Responsibility without Resentment
Why has responsibility been so central to normative theorizing about the criminal law, even as its significance in other areas of political philosophy is diminished? This chapter considers several arguments. First, responsibility is of special concern for the criminal law because reactive attitudes such as blame and punishment are indispensable to our sense of ourselves as responsible agents. Second, when we are faced with actual criminal wrongdoing, we are called upon to respond with blame and punishment, no matter how much we are invested in other means of dealing with crime: the criminal law is inherently retributive and retrospective. Finally, responsibility means people can be liable to harm in ways that are inconsistent with democratic equality. This chapter is devoted to showing why none of these arguments is compelling. Taking responsibility seriously does not require any particular level of public investment in punishment, nor does it imply any particular level of public investment in retrospective punishment as against prospective prevention. Moreover, while people can in certain circumstances render themselves liable to defensive harm through their wrongful acts, this does not entail that public institutions are entitled to discount the rights and interests of the guilty relative to those of the innocent. In short, skepticism about punishment need not rest upon skepticism about responsibility.