Lessons from the History of Science

Black Boxes ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 49-81
Author(s):  
Marco J. Nathan

This chapter provides four historical illustrations of black boxes. The first two originate from two intellectual giants in the field of biology. Darwin acknowledged the existence and significance of the mechanisms of inheritance. But he had no adequate proposal to offer. How could his explanations work so well, given that a crucial piece of the puzzle was missing? A similar shadow is cast on the work of Mendel and his early-twentieth-century followers, the so-called classical geneticists, who posited genes having little to no evidence of the nature, structure, or even the physical reality of these theoretical constructs. Another illustration is found in the elimination of mental states from the stimulus-response models advanced by psychological behaviorism. A final example comes from neoclassical economics, whose “as if” approach presupposes that the brain can be treated as a black box, essentially setting neuropsychological realism aside. The history of science, the chapter concludes, is essentially a history of black boxes.

Black Boxes ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 136-161
Author(s):  
Marco J. Nathan

This chapter revisits the earlier case studies from the perspective of the present analysis of black boxes. By breaking down these episodes into the three main steps outlined in Chapter 5, one is able to see how it was possible for Darwin to provide a simple and elegant explanation of such a complex, overarching explanandum: distributions of organisms and traits across the globe. It also explains why Mendel is rightfully considered the founding father of genetics, despite having virtually no understanding of what genes are, how they work, and even if they existed from a physiological perspective. Furthermore, if Darwin and Mendel are praised for skillfully setting the mechanisms of inheritance and variation aside, and keeping them out of their explanations, why is Skinner criticized for providing essentially the same treatment of mental states? Finally, the analysis sheds light on the contemporary dispute over the goals and methodology of economics.


2006 ◽  
pp. 76-91
Author(s):  
J. R. Kantor

2002 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 443-448
Author(s):  
Marilyn Williams

The use of surgical procedures to alter mental states raises many issues. Surgery on the brain has been known for thousands of years, but procedures developed in the 1930s, ‘40s and ‘50s, and the reasons for them, raised many ethical issues that remain with us today. The following article touches on the history of psychosurgery, the conditions treated, the literature on the subject, and the ethical and legal issues.


Osiris ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 194-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy J. Nersessian

Author(s):  
Marco J. Nathan

Textbooks and other popular venues commonly present science as a progressive “brick-by-brick” accumulation of knowledge and facts. Despite its hallowed history and familiar ring, this depiction is nowadays rejected by most specialists. Then why are books and articles, written by these same experts, actively promoting such a distorted characterization? The short answer is that no better alternative is available. There currently are two competing models of the scientific enterprise: reductionism and antireductionism. Neither provides an accurate depiction of the productive interaction between knowledge and ignorance, supplanting the old metaphor of the “wall” of knowledge. This book explores an original conception of the nature and advancement of science. The proposed shift brings attention to a prominent, albeit often neglected, construct—the black box—which underlies a well-oiled technique for incorporating a productive role of ignorance and failure into the acquisition of empirical knowledge. What is a black box? How does it work? How is it constructed? How does one determine what to include and what to leave out? What role do boxes play in contemporary scientific practice? By detailing some fascinating episodes in the history of biology, psychology, and economics, Nathan revisits foundational questions about causation, explanation, emergence, and progress, showing how the insights of both reductionism and antireductionism can be reconciled into a fresh and exciting approach to science.


1970 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. R. J. Shea

Until fairly recently a common way of doing history of science was to pick up an important strand of contemporary scientific thought and to trace its origin back to the philosophical tangle of the scientific revolution. This approach conveniently by-passed the breakdowns of once useful and pervasive theories, and neglected the long intellectual journeys along devious routes. History of science read like a success story; the pioneers who failed were neither dismissed nor excused; they were simply ignored. The historian knew what he was hunting for and he was careful to limit his search to areas where his quarry was sure to be found. This method, which has been dubbed the precursor-view, stands in contrast—albeit, not in opposition—to the contextual method, which aims at a better understanding of the actual thought-processes of the early scientists. On this second view, history of science must not only account for present theories in the light of past developments, it must also assess old theories in terms of the scientist's conceptual framework, and judge them against the background of the world picture of his age. This may lead the historian down the blind alleys of the past, chasing spurious attempts at explaining the nature of physical reality, but it can clear the ground for a less anachronistic interpretation of the emergence of modern science and the actual process of discovery. History of science acts as a winnowing fork, but we cannot suppose that the discoverer himself always separated the wheat from the chaff, and we must be ever wary of equating the dream with the task.


Author(s):  
Nancy Hebben ◽  
Margaret O'Connor

The Veterans Administration’s response to WWII altered the fields of psychology and neurology and made it possible for the Boston VA Hospital to evolve into an environment where neuropsychology, aphasiology, and behavioral neurology could jointly flourish. Starting with Harold Goodglass, Edith Kaplan, and Norman Geschwind in the 1950s, a multi-disciplinary group of clinicians and scientists helped usher in a transition from holistic “black box” empiricist models of the brain to models that were more localizationist and modular. Under the influence of this pioneering trio of astute observers, experimentalists, and thinkers, the Boston VA became the epicenter of basic research in human cognitive and behavioral neuroscience in the world. While signaling a revolution in psychology that unified neurobiology and behavioral principles, the work done at the Boston VA established a direct link from this neuroscience of the mind to patient care, especially as it affected the veterans of the United States.


Author(s):  
Suparna Roychoudhury

This chapter offers a reading of the most famous Shakespearean lines on imagination, a speech by Theseus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, arguing that this speech presents not a unified but a pluralistic idea of what imagination is—a story; a section of the brain; a shape; a substance. To account for this variegation, the chapter summarizes the long intellectual history of imagination, emphasizing the cognitive or psychological tradition founded by Aristotle. The chapter then examines the complex and often confused early modern discourse of imagination, arguing that these confusions indicate the ways in which proto-scientific fields were destabilizing faculty psychology. To understand Theseus’ polysemic idea of imagination, and Shakespeare’s more generally, we must explore the various contexts in which imagination’s earlier philosophy was tested or recast by the early modern history of science; these contexts will be explored in subsequent chapters.


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