The Great Society and the Politics of Assured Destruction, 1963–1966
This chapter shows how Lyndon Baines Johnson and Robert McNamara attempted to reconcile the US emphasis on nuclear superiority with the administration’s new Great Society program and the consequent need to limit military spending. McNamara’s strategy of assured destruction tried to balance these imperatives by positing that the Soviet Union would not attempt to gain nuclear parity with the United States because it had forces sufficient to assure America’s destruction if it attacked the USSR. Assured destruction also left the United States’ antiballistic missile program in a state of perpetual research and development. This was partly due to its ineffectiveness, but also because the expense of deployment would endanger the administration’s budgetary priorities, particularly after the escalation of the Vietnam War. An unexpected Soviet nuclear buildup upset this balance between budgetary control and strategic coherence, necessitating an American diplomatic approach to the Soviet Union for talks on limiting strategic armaments.