Posthuman Bliss?

Author(s):  
Susan B. Levin

Transhumanists urge us to pursue the biotechnological heightening of select capacities, above all, cognitive ability, so far beyond any human ceiling that the beings with those capacities would exist on a higher ontological plane. Because transhumanists tout humanity’s self-transcendence via science and technology, and suggest that bioenhancement may be morally required, the human stakes of how we respond to transhumanism are unprecedented and immense. In Posthuman Bliss? The Failed Promise of Transhumanism, Susan B. Levin challenges transhumanists’ overarching commitments regarding the mind, brain, ethics, liberal democracy, knowledge, and reality in a more thoroughgoing and integrated way than has occurred thus far. Her critique shows transhumanists’ notion of humanity’s self-transcendence into “posthumanity” to be pure, albeit seductive, fantasy. Levin’s philosophical conclusions would stand even if, as transhumanists proclaim, science and technology supported their vision of posthumanity. They offer breezy assurances that posthumans will emerge if we but allocate sufficient resources to that end. Yet, far from offering theoretical and practical “proof of concept” for the vision that they urge upon us, transhumanists engage inadequately with cognitive psychology, biology, and neuroscience, often relying on questionable or outdated views within those fields. Having shown in depth why transhumanism should be rejected, Levin defends a holistic perspective on living well that is rooted in Aristotle’s virtue ethics but adapted to liberal democracy. This holism is thoroughly human, in the best of senses. We must jettison transhumanists’ fantasy, both because their arguments fail and because transhumanism fails to do us justice.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Susan B. Levin

Optimally, would decisions be reached by reason alone? Would existence be better if we felt only pleasure, having excised the capacity to experience anything deemed unpleasant? Are key societal challenges we face rooted in human biology, to which, therefore, we should look for solutions? Such questions draw our attention to contending values and aspirations in today’s debate over human enhancement. The stakes of how this debate turns out are highest for transhumanism, whose proponents urge humanity’s self-transcendence via science and technology. In this introduction, Susan B. Levin states that Posthuman Bliss? The Failed Promise of Transhumanism will challenge transhumanists’ views of the mind, brain, ethics, liberal democracy, knowledge, and reality in a thoroughgoing and integrated way. Against the backdrop of this critique, the author will defend a perspective on living well that incorporates insights from Aristotle’s virtue ethics but is adapted to the ideas and promise of liberal democracy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 04057
Author(s):  
Shengfang Peng ◽  
Baoying Peng ◽  
Xiaoxuan Li

In recent years, embodied cognition has become a new approach in the field of cognitive psychology. The shift in cognitive psychology from a focus on the brain to a focus on the human body,just as from the disembodied cognition to the embodied cognition is valuable for many fields related to cognitive science including product design and its method. With Gibson’s theory of affordances, embodied cognition is a perfect explanation of today’s products guided by the idea of intuitive design and its logic. On the premise of embodied cognition, it is the “Mind-Body complex” that serves as the subject of behavior and interaction, the basis of “natural interaction” in Intelligent age, and the foundation for building a more complete theory of “user experience”. Based on the embodied cognitive, the method of design and its research should put more emphasis on specific tools.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095935432110538
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Rucińska

Review of psychological data of how children engage in imaginary friend play (IFP) shows that it involves a lot of explicit embodied action and interaction with surrounding people and environments. However, IFP is still seen as principally an individualistic activity, where, in addition to those interactions, the actor has to mentally represent an absent entity in imagination in order to engage in IFP. This capacity is deemed necessary because the imaginary companion is absent or not real. This article proposes a proof of concept argument that enactivism can account for complex imaginary phenomena as imaginary friend play. Enactivism proposes thinking of IFP in a fundamentally different way, as an explicitly embodied and performative act, where one does not need to mentally represent absent entities. It reconceptualizes imagination involved in IFP as strongly embodied, and proposes that play environments have present affordances for social and normative interactions that are reenacted in IFP—there is no “absence” that needs to be mentally represented first. This article argues that IFP is performed and enacted in the world without having to be represented in the mind first, which best captures the social and interactive nature of this form of play.


Author(s):  
Fernando Blanco ◽  
Helena Matute

In the last decades, cognitive Psychology has provided researchers with a powerful background and the rigor of experimental methods to better understand why so many people believe in pseudoscience, paranormal phenomena and superstitions. According to recent evidence, those irrational beliefs could be the unintended result of how the mind evolved to use heuristics and reach conclusions based on scarce and incomplete data. Thus, we present visual illusions as a parallel to the type of fast and frugal cognitive bias that underlies pseudoscientific belief. In particular, we focus on the causal illusion, which consists of people believing that there is a causal link between two events that coincide just by chance. The extant psychological theories that can account for this causal illusion are described, as well as the factors that are able to modulate the bias. We also discuss that causal illusions are adaptive under some circumstances, although they often lead to utterly wrong beliefs. Finally, we mention several debiasing strategies that have been proved effective in fighting the causal illusion and preventing some of its consequences, such as pseudoscientific belief.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 477-492
Author(s):  
Ryan Nichols ◽  
Henrike Moll ◽  
Jacob L. Mackey

AbstractThis essay discusses Cecilia Heyes’ groundbreaking new book Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking. Heyes’ point of departure is the claim that current theories of cultural evolution fail adequately to make a place for the mind. Heyes articulates a cognitive psychology of cultural evolution by explaining how eponymous “cognitive gadgets,” such as imitation, mindreading and language, mental technologies, are “tuned” and “assembled” through social interaction and cultural learning. After recapitulating her explanations for the cultural and psychological origins of these gadgets, we turn to criticisms. Among those, we find Heyes’ use of evolutionary theory confusing on several points of importance; alternative theories of cultural evolution, especially those of the Tomasello group and of Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, are misrepresented; the book neglects joint attention and other forms of intersubjectivity in its explanation of the origins of cognitive gadgets; and, whereas Heyes accuses other theories of being “mindblind,” we find her theory ironically other-blind and autistic in character.


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-368
Author(s):  
Endre Dányi

How to engage with the recent crisis of liberal democracy in a politically productive manner? Using the example of Hungary, the first part of this article contrasts two empirical strategies. The first takes inspiration from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and explores the conditions of critique within the architecture and infrastructure of liberal democracy. The second empirical strategy turns to a novel by László Krasznahorkai and a film by Béla Tarr, and engages with the problem of critique through búskomorság. This common Hungarian word refers to a sad-sombre sentiment that is both collective and thoroughly political. The second part of the article focuses on an exhibition created by Béla Tarr that combined these two empirical strategies in a generative way. With the help of the exhibition and recent empirical examples, the article outlines what could be called búskomor politics – a set of critical practices that take place not so much within the architecture and the infrastructure of liberal democracy as amid its ruins.


1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Jonides ◽  
Patricia Reuter-Lorenz

AbstractPosner & Raichle illustrate how neuroimaging blends profitably with neuropsychology and electrophysiology to advance cognitive theory. Recognizing that there are limitations to each of these techniques, we nonetheless argue that their confluence has fundamentally changed the way cognitive psychologists think about problems of the mind.


Author(s):  
David Clarke

Our understanding of the numerous and significant problems of consciousness is inseparable from the often incommensurable disciplinary frameworks through which the topic has been approached. Music may offer a range of perspectives on consciousness, some issuing from interdisciplinary alliances (such as with cognitive psychology and neuroscience), others tapping into what is distinctively musical about music and what music shares with comparable aesthetic formations. Philosophically speaking, music might afford valuable complementary perspectives to approaches within the empirical sciences that see consciousness as essentially a computational process (Pinker, Dennett), or as solely an epiphenomenon of neural activity within the brain. This chapter will look to experiences of music that support views of the mind as extended and embodied, and that see consciousness as ecologically bound up with Being-in-the-world, to adopt notions from Gibson and Heidegger respectively. In this way, music studies can make a contribution to the philosophical study of consciousness from epistemological, phenomenological, and ontological standpoints.


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