War

Philosophy ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar ◽  
Jonathan Parry
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Basic Problem ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
The Third

Wars are large-scale armed conflicts between two or more organized groups. The basic problem of warfare is that it involves inflicting death and suffering on people, who, in ordinary circumstances, would have fundamental rights that protect them against being treated in these ways. Of course, everyone recognizes that wars are problematic in other respects: they corrupt and destroy institutions and relationships, they waste vast sums of wealth that could be used to remedy entrenched vulnerability, and they cause irreversible and massive damage to the natural environment. These are by no means negligible costs. And yet when considering the ethics of war, most start with the killing and the suffering, because if the killing cannot be justified, then the rest is irrelevant: our only choice is to affirm pacifism. However, justifying the killing is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of justifying wars as a whole. There remain important questions to be asked about how and why the killing may be done. While the permissibility of killing per se provides the philosophical foundations of any theory of just war, the superstructure requires attention to specific questions governing the practice of warfare. In particular, for what reasons may conflict be permissibly initiated? How can we fight permissibly? How can we end wars, and deal with their aftermath, permissibly? The first two—justified resort and justified conduct—correspond to jus ad bellum and jus in bello in historical just war theory. The third is a more novel, less-discussed contribution, coined as jus post bellum by recent scholars. Only a war in which the killing is justified, and which is started, fought, and ended justifiably, can properly be called a just war.

scholarly journals On the Duty to Reconstruct After War: Who is responsible for jus post bellum?

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 403-430
Author(s):  
Lonneke Peperkamp
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Moral Compass ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Post War ◽  
Specific Duty

Many argue that the problems encountered in and after today’s armed conflicts demonstrate the need for norms to govern the aftermath of war. Therefore, jus post bellum is welcomed as a ‘new’ branch of just war theory, complementing the theory’s two traditional branches—jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus post bellum is meant to function as moral compass, offering the needed guidance in the aftermath of war. While many agree on the importance of a third branch, an important question is often overlooked: After war, how should we distribute post war duties? This question deserves more attention, because uncertainty about specific duty bearers might lead to a situation in which no one will properly acquit these duties, and the critique could be raised that jus post bellum is in fact merely empty rhetoric. Two specific questions need answering. First: Which conditions can serve as the foundation for post war duties? Second: How to weigh these conditions when they clash or when they point to different actors? This article directly addresses the foundation for responsibility after war, using David Miller’s and H.L.A. Hart’s theories on responsibility, with an eye to developing a system for assigning post war duties in concrete situations. Only with such a system in place is there a realistic prospect that jus post bellum functions as a useful tool in the creation of a just and stable peace.

10. War and intervention

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Frowe
Keyword(s):  
War On Terror ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
World War ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
The World ◽  
Just War Tradition

This chapter examines the main theoretical approaches to war and the circumstances under which it is permissible to wage war. War is one of the most morally difficult, and morally pressing, aspects of human existence. It nearly always involves killing and maiming on a vast scale. Despite its destructive nature, and despite the rise of rights talk on the international stage and the spread of democracy across large parts of the world, war persists. The chapter first considers the just war tradition and alternatives to just war theory before discussing two theoretical approaches to the ethics of war: collectivism and individualism. It also explores three principles that govern the fighting of war: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. A case study on Afghanistan and the ‘war on terror’ is presented, along with Key Thinkers boxes featuring Michael Walzer and Jeff McMahan.

Restraining the fox: Minimalism in the ethics of war and peace

2021 ◽  
pp. 175508822110347
Author(s):  
Lonneke Peperkamp
Keyword(s):  
Recent Article ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Alternative Concept ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Guiding Principle ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Ethics Of War ◽  
As If

Peace plays a central role in the ethics of war and peace, but this proves to be an enormous challenge. In a recent article, Elisabeth Forster and Isaac Taylor grapple with this important topic. They argue that certain concepts in just war theory—aggression, legitimacy, and peace—are essentially contested and susceptible to manipulation. Because the rules are interpreted and applied by the very states that wage war, it is as if the fox is asked to guard the chicken coop—a recipe for disaster. To avoid manipulation of the theory and make the goal of peace attainable, they defend “minimalism” in the ethics of war and peace. This paper responds to and builds on their article. After nuancing the analysis, I will argue (a) that their minimalism does not solve the problem since the proposed alternative concept is equally prone to misuse, and (b) that their minimalism is mistargeted. What I propose is to specify and ground the rules of war without raising the standard too high, to disentangle jus ad bellum and jus post bellum and see peace as guiding principle for jus post bellum, and to interpret that in a minimalist way.

Robots in Warfare and the Occultation of the Existential Nature of Violence

2015 ◽  
pp. 225-238
Author(s):  
Rick Searle
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Fundamental Characteristic ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Ethical Concerns ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Autonomous Weapons ◽  
Modern War

We are at the cusp of a revolution in the development of autonomous weapons, yet current arguments both for and against such weapons are insufficient to the task at hand. In the context of Just war theory, arguments for and against the use of autonomous weapons focus on Jus in bello and in doing so miss addressing the implications of these weapons for the two other aspects of that theory- Jus ad bellum and Jus post bellum. This paper argues that fully autonomous weapons would likely undermine adherence to the Jus ad bellum and Jus post bellum prescriptions of Just war theory, but remote controlled weapons, if designed with ethical concerns in mind, might improve adherence to all of the theory's prescriptions compared to war as currently waged from a distance, as well as help to undo the occlusion of violence which has been a fundamental characteristic of all forms of modern war.

War’s Aftermath and the Ethics of War

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Fabre
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Full Account ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Partial Agreement ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
The Family ◽  
The One

This chapter offers an account of the role and place of jus post bellum within just war theory and highlights avenues of inquiry on the aftermath of war that have been largely ignored. The author discusses recent arguments to the effect that jus ad bellum and jus in bello exhaust just war theory and that jus post bellum, far from being a key member of the family, in fact does much better as an outsider. The author claims, on the contrary, that there is ample space for jus post bellum within just war theory; in partial agreement with those arguments, however, the author agrees that a full account of the ethics of war’s aftermath must also draw on other fields of normative inquiry and fleshes out in greater details connections and disconnections between jus post bellum on the one hand and the other two jura on the other.

Robots in Warfare and the Occultation of the Existential Nature of Violence

2019 ◽  
pp. 487-500
Author(s):  
Rick Searle
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Fundamental Characteristic ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Ethical Concerns ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Autonomous Weapons ◽  
Modern War

We are at the cusp of a revolution in the development of autonomous weapons, yet current arguments both for and against such weapons are insufficient to the task at hand. In the context of Just war theory, arguments for and against the use of autonomous weapons focus on Jus in bello and in doing so miss addressing the implications of these weapons for the two other aspects of that theory- Jus ad bellum and Jus post bellum. This paper argues that fully autonomous weapons would likely undermine adherence to the Jus ad bellum and Jus post bellum prescriptions of Just war theory, but remote controlled weapons, if designed with ethical concerns in mind, might improve adherence to all of the theory's prescriptions compared to war as currently waged from a distance, as well as help to undo the occlusion of violence which has been a fundamental characteristic of all forms of modern war.

13. War and Intervention

2019 ◽  
pp. 263-283
Author(s):  
Helen Frowe
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
War Literature ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Ethics Of War ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Moral Rules

This chapter assesses war and intervention. Just war theorists share two beliefs: that wars can, at least in theory, sometimes be just, and that the fighting of war is governed by moral rules. Just war theory is usually divided into jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. Jus ad bellum (justice prior to war) sets the conditions under which it is just to declare war. Jus in bello (justice during the war) sets the ‘rules of engagement’, governing the conduct of combatants during a conflict. Jus post bellum (justice after war) deals with topics like war reparations and punishment of aggression and had, until recently, received comparatively little attention in the just war literature. Meanwhile, pacifism and realism offer alternative approaches to the ethics of war.

Just and Unjust Uses of Limited Force

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Berlin Wall ◽  
Special Forces ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Use Context ◽  
Just War Tradition

Limited force—no-fly zones, limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and drones strikes outside “hot” battlefields—has been at the nexus of the moral and strategic debates about just war since the fall of the Berlin Wall but has remained largely under-theorized. The main premise of the book is that limited force is different than war in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical permissions and restraints. By revisiting the major wars animating contemporary just war scholarship (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone “wars,” and Libya) and drawing insights from the just war tradition, this book teases out an ethical account of force-short-of-war. It covers the deliberation about whether to use limited force (jus ad vim), restraints that govern its use (jus in vi), when to stop (jus ex vi), and the after-use context (jus post vim). While these moral categories parallel to some extent their just war counterparts of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and jus ex bello, the book illustrates how they can be reimagined and recalibrated in a limited force context, while also introducing new specific to the dilemmas associated with escalation and risk. As the argument unfolds, the reader will be presented with a view of limited force as a moral alternative to war, exposed to a series of dilemmas that raise challenges regarding when and how limited force is used, and provided with a more precise and morally enriched vocabulary to talk about limited force and the responsibilities its use entails.

Just War Theory & the Conduct of Asymmetric Warfare

Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Allen S. Weiner
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Asymmetric Warfare

A central element of the dominant view of just war theory is the moral equality of soldiers: combatants have equal rights to wage war against one another and are entitled to certain protections if captured, without regard to which side's cause of war is just. But whether and how this principle should apply in asymmetric armed conflicts between states and nonstate groups is profoundly unsettled. I argue that we should confer war rights on fighters for nonstate groups when they are engaged in violence that has risen to the level of armed conflict, and when the state against which the war is being waged is not entitled to assert its monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force, either because 1) the nonstate group has established sufficient control over territory to assert its own governing authority; or 2) because the group is located abroad. Conferring war rights on nonstate fighters does not, however, permit them to engage in acts that violate the laws of war. Fighters who commit such violations are individually subject to prosecution without regard to their group's entitlement to war rights.

Ending War

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rodin
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Moral Assessment

In “The Ethics of America's Afghan War,” Richard W. Miller argues that reflecting on whether and how to end the war in Afghanistan exposes serious deficiencies in just war theory. I agree, though for different reasons than those canvassed by Professor Miller. Miller argues that by focusing on the traditional categories of just cause, proportionality, and necessity (or last resort), just war theory obscures the importance of broader geostrategic considerations that he believes are the most plausible—though ultimately for Miller insufficient—rationale for continuing with the strategy of large-scale counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. I doubt that geostrategic considerations can play the role in moral assessment that Miller believes they do. But the phenomena he is pointing to do illuminate important defects in traditional just war theory.

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