondent improved? The authors argue that it has not. Bilateral Investment Treaties (hereinafter BIT(s)) are still asymmetrical in nature where the states are obliged to protect the rights of the foreign investors but are not provided with any remedy against the corrupt activities of the investors. While tribunals have denied jurisdiction over the investors’ claims tainted with corruption, they have provided states with no consequent remedy against such investors. Consequently, the states have to first bear the loss of a failed investment in its territory and then pay for the exorbitant costs of international arbitration as well. Where scholars are arguing for attribution of liability of corrupt activities of the public officials to the states, the authors here raise an important question of what if the liability cannot be attributed to the states due to lack of apparent authority? Should the states be then allowed to move forward from the jurisdictional stage to raise counterclaims to seek damages for the loss caused by the investors? In this article, the authors explore these questions and present arguments in favour of the inclusion of corruption-based counterclaims.


Yuridika ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Yetty Komalasari Dewi ◽  
Arie Afriansyah

In various countries, BITs are not always the same, but most of them contain many commitments or promises to protect the investment and investors of a country ("investors") in the territory of another country ("host country").[1] This protection includes treatment that is fair, equal and not discriminatory in overseeing the implementation of investment agreements and other obligations related to investment. The important thing is, in most cases, this kind of protection is accompanied by a very strong international arbitration mechanism that allows investors to file a lawsuit directly against a host country that is suspected of violating the protection under international law. Capability of investors to "enforce" their rights directly on a country without an arbitration agreement is considered as one of the extraordinary achievements of BIT innovation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 793-835
Author(s):  
Luke Nottage ◽  
Sakda Thanitcul

Abstract Thailand was initially cautious with its bilateral investment treaties (BITs), consistently eschewing investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). From 1989 it began agreeing to ISDS, but only if both states were party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, which Thailand signed in 1965 but never ratified. From 1993, BITs increasingly provided for ad hoc arbitration. Major disputes emerged from the 1990s instead under contracts with foreign investors containing arbitration clauses. From 2004 concession contracts required Cabinet pre-approval. This limitation was extended to all public contracts from 2009, after the first treaty-based ISDS award against Thailand, although two further claims have been filed recently. A 2002 Model bit was revised in 2013 to incorporate more pro-host-state provisions, but Thailand had net foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows in 2011 and still concludes treaties with ISDS. These patterns suggest ‘more than bounded’ rationality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-61
Author(s):  
Ashraf M. A. Elfakharani ◽  
Rohana Abdul Rahman ◽  
Hamza E. Albaheth ◽  
Nor Anita Abdullah

Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), as the name indicates, are meant to govern investment relations between two signatory states. In this context, Egypt holds a significant place among all respondent states, having to face a very high number of legal issues from foreign investors. These cases are pending before several international investment tribunals and Egypt is facing claims of over USD 20 billion annually from its foreign investors. In spite of such a grim situation, there are legal arbitrations that have increased the appearance of Egypt in international arbitration forums. There are several reasons for such a situation to arise, mainly because of the governmental measures towards foreign investors and interests. This article argues that in spite of the unspecified criteria shown towards foreign investors, the Bilateral Investment Treaty's items have played a vital role in increasing Egyptian appearances.


2018 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850018
Author(s):  
Liu Huichun

The construction of China’s free trade zones (FTZs) has levered the evolution of the arbitration regime in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Under the FTZ template, breakthroughs in arbitration have been made in regulations, FTZ arbitration rules, arbitral proceedings and judicial practice. The development of FTZ arbitration mechanism is highlighted with the introduction of new concepts, such as ad hoc arbitration consolidation of arbitration joinder of third parties and model cases, and with the updated or expanded interpretation of the existing concepts, such as permission for the offshore arbitration for WFOEs and FIEs interim measures arbitration in combination with mediation, and the open panel of arbitrators. Regardless of the progress, many issues related to the FTZ arbitration need to be clarified, among which is the amendment of the PRC Arbitration Law and keeping it in line with the mainstream international arbitration, constitute probably the most effective way to promote and guarantee the arbitration evolution.


Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W

This chapter focuses on investment treaty dispute settlement, examining the nature of conflicts between investors and states and the various means provided by treaties to resolve them. In general, investor–state disputes governed by treaties occur because a host state has taken a ‘measure’ that allegedly violates that state's treaty commitments on the treatment it has promised to accord to investments protected by that treaty. Before the advent of investment treaties, investors basically had three methods to seek resolution of their disputes with host states: (a) direct negotiation with host state governments; (b) domestic courts in the host country; and (c) diplomatic protection by their home states. In order to establish a stable, rule-based system for international investment, treaties provide means to resolve disputes about the interpretation and application of treaty provisions. Most investment treaties provide four separate dispute settlement methods: (1) consultations and negotiations between contracting states; (2) arbitration between contracting states; (3) consultations and negotiations between covered investors and host governments; and (4) investor–state arbitration.


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