History of Science, Black-Boxing Style

Black Boxes ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 136-161
Author(s):  
Marco J. Nathan
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Founding Father ◽  
Black Boxes ◽  
History Of

This chapter revisits the earlier case studies from the perspective of the present analysis of black boxes. By breaking down these episodes into the three main steps outlined in Chapter 5, one is able to see how it was possible for Darwin to provide a simple and elegant explanation of such a complex, overarching explanandum: distributions of organisms and traits across the globe. It also explains why Mendel is rightfully considered the founding father of genetics, despite having virtually no understanding of what genes are, how they work, and even if they existed from a physiological perspective. Furthermore, if Darwin and Mendel are praised for skillfully setting the mechanisms of inheritance and variation aside, and keeping them out of their explanations, why is Skinner criticized for providing essentially the same treatment of mental states? Finally, the analysis sheds light on the contemporary dispute over the goals and methodology of economics.

Lessons from the History of Science

Black Boxes ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 49-81
Author(s):  
Marco J. Nathan
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Black Box ◽  
Neoclassical Economics ◽  
Response Models ◽  
Stimulus Response ◽  
Black Boxes ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Brain

This chapter provides four historical illustrations of black boxes. The first two originate from two intellectual giants in the field of biology. Darwin acknowledged the existence and significance of the mechanisms of inheritance. But he had no adequate proposal to offer. How could his explanations work so well, given that a crucial piece of the puzzle was missing? A similar shadow is cast on the work of Mendel and his early-twentieth-century followers, the so-called classical geneticists, who posited genes having little to no evidence of the nature, structure, or even the physical reality of these theoretical constructs. Another illustration is found in the elimination of mental states from the stimulus-response models advanced by psychological behaviorism. A final example comes from neoclassical economics, whose “as if” approach presupposes that the brain can be treated as a black box, essentially setting neuropsychological realism aside. The history of science, the chapter concludes, is essentially a history of black boxes.

scholarly journals Using History as Evidence in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Critique

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
History Of

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.

scholarly journals REFORMATION AND THE DISTRUST OF THE PROJECTOR IN THE HARTLIB CIRCLE

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
KOJI YAMAMOTO
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Shared Experience ◽  
Useful Knowledge ◽  
New Synthesis ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
History Of

ABSTRACTCase-studies of the circle of Samuel Hartlib, one of the most prolific groups of reformers in post-Reformation Europe, are flourishing. The uncovering of rich details has, however, made it difficult to draw a meaningful generalization about the circle's bewilderingly wide range of activities. Focusing on the circle's promotion of ‘useful knowledge’, this article offers an analytical framework for building a new synthesis. The eclectic and seemingly chaotic pursuit of useful knowledge emerged, it will be shown, as differing responses to, and interpretations of, pervasive distrust and the pursuit of reformation. The article thus explores how loosely-shared experience shaped the circle's ambivalent practices of collaboration and exclusion. The study thereby contributes not only to studies of the Hartlib circle, but also to the historiography of post-Reformation culture and burgeoning studies of trust and credibility in the history of science and technology.

„Gentlemen in, Genuine Knowledge out“? Zum Status wissenschaftlicher Normen für die Erkenntnissicherung

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Huber
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Engineering ◽  
Transgenic Mice ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Scientific Practices ◽  
History Of ◽  
Genuine Knowledge

ZusammenfassungCase studies in the history of science and technology have shown that scientific norms, so called standards, contribute significantly to the evolution of scientific practices. They arise predominantly, but not exclusively, on the basis of interactions with instruments of measurement and other technical devices. As regards experimental practices standards are mandatory preparatory procedures in a variety of designs, including the inbreeding and genetic engineering of experimental organisms (e.g. transgenic mice). I claim that scientific norms not only regulate mere technical preconditions of research but also guide experimental practices, for example with regard to the stabilisation and validation of phenomena. Against this background, the paper introduces different kinds of scientific norms and elaborates on the question if they are means to epistemic ends (e.g. stability).

Explication Work for Science and Philosophy

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jutta Schickore
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Historical Accuracy ◽  
History Of ◽  
Professional History

Abstract This article disentangles the various assumptions and expectations tied to case studies, to testing philosophy through cases, and to historical adequacy. Several notions of historical adequacy are distinguished: 1) adequacy to the standards of professional history of science, 2) historical accuracy, i.e. capturing the historical record, 3) relevance of historical episodes to the epistemic interests of philosophers of science, and 4) withstanding tests by historical cases. I argue that philosophers’ preoccupation with historical adequacy is misplaced if we understand “historical adequacy” as adequacy to professional history of science, capturing the historical record, a path to philosophical discovery, or as a test. In the last part of the article, I identify two important roles for philosophically informed studies of science: case studies of current issues can do explication work for the sciences. Tracing the history of philosophical reflections in past science can do explication work in the service of philosophy. Both kinds of endeavors are worthwhile but have very different goals and should not be conflated.

Philological Observation

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Christian Flow
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Art History ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Founding Father ◽  
Recent Interest ◽  
History Of ◽  
Shed Light

Scholars have shown that historicizing studies of sight can shed light on everything from art history to statecraft to scientific inquiry. But the disciplined eye of the scholar of language—the philological observer—has received little attention, an omission particularly worthy of notice given recent interest in how the history of humanities might be incorporated into the history of science more broadly. This article contributes to a treatment of philological observation in the nineteenth century. Focusing particularly on the career of the Munich Latinist Eduard Wölfflin (1831–1908), a founding father of the monumental Latin lexicon known as the Thesaurus linguae Latinae, it isolates three distinct modes of philological observation: the constitutive, the collative, and the estimative. In the process, it indicates parallels between the kinds of sight practiced by philologists and those of their contemporaries in other investigative arenas, showing how developments on a Latinist's desk can be tied into much larger networks of cultural and epistemic concerns

scholarly journals The Non-Miraculous Success of Formal Analogies in Quantum Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 255-275
Author(s):  
Doreen Fraser
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Higgs Model ◽  
Historical Case ◽  
Quantum Theories ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
History Of

The Higgs model was developed using purely formal analogies to models of superconductivity. This is in contrast to historical case studies such as the development of electromagnetism, which employed physical analogies. As a result, quantum case studies such as the development of the Higgs model carry new lessons for the scientific (anti-)realism debate. Chapter 13 argues that, by breaking the connection between success and approximate truth, the use of purely formal analogies is a counterexample to two prominent versions of the ‘No Miracles’ Argument (NMA) for scientific realism: Stathis Psillos’ Refined Explanationist Defense of Realism and the Argument from History of Science for structural realism. The NMA is undermined, but the success of the Higgs model is not miraculous because there is a naturalistically acceptable explanation for its success that does not invoke approximate truth. The chapter also suggests some possible strategies for adapting to the counterexample for scientific realists who wish to hold on to the NMA in some form.

scholarly journals In defense of epicycles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar D Endress
Keyword(s):  
Associative Learning ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Bayesian Models ◽  
Rule Learning ◽  
Learning Problems ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
History Of ◽  
Bayesian Models Of Cognition

As simpler scientific theories are preferable to more convoluted ones, it is plausible to assume (and widely assumed, especially in recent Bayesian models of cognition) that biological learners are also guided by simplicity considerations when acquiring mental representations, and that formal measures of complexity might indicate which learning problems are harder and which ones are easier. However, the history of science suggests that simpler scientific theories are not necessarily more useful if more convoluted ones make calculations easier. Here, I suggest that a similar conclusion applies to mental representations. Using case studies from perception, associative learning and rule learning, I show that formal measures of complexity critically depend on assumptions about the underlying representational and processing primitives and are generally unrelated to what is actually easy to learn and process in humans. An empirically viable notion of complexity thus need to take into consideration the representational and processing primitives that are available to actual learners even if this leads to formally complex explanations.

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