Causal pathways, random walks, and tortuous paths: Moving from the descriptive to the etiological in psychiatry
Most philosophers of psychiatry as well as psychiatrists themselves believe that instead of revising psychiatric categories, researchers should attempt to discover causal mechanisms that can explain these common clusters of signs and symptoms. But what sorts of causal explanations can realistically be hoped for? We argue here that psychiatric nosologists should aim to construct categories that represent robust patterns in the data that emerge from our best theories. The portmanteau term “robust pattern” introduces two philosophical terms: Dennett’s real patterns, and Wimsatt’s theory of robustness. Robust patterns are best seen heuristically, as categories growing out of empirical theories in response to practical needs. In the case of schizophrenia, we explore how a robust pattern approach might differ from a traditional diagnostic kind as formulated by the DSM. We conclude by considering the ontological status of diagnostic categories viewed as robust patterns, and comparing this with a “natural kinds” approach.