Passivity and Activity in Intentional Actions

Mind ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol XC (357) ◽  
pp. 41-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONALD GUSTAFSON
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Actions

On the Role of Attention and Ascription in the Formation of Intentions within Behavior

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-196
Author(s):  
Michela Summa
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Behavior ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Active Nature

This article explores the roots of action in behavior. Departing from the standard understanding of action as ‘intentional behavior’, we argue that this view is often based on the underestimation of the intentional structures that are already operative within behavior. Distinguishing between a broader and a narrower meaning of intentionality, we then elaborate on the processes that lead from the diffuse and operative intentionality of behavior to the focused intentionality of action. In order to properly appreciate these processes, we show that a reassessment of the phenomenon of attention – which takes into consideration its double (passive and active) nature as well as its social embedment – is required. Finally, we discuss the interplay between the obtained reframing of the genesis of intentional actions with the phenomenon of social ascription

Action and the Problem of Free Will

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Motor Control ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
Control Processes ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Neuronal Processes

This chapter examines the concept of free will as it is discussed in philosophy and neuroscience. It reviews reflective and perceptual theories of agency and argues against neuro-centric conclusions about the illusory nature of free will. Experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet suggest that neural activations prior to conscious awareness predict specific actions. This has been taken as evidence that challenges the traditional notion of free will. Libet’s experiments, arguably, are about motor control processes on an elementary timescale and say nothing about freely willed intentional actions embedded in personal and social contexts that involve longer-term, narrative timescales. One implication of this interpretation is that enactivism is not a form of simple behaviorism. Agency is not a thing reducible to elementary neuronal processes; nor is it an idea or a pure consciousness. It rather involves a structure of complex relations.

scholarly journals GOALIATH: a theory of goal-directed behavior

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Hommel
Keyword(s):  
Driving Forces ◽  
Action Selection ◽  
Action Control ◽  
Event File ◽  
Impact Action ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Operational Characteristics ◽  
Different Origins ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Goal Directed Behavior

AbstractCommonsense and theorizing about action control agree in assuming that human behavior is (mainly) driven by goals, but no mechanistic theory of what goals are, where they come from, and how they impact action selection is available. Here I develop such a theory that is based on the assumption that GOALs guide Intentional Actions THrough criteria (GOALIATH). The theory is intended to be minimalist and parsimonious with respect to its assumptions, as transparent and mechanistic as possible, and it is based on representational assumptions provided by the Theory of Event Coding (TEC). It holds that goal-directed behavior is guided by selection criteria that activate and create competition between event files that contain action-effect codes matching one or more of the criteria—a competition that eventually settles into a solution favoring the best-matching event file. The criteria are associated with various sources, including biological drives, acquired needs (e.g., of achievement, power, or affiliation), and short-term, sometimes arbitrary, instructed aims. Action selection is, thus, a compromise that tries to satisfy various criteria related to different driving forces, which are also likely to vary in strength over time. Hence, what looks like goal-directed action emerges from, and represents an attempt to satisfy multiple constraints with different origins, purposes, operational characteristics, and timescales—which among other things does not guarantee a high degree of coherence or rationality of the eventual outcome. GOALIATH calls for a radical break with conventional theorizing about the control of goal-directed behavior, as it among other things questions existing cognitive-control theories and dual-route models of action control.

scholarly journals The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts

Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Schierbaum
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Faculty Psychology ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
The Mind

AbstractAny account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one’s body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus’s account is close to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ accounts, whereas Ockham’s account is incompatible with them.

Evaluating the sufficiency of proposed security measures in favour of building objects

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-66
Author(s):  
Josef Reitšpís ◽  
Jozefína Drotárová
Keyword(s):  
Limited Area ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Exact Methods ◽  
Technical Standards ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Level Of Knowledge ◽  
Satisfactory Answer

Security is understood as one of the basic life needs of people. However, it is necessary to realize that security is a natural quality of the environment where people live and is designated as a security environment. The need for sacurity is part of implementing sacurity measures that are created in compliance with a certain level of knowledge and needs. The content of this process can be characterized as a set of answers to primary questions (What is to be protected? – protected interest, Why to protect?, What to protect from? – threats) and secondary questions (Who will provide the protection?, How will the protection be provided?, When will the protection be provided?, By means of what will the protection be provided?, What price will the protection be provided for? etc.). From this viewpoint it is necessary to pay attention primarily to the problems concerning property protection from intentional actions focusing on protecting a particular building onject. In case of building objects it is primarily about the protection of tangible and intangible properties that are part of a particular limited area (mostly a building object) that is in possession or administration of a particular state or a private subject. The issues are dealt with by legal regulations, technical standards and various technical books. These usually concentrate on a particular area, kind of a building object and/or environment. However, none of them focuses on the property protection in a complex way and does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question "How to create protection systems in view of their sufficiency, complexity and balance in the technical and economic spheres?" That is why it is a social interest to search for new standardized procedures based on exact methods by means of which it will be possible, in empiric or intuitive ways, to exactly evaluate the effectivness of the existing or proposed property protection systems, including the formal desposition of results in project solutions Keywords: Project, Project documentation, Attack, Intervention and Detection time, Resistance of a building object, Modeling, Simulating

Morality or Modality? What Does the Attribution of Intentionality Depend On?

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bence Nanay
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
A Company

It has been argued that the attribution of intentional actions is sensitive to our moral judgment (Knobe 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, see also Mele 2003, Phelan & Sarkissian 2008). I will examine these arguments and Suggest an alternative explanation for the experiments they are based on.Joshua Knobe conducted the following experiment (Knobe 2003) to support this claim. Subjects were given two vignettes that differed only in one small detail and this difference influenced their attribution of intentionality. The first vignette was the following:The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.’The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don't care at all about harming the environment. I jus)t want to make as much profit as I can. Let's start the new program.’They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.

scholarly journals Water as a weapon in ancient times: considerations of technical and ethical aspects

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 1490-1498
Author(s):  
L. J. Del Giacco ◽  
R. Drusiani ◽  
L. Lucentini ◽  
S. Murtas
Keyword(s):  
Water Contamination ◽  
Health Knowledge ◽  
Water Sources ◽  
Ethical Aspects ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Ancient Times ◽  
The Impact

This paper addresses the issue of how water played a role in ancient conflicts, from the poisoning of water sources to flooding, to stop the advance of enemy armies. It deals with military actions quoted by several ancient Greek and Roman authors, who in some cases narrate these experiences first-hand. Although many abhorred such actions, they were considered tactical expedients to resort to, as cited by the war manuals of the time. The analysis starts from the ‘manual’ Strategemata of Sextus Julius Frontinus, in addition to other references left by historians and chroniclers of different periods. It continues with the evaluation of the impact of the intentional actions of water contamination described by the ancient authors, according to present toxicological and health knowledge.

11. Intentional torts

2021 ◽  
pp. 128-139
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Per Se ◽  
False Imprisonment

This chapter discusses both common law and statute in relation to the torts of trespass to the person: battery, assault, and false imprisonment. These torts have three common characteristics: they are the result of intentional actions, take the form of direct harm, and are actionable per se, that is, without proof of damage. An additional intentional tort is derived from Wilkinson v Downton (1897), the wilful infliction of physical harm upon the claimant by indirect means. This category of intentional harm is also augmented by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Defences to the intentional torts are also discussed.

Answerability Without Reasons

2021 ◽  
pp. 32-53
Author(s):  
Lilian O’Brien
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Actions

It is widely accepted that we are answerable in a special way for our intentional actions. And it is also widely accepted that we are thus answerable because we perform intentional actions for reasons. The aim of this chapter is to argue against this ‘reasons’ view of such answerability. First, reasons are distinguished from practical standards. Then, it is argued that the best interpretation of the practices in which we treat agents as answerable is that they fundamentally concern practical standards rather than reasons. This view shows that we are answerable, not just because we are deliberators, but because we are executive agents whose complex executive capacities open us to criticism.

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