A Theory of Stratified Expansion of Social Welfare

Author(s):  
Xian Huang

Chapter 2 presents a supply-side theory that explains the political logic and distributive characteristics of social welfare provision in the Chinese authoritarian setting. The theory takes into account the logic of authoritarian regime survival, multilevel governance and local political economies, and specifies the main political actors and their interests and strategies in Chinese social welfare provision. It argues that authoritarian leaders, whose basic interest lies in regime survival and stability, use stratifying and expansive social welfare policies to privilege elites and placate the masses. To explain the stratified social welfare expansion in the Chinese authoritarian yet decentralized setting, it is necessary to disaggregate the authoritarian state and to examine divergences in policy preferences among different levels of the authoritarian state and the factors that shape the dynamics of interaction between them, ultimately with an eye toward the impact of these divergences and interactions on policy implementation and outcomes.

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 2943-2964
Author(s):  
Xudong Lin ◽  
Xiaoli Huang ◽  
Shuilin Liu ◽  
Yulin Li ◽  
Hanyang Luo ◽  
...  

With the rapid development of information technology, digital platforms can collect, utilize, and share large amounts of specific information of consumers. However, these behaviors may endanger information security, thus causing privacy concerns among consumers. Considering the information sharing among firms, this paper constructs a two-period duopoly price competition Hotelling model, and gives insight into the impact of three different levels of privacy regulations on industry profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The results show that strong privacy protection does not necessarily make consumers better off, and weak privacy protection does not necessarily hurt consumers. Information sharing among firms will lead to strong competitive effects, which will prompt firms to lower the price for new customers, thus damaging the profits of firms, and making consumers’ surplus higher. The level of social welfare under different privacy regulations depends on consumers’ product-privacy preference, and the cost of information coordination among firms. With the cost of information coordination among firms increasing, it is only in areas where consumers have greater privacy preferences that social welfare may be optimal under the weak regulation.


Author(s):  
Cybelle Fox

This concluding chapter summarizes the principal findings and offers some reflections on the boundaries of social citizenship and the role of race and immigration in American social welfare provision. Taken together, the treatment of blacks, Mexicans, and European immigrants provides a nuanced picture of how race, citizenship, and nativity served as dividing lines between those who were judged worthy of assistance and those who were not. Despite persistent and widespread nativism, European immigrants were included within the boundaries of social citizenship while Mexicans were left on the periphery, granted limited inclusion at times, completely excluded at other times, and in some instances expelled from the nation entirely. Ultimately, the different treatment of blacks, European immigrants and Mexicans reflected the worlds each group inhabited—worlds bound by both regional political economies and each group's social position.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
REZA HASMATH ◽  
ANDREW W. MACDONALD

AbstractThe social welfare of ethnic minorities is a contested subject with a deep politicalised history in contemporary China. This article uses a new large dataset solely looking at ethnic minorities in China, to analyse the impact and outcomes that new urban social and welfare schemes – with notable attention to the basic medical insurance, and the minimum livelihood guarantee allowance (dibao) – have on the livelihoods of minorities. The data suggests that, contrary to the pro-minority rhetoric of the state, minority participation in social welfare programmes is predicated on the incentive set of local government officials. These findings have strong implications for constructing future social welfare policies, and for understanding their potential differential impact on ethnic minority cohorts.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 858-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles F. Cnudde ◽  
Donald J. Mccrone

Recent comparative, quantitative studies of state politics conclude that party competition and other political variables have little or no impact on important state policies such as per pupil expenditure, old age assistance, unemployment compensation, and aid to dependent children. These are rather unexpected and disturbing conclusions for they disconfirm relationships predicted by some of the most important theoretical formulations concerning democratic politics. Before re-examining the bases for these conclusions, a review of theory is in order.V. O. Key, Jr., set the context for examining the effects of political variables on state policies. He stressed the importance of two-party competition, or bi-factionalism in one-party states, as a determinant of policy. Key sees the degree of party competition as crucial because it reflects the extent to which politics is organized or unorganized. Party competition by producing some semblance of an organized politics lessens the difficulty of lower status groups in sorting out political actors and issues, thereby enabling them to promote their own interests more effectively. Since state social welfare policies are undoubtedly relevant to the interests of “have-nots,” we can utilize state expenditures in this area as a measure of the success that these groups have enjoyed. Key's formulation, then, would lead to a simple two variable model:P = e1S = k1P + ezWhere P is inter-party competition, S is expenditure on social welfare, and e1 and ez represent error or variables left out of the system, and k1 is a constant.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019251212090711
Author(s):  
Yichen Guan

A large body of literature suggests that ethnic diversity matters to social welfare provision in democracies by lowering the demand for public projects, but it does not look at the impact of ethnic diversity on social welfare provision in authoritarian regimes. By analyzing county-level data on ethnic composition and public spending on social welfare in China, this study finds that in an authoritarian settings, ethnic diversity is correlated with a higher share of social welfare spending. Despite the divergent preferences people may have for social welfare provision due to ethnic diversity, local Chinese government tends to provide a larger share of social welfare spending in ethnically fragmented places to improve the general well-being of the population and maintain regime stability. This finding extends our understanding of the relationship between ethnic diversity and social welfare provision in non-democratic settings, shedding new light on how regime type affects the shaping of local fiscal policy.


2014 ◽  
Vol 56 (01) ◽  
pp. 120-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Grassi

AbstractThis article aims to assess how democracy affects social welfare by analyzing Uruguay and Paraguay, one country with a vibrant democratic history and a progressive political landscape, the other with a generally authoritarian past and a conservative dominant party. The article maintains that welfare systems in these countries have been critically shaped by the impact of democracy, or by its absence, and by the strategies adopted by major social and political actors, especially parties; these strategies have been determined, in turn, by parties' ideologies and by the workings of electoral competition. The article also emphasizes that the impact of democracy on social welfare is critically mediated by the role of previous welfare legacies, the presence of welfare constituencies defending acquired rights and privileges, and social and economic variables, such as overall wealth levels, the formal or informal nature of labor markets, and the political organization of domestic economies.


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